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ABSTRACT
This study uses Mikhail Bakhtin’s chronotope, which is the informing principle of
one’s experience of space and time, to explore different relations among space, time,
actors, and audience in medieval theatre. Relations between the material and spiritual
worlds as understood in the Middle Ages are considered in the context of relations
between performers and audience members with two goals. First, I explore how the
ontological status of the metaworld created through performance changed in the context
of specific chronotopes. Second, I explore how diverse religious discourses affected
medieval modes of representation.
This study posits three chronotopes of performance informing medieval theatrical
experience. In the sacramental chronotope, disciplined bodies moved through spiritual
geographies in Latin liturgical dramas to bring participants into contact with an
ontologically superior divine world. The consubstantial chronotope operated from an
ontology of self-sufficiency locating power in the individual’s body rather than in a
superior being. Within the consubstantial chronotope, performance, and representation
more generally, was understood as a tool for the contemplation of ideas rather than as a
vehicle for bringing performers into contact with an ontologically substantive world.
The transubstantial chronotope works within an ontology of community that
constructs performances as sites of cultural contestation and engagement. The communal
mystery plays performed on Corpus Christi day in medieval England created a space and
time for communicative bodies to tell shared narratives in a ritual effort to strengthen,
purify, and heal souls. Performance within the transubstantial chronotope was uniquely
open to metalinguistic and dialogic play, allowing the imaginative metaworld of the
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performance to function as innerly persuasive discourse possessing its own ontological
weight and agency.
Having explored these three chronotopes, this study examines the
heterochronotopic quality of medieval English morality plays. I conclude with an
analysis of a recent production of the Chester mystery cycle, Yimmimingaliso: The
Mysteries. Using a variety of different languages in performance, as well as different
languages of performance, this production evoked something of the transubstantial
chronotope of medieval England.
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CHAPTER 1
CHRONOTOPIC CONSCIOUSNESS IN PERFORMANCE
Three Preludes
One: The late tenth century; an English monastery
It is around two o’clock on Easter morning, the celebration of our Risen Lord.
The air is dark and chilly, and a bit damp, as I rise from my monastic cell, pull on my
scratchy robes, and tramp over muddy ground until I reach the church. It is Matins, the
first office of the day, and today’s office is a special one. The bells of the abbey have
called me to this service, joyfully announcing a change in the world. Throughout the
previous Passion week, “the church was progressively stripped of its finery and
darkened” (Harris 29). By Good Friday the church had become a cemetery with one
buried soul—a cross representing our Lord Jesus, which was “laid in the ‘sepulchre’
[near the altar, and then] an actual burial ceremony was pronounced over it” (Harris 29).
The world grew dark this week, a single Paschal candle illuminating the church as a
symbol of the darkened world redeemed only by the promise of the Saviour’s
resurrection. And now that resurrection has come.
I walk with others in procession around the altar, now lit with seven sacred
candles, the bells still pealing. The procession travels around the church, eventually
returning to the curtained structure to the side of the altar that serves as the “sepulchre” of
Christ on this day. As has been the case for years now, that which Ethelwold wrote in his
Regularis Concordia determines what happens next:
While the third lesson is being recited, let four brethren vest themselves;
of whom let one, wearing an alb, enter as if on other business, and go
unobtrusively to the place of the sepulchre, and there, holding a palm in
his hand, let him sit quietly. While the third responsory is being sung, let

1

the remaining three follow, all of them vested in copes, bearing in their
hands thuribles with incense; and haltingly, in the manner of seeking for
something, let them come before the place of the sepulchre. (Bevington,
Medieval Drama 27)
I glance over at one of the novices, who seems pleasantly surprised by the sudden shift as
the formerly “unobtrusive” brother stands and becomes part of the ceremony.
This brother, bearing the symbol of God’s heavenly host in his hand, now takes
the role of the angel at Jesus’ tomb. He begins to sing “in a sweet and moderate voice”:
“Quem quaeritis in sepulchro, o Christicolae?” (“Whom do you seek in the sepulchre, O
followers of Christ?”). To which the three seekers respond, “Jhesum Nazarenum
crucifixum, o caelicola” (Jesus of Nazareth, who was crucified, O heaven-dweller”). The
heaven-dweller joyfully replies, “Non est hic…” (He is not here). Our Lord is risen, and
songs rise to announce his triumph (Bevington, Medieval Drama 27). And through my
participant-observation of this service, I have both witnessed the divine miracle and
announced that miracle to the world.
*****
Two: The early fifteenth century, York, England
Spring has come to York, yet the afternoon air is still crisp, and a low gray sky
hovers over Micklegate Road. Rain has threatened the Corpus Christi pageant
throughout the day, but thus far, no drops have fallen and the pageant has been most
enjoyable. I am one of the fortunate souls to have paid for a good seat at the fourth
station, the one near St. John’s church, just before the rise of the Ouse Bridge that the
wagon-handlers must struggle over. I take another sip of ale as I hear applause coming
from the third station. Soon the pageant telling the story of Christ’s crucifixion will be
here. Someone to my left in the stands mutters, “About time!” But this wait is a familiar
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one; I have actually come to enjoy the little breaks that come between performances
when one of the wagons begins to lag behind. It’s certainly better than when two
pageants sit at one station together, with all the fuss of the next pageant taking attention
away from the one currently in performance.
At last the wagon arrives, and the players begin to set up. The crowd on the
streets gathers around the wagon in anticipation. From behind the wagon appear four
men dressed as soldiers escorting another man dressed in ragged white robes. I recognize
the man in the robes as Geoff, one of the local ironmongers who has done some good
work for me in the past. Now, however, he is bullied up onto the wagon by four brutish
clods. The soldiers discuss their cruel assignment while Christ stands mute; then, after a
brief prayer to the Father, Christ willingly lays down on the cross for our sins.
What follows next horrifies some, but prompts stifled laughter from others. The
soldiers stupidly struggle to stretch Christ’s body to fit the holes notched into the cross.
From my seat near the bottom of the stands, I can’t see Geoff lying on the cross, but I can
see the soldiers “working” on him, stretching him, sweating and swearing as they drive
the nails into his flesh. The soldiers then comically strain to raise the cross, arguing over
who should take what tasks and complaining that their backs will break before the cross
is raised.
Then it happens. The cross sinks into the mortise provided for it on the pageant
wagon, and Christ hangs on the cross looking down upon me. And He has something to
say to me: “All men that walk by way or street,/ Take tent ye shall no travail tine! (Take
heed that you miss none of my suffering)” (The Crucifixion 253-254; Beadle and King
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220). I have been “caught,” guilty of watching—and even enjoying—the crucifixion of
Our Lord.
I take another sip of ale and say a little prayer for my soul.
*****
Three: The late fifteenth century, an English nobleman’s great hall
Christmas cheer fills the great hall as I take a seat at a table near the deliciously
warm central fireplace. I am eagerly awaiting the evening’s entertainment, which among
other events features an interlude by Henry Medwall. I know the players must be
somewhere about—probably hidden behind the screens at the end of the hall—and I
glance around and over several heads to see if I can glimpse one of them. Seeing no one
but other revelers trooping into the hall, I spear a piece of mutton with my knife and
content myself with good food and good wine.
Then, slowly, like a wave settling rather than rising, the hall grows quiet, the
silence and muffled coughs moving from the screens at the far end of the hall through to
the high table at the other end. Heads turn as a young man struts imperiously into the
hall, surveying the seated crowd, occasionally encouraging folks to make room for him,
carving a path that leads to within a few feet of the high table. Once there, he silently
paces out a ring, all eyes rapt upon him as he pokes and prods those sitting there to move
away, creating a small empty space. Once there, he smiles and shouts, “For Goddis will,/
What mean ye, syrs, to stond so still?/ Have ye now etyn and your fill,/ And paid
nothinge therfore?” (Fulgens and Lucres I.1-4; Creeth 5) After praising the host for the
gift of such a fine feast, the young man berates the assembly for their apparent lethargy:
“But I mervayle moche of one thinge,/ That after this mery drynkynge/ And good
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recreacyon/ There is no words amonge this presse” (Fulgens and Lucres I.14-17; Creeth
5)
Laughter spreads around the hall. The man is a player, of course, speaking to us
as if he, too, were waiting for the entertainment to begin. Indeed, when another unnamed
man enters the cleared space, the first speaker questions him with false naiveté: “Shall
here be a play?” (Fulgens and Lucres I.37; Creeth 6). As the play proceeds and we are
introduced to the story of Lucres, who must choose between two suitors, these same two
young men continue to comment on the action of the play as if they were audience
members. That is, they do so until the moment when one of the men decides to do more
than merely watch the play as a passive spectator by speaking with one of the characters:
B:

A:
B:

Now have I spied a mete office for me,
For I wyl be of counsell and I may
With yonder man-Peace, let be!
Be God, thou wyll distroy all the play!
Distroy the play, quod a? Nay, nay,
The play began never till now. (Fulgens and Lucres I.360-365,
Creeth 15)

More laughter erupts. “The joke is based on the motif of the naive member of the
audience who doesn’t realize the difference between theatre and real life” (Twycross 75).
As an experienced theatergoer, however, I know well the difference between theatre and
real life. From the satisfied smiles all around the fire lit hall, I become certain that
Medwall has authored a great success.
“Just a Play”?
In the first of these preludes, the tenth century Visitatio Sepulchri from St.
Ethelwold’s Regularis Concordia, we see a play that is not a play—at least, not in the
minds of the participants. Understood in the context of the Easter week services, the
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Visitatio allows for the demonstration—not re-creation—of events from the Bible, events
that in the minds of the viewers were history. The religious service commemorates those
events, rejoices in those events, but never intends to duplicate or re-present those events.
The four brothers remain brothers throughout, rather than becoming divine characters
through mimesis, and the transformative, otherworldly qualities experienced during the
service are attributable to the divine spiritual presence in the church. Nothing Godly
need be embodied in this “play”; God is always already present in His House.
The other two preludes reflect a more “play-ful,“ metatheatrical approach which
draws the audience into an awareness of their own involvement in the process of making
a play. The Crucifixion prelude, taken from the Biblical cycle of pageant plays staged in
York starting in the late fourteenth century, presents the crucified Christ ostensibly
admonishing the four soldiers who have finished their gruesome work to take heed of his
suffering. In the context of performance for an audience, however, this speech also
serves to admonish the men and women on the street watching the play, reminding them
that His sacrifice was for their souls as well. Indeed, Christ’s words chasten this
audience: “an onlooker’s silent complicity in what has gone before precipitates a guilty
sense of implication in the Crucifixion” (Beadle 101).
In the passage from Medwall‘s late fifteenth century interlude, the two characters
“A” and “B” have presented themselves throughout the performance as audience
members rather than players. Now, caught up in the action of the play, “B” decides to
speak with Cornelius, one of the characters in the play. “A” chastises “B” for threatening
to disrupt the fictional world, whereupon “B” asserts that his involvement in that world is
precisely what “makes” the play.
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More thoughtful consideration of the context of these two passages, however,
reveals two very different relationships between the fictive metaworld of the play and the
world of the audience members. In a general way one might argue that when a performer
and his/her words “reach out” from the fictive metaworld of performance to speak
directly to the world of the audience, two major effects can occur. The audience can
either be reminded that the performance is “just a play,“ or the audience can come to see
the performance as “more than just a play.” Or perhaps, to avoid a hierarchy, we might
say on the one hand that a metatheatrical moment can void the fictive metaworld of its
ontological force for the spectator, granting more or less full interpretive authority to the
spectator as the one who “makes” the play. On the other hand, a metatheatrical moment
can also enhance the ontological force of the fictive metaworld, granting that metaworld
authority to “speak to” the spectator in a manner that is, if not “more than” a play, then
certainly at least “other than” a play or game.
Imagining oneself in the place of a Christian man or woman on the streets of
York, especially at a time when plague is devouring the entire country, one might
imagine that having Jesus personally address one would be a sobering point of contact
between the divine and the mundane. While the power of Christ’s address in this
performance derives in part from his violation of the supposed distance between the
events of the play and the present time/space of the audience, the effect of this address is
to erase that divide, to bring the viewer into contact with divine presence. While there is
a certain kind of “play” going on in Christ’s address, this game is deadly earnest because
of the contact between two worlds—the audience’s and Christ’s—which are both
presumed to be “real.” The audience is watching “more (or other) than just a play,”
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where each world has ontological substance for the other and can actively challenge the
other.
Medwall’s play, however, offers modern audiences a comfortable, reasonably
familiar form of boundary breaking. For him, the play is “mere” game, and the
interaction between audience and actor is conditioned both by the rules of that game and
by his cleverness in subverting those rules/roles. Granted, some moralizing and
chastising occurs in Fulgens and Lucres—after all, the play functions as a secular version
of a morality play, encouraging nobles (including those who might be attending the play)
to behave more nobly. Yet the point of contact here is between two worlds of different
ontological status. The “real world” of the audience retains power over the “illusory
world” of the performance. It is the interpretive effort of the audience that “makes” the
world of the play in Fulgens and Lucres; without the audience’s willing interaction, the
world that “A” and “B” inhabit would disappear. While both Christ’s crucifixion and B’s
determination to become part of the play might be described as metatheatrical, the moral
admonitions of Medwall‘s plays have a different force than the force behind the words of
the Christ crucified in York.
The differences between these various audience-actor relationships reminds us
that to use the term “metatheatrical” is to presume certain generic conventions of
“theatricality” that may not be uniformly applicable in the context of early English
theatre. In particular, our contemporary sense of “metatheatrical” implies clear
expectations about the distinctiveness of actor and audience roles, expectations that can
then be violated by “breaking the fourth wall” or otherwise confusing the boundary
between these roles. In medieval England, however, there appear to have been several
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competing conceptions of the relations among space, time, actors, and audience—just as
there are several such competing conceptions in contemporary theatre. In short, the
concept of “playing” for an audience was as complex in the Middle Ages as it is today.1
This is a dissertation about playing. It is about the various ways in which plays
and playing affect our understanding of space and time, and the ways in which our
understanding of space and time affect our playing. To study early English theatre as
playing requires us to look beyond and through the surviving texts to the bodies at play,
the audience and performers who play with (or play against, or play about) each other. In
an evolutionary model of Western theatre history, certain theatrical practices of medieval
Europe can be regarded as naive efforts to recover the greatness of classical Greek and
Roman theatre—faltering steps toward the brilliance of Renaissance theatre and the
eventual development of psychological realism. Recent research efforts, driven in large
part by an interest in the phenomenological impact of the pageant plays as live events,
have suggested that the Corpus Christi plays and other religious theatrical events of the
Middle Ages possess a unique and compelling power of their own.
While often derided as immature texts when considered as literature, this religious
theatre appears in a different light when embodied and given flesh. The fullest possible
appreciation of early English theatrical forms comes only when such plays are
experienced as live—and living—events occurring within a community. Glynne
Wickham documents the profound impact of live staging on the scholarly community’s
understanding of medieval theatre in his discussion of the revelatory effects of the first
twentieth century productions of the York cycle:
Audiences and critics alike who witnessed these performances were
astonished. In an almost literal sense, those who had come to gaze, even
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to mock, stayed to pray.[… T]he speed and efficacy of the stagecraft had
proved to be as compelling and convincing as was the power of the spoken
text to stir imaginations and to move hearts to both laughter and tears.
Such plays could no longer be dismissed as historical curiosities: rather
did they cry out to be reassessed as living theatre. (“Introduction” 5)
Moreover, live performances of medieval theatre have been steadily gaining appreciative
audiences, not only among scholars but among the public generally, as “performances of
medieval plays ranging from cycles to single moralities, saint plays and interludes are so
frequently on offer to the public as no longer to occasion surprise; nor do large audiences
who pay to attend these performances continue to regard the plays themselves as ‘quaint’
or ‘naïve’” (Wickham, “Introduction” 10).
Sheila Lindenbaum’s description of the well-known 1977 University of Toronto
production of the York Corpus Christi cycle illustrates the eye-opening effects of live
performance on our understanding of medieval theatre:
The effect created, at least at Toronto, was a rich and fluid theatrical
environment. As the brilliantly colored wagons made their way around
the stations, and the actors appeared in a seemingly endless display of
medieval costumes ranging from royal regalia to shepherd’s weeds, one
could sense much of the visual excitement of a medieval spectacle. Part of
the audience crowded into the stands and a few perched in the windows of
surrounding buildings, as records indicate they did in medieval York.
They could also walk from station to station to see a pageant a second
time, and many did this for the popular Harrowing of Hell. The line that
separated the actors from the audience was therefore constantly shifting.
The audience was pushed back by the soldiers in the Passion sequence and
raided by the devils in The Day of Judgement; the actors’ space was
invaded in turn by curious spectators, photographers, and the many
children and stray animals who failed to distinguish the dramatic
performance from the larger festival event. (202)
Live performance illuminated a variety of relations of space and time, of audience and
actors, and of words and images that would otherwise be lost when considering the
surviving texts of medieval plays as literary products.
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In contemporary productions, the act of performing medieval theatre “can be seen
to fulfil one of its original purposes in bringing together a community of participants and
spectators in celebration of God and City” (Marshall 291). Indeed, Marshall attributes
the increased appeal of medieval theatre today among scholars, performers, and everyday
theatre-goers to the experience of such theatre as a live event: “There is clearly
something in the nature and structure of medieval drama and its relationships with
community and audience that generates popular appeal” (292). An analysis of the
relations among space, time, audience, and actors in performance keeps us focused on
those “relationships with community and audience” that generate much of the appeal of
early English theatre.
By examining different conceptions of the relations among space, time, actors,
and audience in early English theatre, we can explore how these relationships impacted
the audience’s phenomenal experience of these performances. While live performance
offers perhaps the richest phenomenal understanding of these plays as theatre, it is also
possible to use New Historical research techniques, along with a healthy dose of
imagination, to develop a more profound appreciation of the kinds of experiences
medieval theatergoers might have had. My goal in this study is to describe the unique
relationships of time and space that informed the phenomenal experience of participating
in different forms of early English theatre. We may best understand the relations among
these various medieval performance forms through the critical/analytical tool of Mikhail
Bakhtin’s chronotope, which examines how space and time are made real within and thus
inform lived experience.

11

I will identify three significant chronotopes of early English theatre: the
sacramental, consubstantial, and transubstantial chronotopes. As their names imply, each
chronotope is informed by the pervasive influence of Christianity on medieval English
life. Yet each chronotope regards religion, spirituality, and faith differently due to
distinct conceptions of space and time. In some early English performance chronotopes,
for instance, space includes invisible spiritual entities, while in other chronotopes such
entities are ignored or ruled out. In some chronotopes, time functions like an endless
spiral, always touching upon and being touched by previous events, full of foreshadowing
and prefiguration. In other chronotopes, time is more straightforwardly linear, driven
relentlessly forward by the ticking of the clock (Morson 42-81).
Bakhtin characterizes the chronotope not as a description of objective space and
time (although such space and time are included in the concept of the chronotope) but
rather as a phenomenological frame for making sense of lived experience. As Morson
and Emerson note:
In a primary sense, a chronotope is a way of understanding experience; it
is a specific form-shaping ideology for understanding the nature of events
and actions[…]. Actions are necessarily performed in a specific context;
chronotopes differ by the ways in which they understand context and the
relation of actions and events to it. All contexts are shaped fundamentally
by the kind of time and space that operate within them. (367)
Viewing early English theatre through the lens of Bakhtin’s chronotope helps us engage
the phenomenological experience of performance. Considering various relations among
bodies in space and time enriches our understanding of the experience of early English
theatre by helping us to avoid anachronistic misreadings of these performance forms.
Describing specific chronotopes of medieval performance can help us to reconstruct the
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grounds for representability that would have informed a medieval townsperson’s
meaning-making process during performance.
The remainder of this chapter will therefore define the concept of the chronotope
as it will be applied here and then discuss a variety of means available for accessing the
chronotopic consciousness of participants in early English theatre. In the second chapter,
I will explore various aspects of medieval experience that inform all three of the
chronotopes under discussion. The following three chapters will then explore each
chronotope in detail, moving from the sacramental chronotope to what might be
considered its polar opposite, the consubstantial chronotope, and then concluding with
the transubstantial chronotope, which to some extent synthesizes the other two. The final
chapter will address the implications of these chronotopes for contemporary performance
theory and practice.
Space and Time in Performance
In order to define these three chronotopes of performance, we must first consider
the nature of the chronotope in general. As Morson and Emerson point out, Bakhtin
never offers a precise definition of the term “chronotope” (366). Perhaps one of the more
straightforward descriptions that Bakhtin offers of the term, however, comes in his essay
“Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel”:
We cannot help but be strongly impressed by the representational
importance of the chronotope. Time becomes, in effect, palpable and
visible; the chronotope makes narrative events concrete, makes them take
on flesh, causes blood to flow in their veins. An event can be
communicated, it becomes information[…]. It is precisely the chronotope
that provides the ground essential for the showing-forth, the
representability of events. (Dialogic 250, emphasis in original)
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Here we see the chronotope described as a phenomenological framework. It functions as
the informing principle that makes representation possible within narratives. For a
narrative to convey acts, those acts must have a temporal/spatial context that enables
those acts and which, as we shall see later, in fact conditions what acts occur and what
meanings are made of them.
Reading those essays where Bakhtin specifically address the chronotope, it would
be easy to misinterpret the concept in two ways. The first misinterpretation would be to
regard chronotopes merely as tools for categorizing novels. In “Forms of Time and of the
Chronotope in the Novel” and in his “Bildungsroman” essay, Bakhtin describes various
chronotopes largely in terms of the typical plot lines they generate. This is especially true
of the chronotope of the “adventure novel of ordeal,” for which both essays offer “a
typical composite schema” of the plot line associated with this chronotope (Dialogic 87).
Yet chronotopes are not merely structuralist “distillations” of plot-forms
abstracted from the specific telling of a given story. “Chronotopes are not so much
visibly present in activity as they are the ground for activity[…]. They are not contained
in plots, but they make typical plots possible” (Morson and Emerson 369, emphasis in
original). Bakhtin identifies those acts and their associated plot lines that various
chronotopes enable and even encourage, but any given chronotope is not composed of
those acts. Rather, each chronotope provides the context in which certain acts (and
sequences of acts) are possible, likely, or even inevitable.
For instance, in the “adventure novel of ordeal” as described by Bakhtin, two
lovers are inevitably parted by fate. But what defines the chronotope of that genre is not
the separation of the lovers, but rather the relationships of space and time that make such
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separation—and the lovers’ subsequent return to each other—inevitable (or at least
extraordinarily likely). The temporal gap between the parting of the lovers and their
marriage, for instance, requires a time/space configuration that does “not have even an
elementary biological or maturational duration” (Dialogic 90). The presence of any
biological or psychological growth would transform the lovers’ reunion from something
joyous to something potentially comic or grotesque. Bakhtin points this out in his
discussion of Voltaire’s Candide, which parodies the adventure novel of ordeal by
reuniting the two lovers only “when they have already grown old, and the wondrous
Cunegonde resembles some hideous old witch” (Dialogic 91).
For this reason, we should avoid merely rummaging through Bakhtin’s essays for
simple “matches” between the chronotopes he identifies and the various plot lines of the
early English theatrical narratives we will be examining here. In the essays where
Bakhtin develops the concept of the chronotope, his primary purpose is not to develop a
typology of novels. Rather, he seeks to develop a richer understanding of how novels
conceptualize time and space and thus how various conceptions of time and space have
developed throughout history. Bakhtin aims to examine the “process of assimilating real
historical time and space in literature” (Dialogic 84), and each chronotope that he
identifies assimilates different aspects of “real historical time and space” in different
ways and to different degrees. For Bakhtin, “the evaluation of chronotopes was
important to his project of understanding what historicity really is” (Morson and Emerson
372).
For Bakhtin, “real historicity” might be the fullest definition of the rich
chronotopicity that he finds in the novel. Bakhtin describes this rich sense of history
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most clearly in his analysis of Goethe’s novels. As opposed to literary works that regard
space and time as “abstract” background for the actions (and personalities) of the
characters, in Goethe’s novels,
[t]he locality became an irreplaceable part of the geographically and
historically determined world, of that completely real and essentially
visible world of human history, and the event became an essential and
non-transferable moment in the time of this particular human history that
occurred in this, and only in this, geographically determined human world.
(Speech 50, emphasis in original)
This emphasis on real historicity relates to Bakhtin’s project of situating the ethics of
human acts in the specific “eventness” of what Bakhtin calls a “once-occurent moment of
being.” For Bakhtin, acts are meaningful only when not abstracted from their context.
As opposed to Kant’s ”categorical imperative,” which situates ethics precisely in the
abstract realm of generalizable laws that are (or “should be”) true for all human beings in
all times and places, Bakhtin grounds his ethics in the specific situatedness of onceoccurent moments of being. The richest grasp of historicity allows one to see how time
and space shape acts, and vice-versa. Understood in this light, the chronotope, rather
than serving simply as a tool for literary categorization, functions as the ground for
ethical action, both in the novel and in life.
The second easy misinterpretation of the concept of the chronotope would be to
regard it as a purely aesthetic phenomenon—that is, as a phenomenological framework
for artistic narratives that does not relate to everyday lived experience. Yet this is
precisely the opposite of Bakhtin’s larger project of reuniting artistic and everyday
experience. Indeed, in one of his earliest writings, Bakhtin announces that “Art and life
are not one, but they must become united in myself—in the unity of my answerability”
(Art 2). Bakhtin urges that the act of artistic creation be subject to the same ethical
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answerability as are everyday acts. Furthermore, Bakhtin seeks out ways in which the
chronotopes of artistic narratives interact with the chronotopes of everyday experience:
The work and the world represented in it enter the real world and enrich it,
and the real world enters the work and its world as part of the process of
creation, as well as part of its subsequent life, in a continual renewing of
the work through the creative perception of listeners and readers. Of
course this exchange is itself chronotopic: it occurs first and foremost in
the historically developing social world, but without ever losing contact
with changing historical space. We might even speak of a special creative
chronotope inside which this exchange between work and life occurs, and
which constitutes the unique life of the work. (Dialogic 254, emphasis in
original)
An analysis of the chronotopes of early English theatre, therefore, will of necessity
address the varied relationships between the “everyday space and time” of the audience
and the “artistic space and time” that informs the various theatrical performances.
Through their careful analysis of the concept, Morson and Emerson have
determined the most significant aspects of the chronotope (367-69). The concept of the
chronotope assumes that space and time are fundamentally interconnected; they can be
separated for the purpose of analysis, but as lived experience, space and time are “fused.”
Perhaps Bakhtin’s most compelling description of this fusion comes in his analysis of
Goethe’s understanding of space and time: “Goethe cannot and will not see or conceive
of an locality, and natural landscape, as an abstract thing, for the sake of its self-sufficient
naturalness, as it were. It must be illuminated by human activity and historical events”
(Speech 38). The reverse is also true: if the stamp of human historical time is always
written into space, then the stamp of space is always written into the pattern(s) of history
and human activity. Geography determines what acts become creatively necessary for
humans: “One sees the essential and necessary character of man’s historical activity.
And if he wages wars, one can understand how he will wage them” (Bakhtin, Speech 38,
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emphasis in original).2 Space informs what events are possible in time; time imprints
itself on space.
At any point in history, there are a variety of chronotopes available to help
individuals make meaning out of experience, and we cannot assume that all aspects of the
universe-as-experienced operate within the same chronotope. “Chronotopes are mutually
inclusive, they co-exist, they may be interwoven with, replace or oppose one another,
contradict one another or find themselves in ever more complex interrelationships”
(Dialogic 252). This fact suggests that various chronotopes push up against each other in
lived experience; two people experiencing “the same” event in objective time might well
do so through two quite different chronotopes. Think, for instance, of parents watching a
child playing in a sports event; relations of space and time for the child playing on the
field might be quite different from the space and time experienced by the parents sitting
in the bleachers. Likewise, the various everyday chronotopes of, say, farming experience
and the release from such chronotopes occasioned by the festival/carnival time associated
with most medieval performances likely interacted in a variety of ways with the
chronotopes that informed the metaworld(s) of those performances.
Bakhtin in fact regards multitemporality, or heterochrony, as the richest possible
experience provided by the novel. The more dense and complex the chronotopic vision
of the novel, the more appealing such a vision is for Bakhtin. Here again Goethe serves
as Bakhtin’s prime example: “For him contemporaneity—both in nature and in human
life—is revealed as an essential multitemporality: as remnants or relics of various stages
and formations of the past and as rudiments of stages in the more or less distant future”
(Speech 28). Goethe’s novels demonstrate the “ability to see time, to read time, in the
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spatial whole of the world and, on the other hand, to perceive the filling of space not as
an immobile background, a given that is completed once and for all, but as an emerging
whole, an event” (Speech 25). This “emerging whole” consists of many diverse
chronotopic elements, covering everything from time as revealed in natural processes
such as the “growth of trees and livestock,” to time that reflects “vestiges of man’s
creativity” such as “cities, streets, buildings, artworks,” and the like, to time that reflects
the “socioeconomic contradictions” which are the “motive forces of development” within
a given society (Speech 25). Moreover, just as the various languages of a novel or of
social life can interact with each other dialogically, so chronotopes can interact with each
other dialogically, as different forms of time and space “converse” with one another
(Morson and Emerson 426). The richest possible articulation of experience, in Bakhtin’s
view, involves seeing and making visible all these various chronotopes as they interact
with one another and shape human Being.
Chronotopes also “may change over time in response to current needs; they are in
fact, and in potential, historical” (Morson and Emerson 369, emphasis in original).
Chronotopes assume a dynamic relationship with the society that is their broader context;
ways of perceiving time and space are shaped by social-historical conditions while also
shaping those social-historical conditions in turn. Chronotopes do not, however,
inevitably disappear over time. Indeed, chronotopes resemble speech genres in that they
often refuse to die despite the fact that we often forget the social conditions that brought
these “lost” chronotopes into being in the first place: “This explains the simultaneous
existence in literature of phenomena taken from widely separate periods of time”
(Bakhtin, Dialogic 85). Just as utterances can be stripped of most, but not all, of their
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original intent and context, as new speakers assimilate and appropriate those utterances,
so too chronotopes can retain a residual sense of their original flavor while being stripped
of much of their informing context and function. The task of recovering chronotopes—
which is the central task of this thesis—thus involves reconstructing much of the original
context and function of those chronotopes as one possibly can, in an effort to study
something of the “living” chronotope, rather than the “dying” chronotope that has
traveled through time to us.
A chronotope, then, is the informing principle of time and space that makes
perception and interpretation possible at any given moment; chronotopes are the
conditions that give rise to meaning-making. Furthermore, because “for Bakhtin all
meaning entails evaluation, chronotopes also define parameters of value” (Morson and
Emerson 369). The connection that Bakhtin draws between space/time and value can
best be understood in light of his emphasis on the ethical act. Perhaps the central element
of Bakhtin’s early work is his commitment to understanding human acts as immediately
situated, unrepeatable events. Rather than retreating to abstract ethical principles,
Bakhtin urges that the active subjectum should willingly and consciously “sign” his/her
act, thus acknowledging his/her unique answerability for that act in that specifically
situated moment. “The ought becomes possible for the first time where there is an
acknowledgement of the fact of a unique person’s being from within that person; where
this fact becomes a center of answerability—where I assume answerability for my own
uniqueness, my own being” (Toward 42).
Bakhtin aims to resist the lure of “pretendership,” where the subjectum “writes
away” his or her answerability for a given act by attributing it to some abstract principle
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or imaginary generalized identity (Toward 40-49). One cannot, however, embrace one’s
answerability in any given moment except from within the context in which that act
becomes meaningful. Indeed, temporal/spatial context defines the parameters of what
acts are conceivable in any given instance. As Michael Inwood has observed in his
analysis of Heidegger’s phenomenological description of time, “Time is not just a series
of nows. It is time for doing things with things” (86, emphasis added). Bakhtin likewise
conceives of time and space in terms of the human acts that become possible in that time
and space. As a result, the chronotope functions as a necessary unit of analysis for
understanding value(s) and ethical action in any once-occurent moment of being.
“Loud and Living Intonation” and Performance
It may at first seem unusual to use Bakhtin’s language to describe theatrical
performance, especially in light of his famous dictum that “loud and living intonation
excessively monologizes discourse and cannot do justice to the other person’s voice
present in it” (Problems 198). Bakhtin was principally concerned with the performance
of voices in written discourse—that is, with the play of “disembodied language[s] in the
novel” (Suchy 170, emphasis in original) As Michael Bowman has noted, “while
Bakhtin speaks of ‘multi-voiced’ discourse, he does not believe that the ‘voices’ can or
should be represented orally[…]. In other words, print-typographic media allow an
individual to perform more complex ‘vocal’ tricks than he or she could perform orally”
(19). Performance, Bakhtin feared, “suppresses metalinguistic relations among the many
voices present in one’s speech” (Suchy 170).
We may, however, justifiably use Bakhtin’s chronotope in this discussion of
medieval performance for three reasons. First, while Bakhtin’s project in developing the
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concept of the chronotope was related to his larger project of identifying the uniquely rich
chronotopicity of the novel (and, more broadly, of “novelness”), chronotopes can be and
have been described for works that are clearly neither dialogic nor polyphonic and thus
not “novel” in Bakhtin’s sense. In his efforts to chart the “process of assimilating real
historical time and space in literature” (Dialogic 84), Bakhtin describes a variety of
chronotopes which do not assimilate historical space and time as meaningfully as other,
more novelistic forms. In and of themselves, chronotopes are neither novelistic nor not
novelistic. Those chronotopes which are less novelistic are therefore not “less
chronotopic” than the chronotope of Goethe’s Bildungsroman novels and of the
Dostoevsky novels that Bakhtin celebrates.
Second, in the broadest sense, Bakhtin’s project is a search for the otherness
present in our “own” speech:
By foregrounding the eventful personalism of speech, Bakhtinian
metalinguistics demand that we attend to the intent of the speaker toward
the otherness in his or her speech. That intent may range from monologic
attempts to suppress otherness to restless, unfinalizable wrestling matches
with the other’s embedded or addressed speech. (Suchy 170)
In medieval England, speakers often addressed themselves with a “sideways glance”
toward more than the corporeal presences in their space and time: “Medieval people
lived in a perceptual climate in which noncorporeal beings were a familiar and to some
extent a manageable force, recognized alike by theology and popular culture” (Erickson
27). Thus the “otherness” embedded in medieval discourse was particularly rich in
metalinguistic relations, as there were a myriad of other discourses, on both the material
and the spiritual planes, to which one could attend. Exploring the sacramental,
consubstantial, and transubstantial chronotopes can therefore help us explore ways in
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which the speech of divine (and demonic) presences is embedded in or addressed by the
speech of the performers and characters in theatrical performance.
Finally, no vocabulary more fully describes the phenomenological experience of
medieval theatergoers than does the chronotope. It would, of course, be possible to
address similar themes and issues without reference to Bakhtin’s vocabulary—by, for
instance, talking about the “sacramental (or consubstantial, or transubstantial) mindset”
or the “sacramental (or consubstantial, or transubstantial) mode.” Doing so would,
however, reduce the value of these concepts as phenomenological constructs. What
becomes lost in the substitution of “mindset” or “mode” for “chronotope” is the human
body moving through space and time. Bakhtin struggled to construct a vocabulary that
would return bodies to seemingly disembodied language which in turn would ground his
literary studies in the situated, moment-by-moment ethics of specific (if multiple) voices
speaking from specific viewpoints. Paradoxically, then, the vocabulary of the chronotope
that Bakhtin created for describing disembodied language is imminently suitable for
describing the play of actual bodies interacting and performing.
In his essay “Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel,” Bakhtin
recognized that the “complex problem of the listener-reader, his chronotopic situation and
his role in renewing the work or art” needed to be addressed in order to explore more
fully the ways in which “every literary work faces outward away from itself, and to a
certain extent thus anticipates possible reactions to itself” (Dialogic 257, emphasis in
original). By exploring the space and time both of the represented world of performance
and the world of the performers and audience members, this study investigates the

23

conversation between the performed world and the world of the “listener-reader,” with an
eye toward the reactions each world seems to anticipate from the other.
Speaking with and for the Dead: New Historical Tools
It would seem reasonable at this juncture to ask whether or not we have any
access to these chronotopes, and if so, through what means we might access them. Here
it seems apt to note the dilemma, articulated by Greenblatt, that every New Historical
scholar faces: “I began with the desire to speak with the dead[…]. If I never believed
that the dead could hear me, and if I knew that the dead could not speak, I was
nonetheless certain that I could re-create a conversation with them” (1). This struggle to
speak with and perhaps also for the dead seems especially salient in the case of the
present study, which aims to recover not literary-textual experience but rather the lived
experience of those texts in performance.
Unfortunately, we cannot simply jump into our time-machine and witness a past
performance. Greenblatt does, however, give us three reasons to hope for a tentative but
meaningful dialogue with the dead. Our first “medium” for communication with the dead
would be the texts they have left us, “for the dead . . . [have] contrived to leave textual
traces of themselves, and those traces make themselves heard in the voices of the living”
(1). Greenblatt points to two intertwined arguments here. First, he articulates the notion
that texts have a “social energy” encoded in them that remains accessible to the careful
reader (6). This argument resembles Bakhtin’s notion of the “potentials” encoded into
literary texts:
According to Bakhtin, no author of a great literary work could fully
command all its important implications, because great literary works
exploit resources that have developed over centuries and contain potentials
for development over centuries to come. (Morson and Emerson 285)
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The “social energy” Greenblatt articulates would seem to involve the still-living, stillmoving storehouse of potentials within texts. In the context of a performance-centered
approach to medieval theatre, however, we must take into account textual potentials and,
additionally, we must mine texts for traces of the bodies that produced and responded to
those texts, and for the various potentials those bodies may have carried.
Additionally, Greenblatt’s concept of “textual traces” points to what Roach calls
“living memory”: “’Living memory’ remains variously resistant to […] forgetting […]
through the transmission of gestures, habits, and skills” (26). Greenblatt—and Bakhtin,
as well—would argue that language-as-used should also be included as one of the
sources of “living memory.” In this sense, we are all carriers of history. History resides
in our bodies and in our voices, and thus somewhere deep inside of us—in our linguisticsocial-historical “core” of experience—the bodies and voices of past others echo forward
to help us to grapple with the textual traces those ghosts have left behind. Indeed,
Bakhtin’s primary tool for developing and describing various chronotopes involves deep
readings of the texts themselves, readings informed by a sensitivity both to the embodied
difference between “then” and “now” and by the embodied similarities.
Greenblatt’s third tool for dialogue with the dead involves looking “less at the
presumed center of the literary domain than at its borders, to try to track what can only be
glimpsed, as it were, at the margins of the text” (4). Here Greenblatt primarily refers to
the use of extraliterary sources of insight into the phenomenal world of experience hinted
at by textual traces. As we shall see in Chapter Two, two primary extraliterary sources
will help us develop a richer understanding of the chronotopes of early English theatre.
First, we shall examine specific works of visual art with which the audiences of the time
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would have been familiar. In the painting, sculpture, and other visual art forms of the
middle ages, we have tangible examples of medieval visual experience. It is highly likely
that such art both informed the audiences’ experience of theatrical performance and that a
broader set of visual-interpretive codes that informed both theatrical and visual art of the
Middle Ages can be extrapolated from a careful study of medieval art.
Another extraliterary source of insight used in this study will involve relations
between medieval theatrical experience and medieval religious experience. Christian
philosophy embedded itself in all medieval experience, and the vast majority of the
surviving theatrical texts from the time explicitly address Christian history, Christian
beliefs, and Christian practice. Even those texts which do not explicitly employ a
Christian frame, such as Medwall’s Fulgens and Lucres, offer a moralistic frame shaped
largely by Christian values. In messy and complex ways, Christian thought developed
various and often contradictory interpretations of diverse relationships between image
and reality and between flesh and spirit. Because performance also inevitably addresses
such issues, we can use our understanding of medieval Christian debates over iconicity
and transubstantiation to inform our understanding of the performance experiences of
early English theatre.
Another way to glimpse “at the margins of the text” is to explore embodied
performances of the text. A source of insight into these chronotopes of performance,
then, would be descriptions of the staging of religious pageants such as Sheila
Lindenbaum’s discussion of the production of the York cycle in Toronto in 1977. While
such performances are obviously informed by contemporary experience, many of those
who write about these performances find themselves unexpectedly moved in
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extraordinary ways that point toward a more rich and engaging grasp of medieval
theatrical practice (Bevington, “Castles in the Air”; Lindenbaum; Marshall; Twycross;
Wickham, “Introduction”).
Significance: Chronotopes and Performance Studies
The research offered here is designed to accomplish two primary goals in the
context of current performance research. First, this study contributes to a growing body
of literature committed to the ongoing project of recovering, re-presenting, and
reconstructing the lived experience of medieval theatrical practices. In his preface to his
1991 collection of essays The Theatre of Medieval Europe: New Research in Early
Drama, editor Eckehard Simon discusses some of the concerns his colleagues have raised
about the focus on medieval theatre as performed while ultimately landing squarely on
the side of such an emphasis:
Some of the [reproduced medieval] theatricals one sees are no doubt
governed by the same happy spirit that dwells in such neo-medieval
groups as the Society for Creative Anachronism active on American
college campuses. And in service to a sterner muse, some continental
colleagues will, one suspects, continue to raise an eyebrow or two. But
[…] the method is sound. Medieval drama was not made to be read. This
is why our students have always found it so boring. It was meant to be
heard and seen. (xvii)
Such arguments, made repeatedly throughout the late 1980’s and early 1990’s by scholars
in the field of medieval theatre, have fueled an intense interest, not only in staging these
texts, but also in investigating how medieval people might have experienced such
theatrical performances. My study hopes to make a contribution to this sustained
disciplinary focus on the embodied experience of medieval theatre.
By using Bakhtin’s chronotope as my primary interpretive tool for describing and
articulating various embodied responses to medieval theatre, my study also aims to
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provide one of the first sustained descriptions of chronotopes in the context of
performance outside of Bakhtin’s work in Rabelais and His World. As an investigative
instrument, the chronotope has proven remarkably serviceable in a myriad of fields
investigating diverse kinds of texts. Robert Stam’s Subversive Pleasures: Bakhtin,
Cultural Criticism, and Film presses the chronotope into service to analyze the
carnivalesque pleasures of film spectatorship, while Deborah J. Haynes’ Bakhtin and the
Visual Arts uses the chronotope to articulate certain aspects of postmodern art theory. In
their essay “Scrapbooks as Cultural Texts,” Tamar Katriel and Thomas Farrell gloss the
chronotope in an effort to explore the historical situated quality of scrapbooks. And
recently John Louis Lucaites and James P. McDaniel use the chronotope to articulate the
tension between “then” and “new” in their analysis of the rhetorical construction of Japan
as both fearsome WWII enemy and friendly post-WWII ally. Yet for all these diverse
efforts, the full explanatory and exploratory power of the chronotope remains largely
untapped, especially in the area of performance studies.
Ruth Laurion Bowman’s essay “Domestic(ating) Excess: Women’s Roles in
Uncle Tom’s Cabin and Its Adaptation” offers one of the most clear and compelling
applications of the chronotope to the study of performance in her efforts to address “the
social-aesthetic spaces or ‘chronotopes,’ to use Bakhtin’s term, the female characters
represent,” both in Stowe’s novel and in the host of stage adaptations of the novel (116).
Building on such research, the present study aims to articulate chronotopes in and of
performance, and it aims to do so, not simply by applying the existing literary
chronotopes articulated by Bakhtin, but by describing and exploring new chronotopes
that correspond to distinct ways in which participants in medieval theatre might have
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understood space and time operating in theatrical performance. In this sense, the current
study aims to provide the first lengthy and detailed application of the chronotope to the
analysis of performance.
In our next chapter, then, we will explore those elements of medieval English
experience which are relevant to all three of the chronotopes to be examined. At the
heart of these elements common to all three chronotopes are two kinds of relations:
relations between the world of matter and the world of spirit, and relations between the
world created through performance and the world of the audience and performers. By
considering medieval debates over issues such as iconicity and Eucharistic doctrine, we
can begin our journey back into these long-dead bodies so as to reconstruct, in whatever
partial fashion, some understanding of the way medieval theatergoers would have
understood space and time. With this understanding in place, we can then consider the
specific performance forms and specific chronotopes addressed in chapters three, four,
and five of this study. First, however, we must consider particular forms of vision that
informed thought and action throughout much of the Middle Ages in England.
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CHAPTER 2
SHARED ELEMENTS OF MEDIEVAL CHRONOTOPES
Our lexicon associates visions with mysticism, irrationality, occultism,
impracticality and madness. From our point of view, the visionary is a
person who sees what isn’t there; his visions separate him from reality. In
the Middle Ages, visions defined reality.[…] Visions were the final arbiter
of truth—but only if they were authentic. How was the visionary to tell
true revelations from nightmares, divine illuminations from demonic
delusions?
--Carolly Erickson, The Medieval Vision: Essays in
History and Perception, 30-36
The dominant theme of Erickson’s book on medieval perception is that of all the
senses, sight dominated medieval phenomenal experience. Of course, much the same
argument could be made for most historical eras, including our current one, but Erickson
goes further to define sight in the Middle Ages as vision, that is, as a peculiar capacity to
see beyond the visible and to search as it were through the physical universe for signs of
the divine. Harris notes that since the earliest days of Christendom, the faithful were
urged to investigate
events in the physical world, which, it was believed, might well possess an
inner symbolic meaning far more important than their outward
appearance. [… The origins of this interpretive mindset] lay in an earlier
Jewish vision of the whole of life as the unfolding of God’s divine plan for
the world, as it had been exclusively revealed to his chosen people—a
viewpoint the Christians had naturally acquired with the rest of their
Jewish inheritance. (7)
Such thinking was reflected in and embodied by Christian liturgy. At least since St.
Gregory began the institutionalization of the Mass, Christians regarded “the Mass, and
the Holy Scriptures too, as a fusion of a ‘visible’ outer meaning, which was often a
simple story, with various kinds of ‘invisible’ symbolic meanings reflecting the purposes
of God” (Harris 7).
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In the context of this spirit-soaked phenomenology, medieval people “saw more”
than we do now, according to Erickson: “Their perceptual range was broader than ours.
They were aware of more possibilities, because they were less inclined to dismiss any of
them as unimaginable” (32). The medieval period was “an age maximally open to belief”
(Erickson 16). But expanded vision does not necessarily equate with joy or
transcendence; medieval visionaries saw both heaven and hell, and they often had great
difficulty telling them apart. Gregory of Tours (539-594 a.d.) demonstrates this difficulty
in his description of a simple fly that may have been sent from Satan:
Pannichius, a priest of Poitou, when sitting at dinner with some friends he
had invited, asked for a drink. When it was served a very troublesome fly
kept flying about the cup and trying to soil it. The priest waved it off with
his hand a number of times but it would go off a little and then try to get
back, and he perceived that it was a crafty device of the enemy. He
changed the cup to his left hand and made a cross with his right; then he
divided the liquor in the cup into four parts and lifted it up high and
poured it on the ground. For it was very plain that it was a device of the
enemy. (Halsall)
The world required constant and vigilant interpretation; one must be on one’s guard for
any clues that might lead one to God—or away from Him.
Any discussion of space and time in medieval performance will therefore of
necessity reference a wholly different space and time from our own. This is generally
true of historical research, but when investigating the Middle Ages, the problem becomes
notably acute. There is a fundamental strangeness to medieval perception which
informed the lived experience of performers and audience, nobles and peasants, clerics
and heretics in every genre of medieval artistic expression. As John Drury puts it in his
description of medieval painting:
We are visitors to this Christian world. Even if we are Christians […], the
kind of Christianity that one of these paintings holds and presents will not
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be exactly our own—though we, Christian or not, may be able to make it
our own by means of informed and sympathetic imagination. (ix)
Prior to discussing chronotopes of medieval theatre, therefore, we must first consider
certain common perceptual elements which informed each of these chronotopes. We
may then be able to explore the various forms of space and time in medieval geography
and cosmology with greater confidence.
In this chapter, then, we will explore elements of theatrical experience that are
common to all three of the chronotopes under investigation here. I first discuss the
spiritual and material worlds of medieval England, exploring issues of religious thought
and practice as they impacted medieval “vision.” To do this, I examine spiritual and
material geographies and then move to examine medieval concepts of figural time that
allow for the spiritual past and future of Christianity to come into contact with the
material present of medieval England. Next, as our discussion must inevitably address
issues of representation, I discuss the interaction between the “real world” of the audience
and the performers and the fictive metaworld created in and through performance in
terms of a variety of issues associated with mimesis in medieval thought.
In medieval Europe, acts of mimesis inevitably raised tensions about the
appropriateness of using the human body to represent anything Holy. I therefore follow
my discussion of mimesis with a discussion of various conceptions of the body that would
have informed the medieval experience of moving through space and time. Next, I
explore the sacrament of the Eucharist as a particularly potent example of the variety of
conflicts regarding materiality and spirituality that informed medieval experience. As the
names of my three chronotopes suggest, we may use various ways of thinking about the
Eucharist as metaphorical markers that can describe theatrical experience. This is
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appropriate because, as we shall see in this chapter, medieval experience was saturated
with religious perception, and such religious perception also certainly informed theatrical
perception as well, especially given the religious and/or moral nature of the majority of
these performances. Finally, we shall discuss the nature of addressivity in medieval
theatre as a way of examining the ties between performers, audience, and spiritual entities
that shape all three medieval chronotopes of performance.
We may begin this discussion by focusing on two interpretive planes which
intersect with all three chronotopes. The first of these interpretive planes involves the
distinction between the “visible” or material and the “invisible” or spiritual worlds.
Erickson argues persuasively that in contrast to our modern efforts to “equate realness
with materiality,” medieval people “tended to perceive an all-encompassing, multifold
reality” that included invisible spiritual entities, acts, and geographies (6-8). The second
plane involves the distinction between what Diller calls the “first” and “second” worlds
of performance (Middle English 10). The “first world” (the audience-sphere) is the “real
world” of the audience and players; the “second world” (the play-sphere) is the
metaworld invoked (or conjured?) by the performance.
Spiritual and Material Worlds
Let us first consider the interconnectedness of the material and spiritual worlds in
medieval England. Against those who believe “the events which occur in the course of a
morality play to be not mimetic representations of life, but analogical demonstrations of
what life is about,” Natalie Schmitt offers the following rebuttal:
The distinction, however, does not seem medieval. The world itself was a
great analogy making manifest the otherwise invisible and only reality of
God. The medieval artists were Realists; they believed that the world was
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to be understood not in terms of operations and causes, but in terms of its
meaning. (305)
Far from our skeptical modern empiricism, the Neoplatonic Realism Schmitt mentions
here does not deny the ontological status of the invisible, but nonetheless active, world of
the spirit. Meaning was to be found in examining the complex interaction between the
material and spiritual worlds; meaning was found not in “operations and causes,” but in
the search for Truth. Throughout most aspects of medieval culture and history, “Truth”
was the truth of Christ’s suffering for (hu)mankind, and the ultimate “falsehood” was to
deny the interaction of invisible Godly and demonic entities in the material world of the
“quick.”
In terms of chronotopic consciousness, such interaction between material and
spiritual worlds meant that physical geography was inextricably bound up with spiritual
geography:
It was characteristic of that view that throughout the Middle Ages the
earth was conceived as embracing the geographical locus of unseen truths.
Shrines localized the virtues of a saint in the near vicinity of his or her
remains. Pious journeys and later military expeditions to the Holy Land
allowed medieval people to see and touch the sites where the bodiless
reality of God became the embodied Jesus. And since ancient times dread
and curiosity had brought many to the mouths of hell—the places, such as
Lough Derg in Ireland, from which descent into the lower world was
believed possible. (Erickson 6)
Not only was the world full of locations which provided access to the divine or the
demonic; a potent animism also informed medieval geography, granting a sense of life to
all objects: “Medieval cosmological ideas, undergirded by the Neoplatonic view that all
things participate, however imperfectly, in the life of the creator led the medievals to
attribute to natural and man-made objects a wide range of capabilities” (Erickson 19).
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For some historians, this medieval mode of perception world has “evoked the
epithets ‘childlike,’ ‘naive,’ and ‘popular,’ epithets which have served to mask by
patronizing stereotypes rather than to explain” (Gibson 5). It would be easy to equate the
presence of what Erickson calls the “enchanted world” of medieval Neoplatonism with a
childlike world view to be eventually “corrected” by more objective world views. Yet as
Schmitt notes, “the idea of objectivity, of the existence of things the identity of which can
be known quite apart from ourselves, is a product of a scientific rationalist age; it is not a
medieval idea. Medieval people consciously participated in what they perceived” (306).
Medieval physics explained sight as a form of contact that linked perceiver and
perceived: “Medieval viewers, following Augustine’s theory of vision as a ray projected
onto the object that then passed into the viewer and bonded with the soul, understood
themselves to be active agents in the visual experience” (Sponsler 122). Through the
active facility of looking, the “outer” bonded with the “inner,” making such distinctions
seem arbitrary.
Thus, our own limited concepts of what is “realistic” prevent us from seeing
that these plays which we call allegories are to a far greater extent than we
have realized representations of phenomenological reality. Our
application of anachronistic concepts has confused our reading of the
plays and has removed us from the psychology which they express.
(Schmitt 313)
Schmitt goes so far as to argue that the “conjunction of internal and external” so central
to the medieval mind also characterizes modern phenomenological encounters:
“Experientially the distinction between the two [the internal and the external] is not easily
made and disagreement on it exists in our own society” (308). Recent discoveries in the
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world of physics, from Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Theorem to quantum physics, express
just such an interconnectedness of the perceiver and the perceived.
An Ever-Present God Watching Over Ever-Present Sin
In the Middle Ages, however, the connection between the perceiver and the
perceived came not through physics but through a personal relationship with the risen
Lord. England, especially, felt its fate was linked to the fate of Christianity from at least
the mid-ninth century onwards, as the English people suffered under the scourge of
Viking attacks:
Why, Christians needed to know, had God allowed the Vikings to come to
England “to ravage and burn, plunder and rob”? There could be but one
answer: such events were, in the words of Wulfstan, archbishop of York
(1002-23) “the wrath of God, made clear and visible towards this nation.”
(Leyser 178)
As Leyser notes, in the eleventh century two options for correcting England’s
relationship with God were generally debated. The first advocated a return “to the days
of Archbishop Theodore and of Bede, to a supposed golden age when there were ‘men of
learning…throughout England,’ and when wisdom and success in warfare had gone hand
in hand” (178).
Many in England, especially the ruling feudal lords, found this reliance on
education and clerical wisdom too stringent and preferred a second, and more severely
penitential, course:
The wrath of God, provoked by the terrible sinfulness of his people, must
be and could be assuaged by correct reparation. According to an edict of
c.1009, “decreed when the great army [of Vikings] came to the country,”
the whole nation was to seek God’s help to withstand the enemy. The
Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday before Michaelmas were national fastdays; only bread, herbs, and water were allowed. Everyone was to go
barefoot to church for confession and join in the processions of relics.
(Leyser 179).
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Such a course of reparations reminds us of the deeply rooted pagan impulses that, by the
eleventh century, had been more or less successfully appropriated by Christianity. The
impulse to sacrifice to the gods had moved from sacrificing animals and harvest fruits to
self-flagellation and ascetic purification as a form of self-sacrificial martyrdom. In this
dualistic, almost Manichean world view, God could be best appeased through the
mortification of the body, since the flesh was the source of corruption for the human
spirit.
This ascetic and penitential world view took on greater urgency in the twelfth
through fifteenth centuries due to various religious movements, and due as well to the
terrors of the plague. The most notable religious event of this period was the Fourth
Lateran Council of 1215-1216, which institutionalized sweeping reforms of Church
practice and theology:
In the annals of the history of the Catholic Church, this particular council
holds a prominent position. Its place was secured not only by its
regulations, which are binding even today, or by its statements concerning
the holy war, which altered the course of medieval history, but also by the
function assigned to it by Pope Innocent III—that is, “to eradicate vices
and to plant virtues, to correct faults and to reform morals, to remove
heresies and to strengthen faith, to settle discords and to establish peace, to
get rid of oppression and to foster liberty, to induce princes and christian
people to come to the aid and succour of the holy Land”[…]. (Kobialka
This Is My Body 197)
Perhaps the two most prominent institutionalized changes to Church practice and
theology to originate from this council were “its constitutions regarding confession and
Communion that have been observed in the Catholic church since that time” (Kobialka
This Is My Body 197). As a result of these constitutions, the doctrine of
transubstantiation, that is of the wafer and wine becoming Christ’s flesh and blood when
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blessed by priests for use in the Communion mass, became standard Catholic doctrine.
Additionally, “after the Fourth Lateran Council all adult Christians were required to
confess their sins privately to their parish priest at least once a year usually before they
took communion at Easter” (Harris 84).
Embodied in both practices of confession and Communion is what Harris calls
“an acute sense of sin” (81) and an extension of the practices of self-mortification that
began in England with the Viking raids. To institutionalize such an acute sense of sin,
priests were required to teach the laity of their sinfulness, to explain not only what
thoughts and behaviors were now considered sinful but also to explain what Church
rituals would serve as appropriate penance for these sins. As part of this process, “many
books of penitential instruction—known as ‘shrift manuals’—were written in the
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and widely circulated in manuscript” (Harris 85). The
language used by Canon 21 of the Fourth Lateran Council to describe the new sacrament
of confession employs metaphors of illness and recovery to locate the source of spiritual
imperfection in the body:
Let the priest be discreet and cautious that he may pour wine and oil into
the wounds of the one injured in the manner of a skillful physician,
carefully inquiring into the circumstances of the sinner and of the sin,
from the nature of which he may understand what kind of advice to give
and what kind of remedy to apply, making use of different means to heal
the sick one. (Shinners 10)
The language here also reminds us of Freud’s “talking cure” and of the importance of
discursive practices in both naming and thus “curing” the newly identified sins. This
“talking cure” relied on the sinner’s awareness of, and acceptance of, his or her guilt
before the face of God.
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Accompanying this new sense of sin was a renewed missionary zeal. Tydeman
notes the importance of “the emergence, from the conflicts besetting the twelfth-century
church, of the fraternal Orders of St. Francis and St. Dominic […] and the missionary
zeal of their members in expounding the message of personal salvation to the lay
individual” (“An Introduction” 19). Even prior to the Fourth Lateran Council, Leyser
documents this impressive development: “The rise in the number of monasteries in
twelfth-century England was certainly spectacular; more than 250 new houses were
founded for men, and over 100 for women” (194). Predating the Fourth Lateran Council
but participating in its spirit and urging the reforms made by that council, this monastic
movement transformed the face of God and the follower’s relationship with God:
On the one hand, the God of the twelfth century was less terrifying than
his earlier manifestations had suggested: his compassion and mercy were
seen now to be as great as his power to punish and condemn. On the other
hand, this “humanized” God was in some sense more demanding, for,
wanting to be worshipped not in fear but in friendship, he could expect
from each Christian a personal response rather than the gathering in of a
debt that could be vicariously paid.[…] The monastic call to which so
many responded in the twelfth century was the call to become Christ-like,
to know, to love and to imitate God-as-man. (Leyser 194)
Living with Christ in the Middle Ages meant living with one’s sinfulness and thus living
with how far one’s life was from the model of Christ.
In religious terms, then, for England this era was therefore
a restless and uncertain age, seeking the solutions to many pressing
problems. Then, suddenly, on top of the turmoil created by the new sense
of sin, dissatisfaction with the Church, growing heresy, crusades against
heretics, the Inquisition, friars preaching hellfire sermons and a growing
preoccupation with self-examination and purification, a final factor was
superimposed that gave the whole process a new urgency—the shadow of
the Black Death. (Harris 90)
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The plague made terrifying images part of everyday experience: workers would struggle
to get “rid of the plague-infested bodies, usually in mass graves with victims stacked like
cordwood (or as a contemporary Italian writer remarked, like lasagna), five cadavers
deep” (Cantor 81). Even more terrifying was that the plague seemed to have no cause—
or rather, too many causes could be offered up, from demons to Jews to the apocalypse.
The only protection from the omnipresent and mysterious plague came from faith. As a
widely distributed plague tract of the late fifteenth century noted, “when thy soul is
washed clean from sin, thus mayest thou preserve they body from this pestilential
malady” (qtd. in Keen 36).
In the context of the medieval individual’s struggle with the forces of death and
damnation, medieval Neoplatonism reassuringly “emphasized the primacy of
noncorporeal forces; it was an all-embracing explanation which stressed the close links
between all created things; and it strongly associated the creative principle with visual
imagery” (Erickson 11). In other words, the individual could see, could perceive—and
could thus participate in—the divine, the invisible, and could thus render the material
world meaningful in terms of this grand cosmology. Through this perception and
interpretation of Truth, one could obtain salvation.
The prime example of the link between the material and the invisible for the
medieval mind was the incarnation of the divine spirit into the “man-God” Jesus. The
“emotive spirituality” especially notable in medieval England from the twelfth century on
“sought comfort in a personal religion grounded in the individual’s participation in
Christ’s passion. It was a spirituality attentive to the humanity, more than the divinity of
Christ, and to his physical sufferings as man and Savior” (Coletti 9). Thus, by the
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fifteenth century, “the relevant central image for the Middle Ages is a suffering human
body racked on a cross; the book [of hours] has become his body, its secrets red, fresh,
and bleeding if still mysterious to the minds of man” (Gibson 6). By the fifteenth
century, the incarnated Christ had become the perfect cipher for the blending of the
material and invisible worlds.
The medieval world, then, was one where multiple “realities” coexisted, merging
spirit and matter. As Gibson puts it, the “fifteenth-century commitment to the
particularity of religious experience […involves] a growing tendency to see the world
saturated with sacramental possibility and meaning and to celebrate it” (6). But if
medieval space was substantially different from our own, then it might follow that
medieval perceptions of time also differed. And indeed, just as medieval thought
perceived space as multiple and full to bursting with entities material and spiritual, so too
did medieval thought regard time as multiple, with various eras touching upon and
writing traces on each other in both forward and backward directions.
Figural Time in Medieval Chronotopes
The dominant mode of Christian historical thought throughout the Middle Ages
involved figural interpretation. Figural interpretation began with efforts by the early
Christian fathers to reframe the Old Testament as prefiguring the New Testament and the
new faith of Christianity. In the earliest days of the Christian church, Paul and the other
church fathers struggled to transform the Old Testament from a codification of the laws
of the Jewish people to a historical prelude to the coming of Christ to save all people.
Their goal was to “strip the Old Testament of its normative character and show that it is
merely a shadow of things to come” (Auerbach, “Figura” 50). Figural interpretation of

41

the Old Testament as a series of events prefiguring Christ’s birth, death, resurrection, and
eventual return served key rhetorical functions in justifying the Christian faith and
distinguishing it from its progenitor.
Medieval figural interpretation requires two (or more) historical events which,
through a hermeneutic act of interpretation, can be seen to be informed by the same
principle. For example, the story of Jonah trapped in the belly of a whale for three days
can be read as prefiguring the death and resurrection of Christ after three days (Kolve
64). Likewise, many other figures such as Moses are identified by figural interpretation
as spiritual precursors of Christ. A crucial point here is that both figure and fulfillment
must be perceived as historical, not allegorical, for the figura to have substance:
Moses is no less historical and real because he is an umbra or figura of
Christ, and Christ, the fulfillment, is no abstract idea, but also a historical
reality. Real historical figures are to be interpreted spiritually (spiritaliter
interpretari), but the interpretation points to a carnal, hence historical
fulfillment (carnaliter adimpleri: De resurrectione, 20)—for the truth has
become history or flesh. (Auerbach, “Figura” 34)
Figural interpretation, then, activates an odd kind of historicity. Eternal principles
deriving from the will of God are embodied, given flesh, exposed to the operations of
time, but inasmuch as time always repeats itself, events are bent towards each other, and
are thus often shaped by the same principles into similar outer forms. Figural
interpretation, then, “removes the concrete event, completely preserved as it is, from time
and transposes it into a perspective of eternity” (Auerbach, “Figura” 42). In the process,
two seemingly dissimilar phenomenal events can be seen to be informed by the same
basic truth, granting the interpreter access to the veritas of God.
Figural interpretation can move not only between events in the Old and New
Testaments, but also between current events and biblical ones. Indeed, figural thinking
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collapses time, understanding past, present, and future as inextricably interrelated, even
fused:
[T]he here and how is no longer a mere link in an earthly chain of events,
it is simultaneously something which has always been, and which will be
fulfilled in the future; and strictly, in the eyes of God, it is something
eternal, something omni-temporal, something already consummated in the
realm of fragmentary earthly event. (Auerbach, Mimesis 74)
Events in the here and now are thus marked both by their prefigurations and by the End
to which all events must lead. Within such a concept of history, no event is meaningless
or insignificant, since every event touches scores of other events which have meaning and
which share meaning amongst themselves.
A tempting misinterpretation of figura assumes that the relationship between a
figure and its fulfillment moves in only one direction—that is to say, that the figure exists
merely to prefigure its fulfillment, a fulfillment that is complete unto itself. Such a view
of figura overlooks the way in which both figure and fulfillment point towards each
other. Auerbach notes that even in its earliest usage, the term figura could substitute for
either “model” or “copy,” thus suggesting that the term points both to progenitor and
progeny (“Figura” 16). Yet terms like “progenitor” and “progeny” imply a linear causal
sequence that is not at work in medieval figural interpretation. Instead, figural
interpretation “establishes a connection between two events or persons, the first of which
signifies not only itself but the second, while the second encompasses or fulfills the first”
(Auerbach, “Figura” 53). Thus, a given figura “may point forward or backward to divine
events” (Helterman 19), and the two phenomenal events are neither reducible either to
each other nor to some overarching principle. While one event may be more spiritually
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significant than the other—Christ’s passion clearly outweighs Jonah’s trip in the whale’s
belly—both events point toward each other and require each other for completeness.
One difficulty of understanding medieval figural interpretation is that it assumes
what Harris calls a “vertical” conception of time:
This idea can be best described by saying that medieval man saw time not
as a straight line but as a rising spiral, so that history continually repeated
itself as it progressed. A man could either look forwards and backwards
along the curving line of time or behind him, in which case his point of
view was essentially “horizontal” [or linear] like our own, or he could
look straight up and down at the equivalent points on the many curves of
the time-line directly above or below him, thus taking a “vertical” view.
[…] This “vertical” view of time intimately linked together events of the
past and the present. (101)
Thus while our linear, “horizontal” concept of time urges us to view events within a
linear-causal structure, within the medieval “vertical” concept of history, two events can
be real and historical, with phenomenal differences, while also being equivalent moments
in time. One might say that figure and fulfillment share substance.
Importantly, however, we should note that the historical fulfillment of a figural
urge involves an active and necessary doing rather than simply functioning as a return of
that which already was. An essentially passive way of understanding the relationship
between figure and fulfillment would be to see a given fulfillment as simply an atemporal
return of that which always was and always will be. Such an understanding, however,
fails to take into account the unique grounding in history that characterized the Catholic
Church. Whereas many religious traditions construct a consciously acknowledged
mythical past that does not necessarily connect to the time of those practicing a given
faith, from the earliest development of its orthodox practices, beliefs, and institutions,
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Christianity has consistently constructed itself as rooted in “our” historical time, as Elaine
Pagels notes:
[O]rthodox tradition […] maintained that human destiny depends upon the
events of “salvation history”—the history of Israel, especially the
prophets’ predictions of Christ and then his actual coming, his life, and his
death and resurrection. All of the New Testament gospels, whatever their
differences, concern themselves with Jesus as a historical person. And all
of them rely on the prophets’ predictions to prove the validity of the
Christian message. (132)
Figural thought, therefore, constructed a specific way of understanding relations between
different events in time, but it did so without necessarily constructing time as “finished”
or “already written.”
For example, the traditional medieval figural interpretation of Christ as the
fulfillment of a long line of prophets starting with Moses does not reduce Christ to the
status of “yet another Moses”—nor, for that matter, does figural thought construct Moses
simply as “a paler shade of Jesus.” Within figural interpretation, Christ is much more
than an “echo” of Moses and other Old Testament prophets, and Christ’s sacrifice on the
cross is to be understood as unique, necessary, and not in any way inevitable. Although
Christ’s life makes contact with and shares substance with other historical figures from
Christian history, the tradition of figural interpretation did not view the fulfillment of
various figura throughout history as being inevitable and thus essentially passive
expressions of eternal impulses.
Figural thought did not aim to strip the contributions to Christian history by
figures such as Moses, Abraham, David, and Jesus of their value as active, historically
situated choices. Rather, we might say that figures such as Christ willingly and actively
followed a set of behaviors and practices which had the consequence of fulfilling a
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figural principle; without the individual’s conscious choices, the figure would
conceivably not have found its fulfillment. Medieval figural thought was not an
expression of “predestination by other means.” The importance of this detail lies
primarily in the notion that while certain events, such as the Apocalypse, were regarded
as inevitable, individual choices in the future were regarded as being essentially
unwritten. The past would echo into the present and the future, but the bodies through
which it echoed, and the choices those bodies made, were not predetermined within
figural thought.
This interaction between past and present, material and invisible worlds, and the
concomitant struggle of the perceiver to find/make meaning within these multiple
realities, complicate the “game” of theatre that is so central to the notion of metatheatrical
“play” referenced in my first chapter. Yet it is at this same point in the history of
Western theatre that we find the notion of “game” returning to the forefront of
performance. This leads into an exploration of the second interpretive plane common to
all three chronotopes, the first-world/second-world plane.
Problems of Mimesis: The First and Second Worlds of Performance
In 1966, V. A. Kolve revolutionized the study of medieval theatre by taking
seriously those contemporary references to vernacular theatre using words such as
“ludus,” “play,” and “game” to refer to what we now call theatre. In the Middle Ages,
“drama was conceived as a game,” and such a conception of performance, Kolve argues,
was “a change in the history of theatre” (14, emphasis in original). While Kolve may
overstate the importance of this “change”—after all, the Latin terminology (ludi) reminds
us that throughout the Classical period theatre was viewed as a form of play—Kolve’s
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primary insight has to do with how theatre as “play” and “game” changes the nature of
performance in the Middle Ages. Hanning summarizes the importance of this change:
As distinct from the Latin liturgical drama, for which the usual
nomenclature was representatio, the popular, vernacular cycles were
clearly identified by means of a terminology which stressed the playelement of the drama—the creation of a self-contained world with its own
rules, intended to entertain and instruct, but not able to be confused with
or taken for “reality.” (140)
Whereas liturgical drama offered the congregation only one world—the “real world” of
the ongoing religious ritual—Kolve argues that after much development through time, the
Corpus Christi plays evolved a set of “rules” regarding the theatrical “game,” a game that
created a world distinct from the experience of the audience.
In Diller’s terms, we have a distinction here between the “first world” of the
audience and the “second world” constituted by the metaworld of the theatrical event. In
the context of European theatre in the Middle Ages, such a distinction usefully
differentiates Latin liturgical and vernacular theatre. Drawing upon Lukacs, Diller
asserts that “the ‘world-creating’ capacity of the work of art” distinguished the two kinds
of “theatre”: the ability to create an independent “second world” which confronts the
“first world” of the audience “is exactly what the liturgical drama largely lacks and what
we find in varying degrees in the vernacular plays” (Middle English 3).
Diller summarizes the importance of this “world-creating” power:
The two basic differences between liturgical and later drama concern time
and space and the relationship between the “play” and those who watch it.
While the true play has to “create” the time and place of the world
represented in it, the liturgical ceremony finds them, as it were, readymade by the liturgy: the altar suggests the sepulchre, Easter matins
evoked the first morning after Christ’s resurrection .[…] The play is also
distinguished from the liturgical ceremony in that it presupposes an
audience which it “confronts”; the ceremony knows only a congregation
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consisting above all of participants; it may, but need not, include
onlookers. (Middle English 4)
The creation of a “time and place” distinct from that of the audience represents for Diller
a revolutionary artistic world view.
The larger issue at hand here is the development of a richer and more “play-ful”
understanding of mimesis and representation as the Middle Ages progressed. The
question at issue here is to what extent the representation of a thing equates to the
substantive becoming of that thing. Camille documents the tension throughout the
Middle Ages between idolatria and latria, between images as tools for idol worship and
images as gestures of homage directed toward the divine (203-8). Early in its history, the
medieval church’s deep fear of idolatry allowed images to do little more than point to the
True God rather than incarnating God here on earth: “images were fine as long as they
were only channels that diverted attention away from the materiality of the signifier and
pointed the viewer to its transcendental meaning” (Camille 204).
Throughout the Middle Ages, theologians engaged in hair-splitting discussions of
the relationship between image and referent, perhaps best summed up in the words of
Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225-1274) in his Summa Theologica:
[T]here is a two-fold movement of the mind towards an image: one
indeed towards the image itself as a certain thing; another, towards the
image in so far as it is the image of something else. And between these
movements there is this difference; that the former, by which one is
moved towards an image as a certain thing, is different from the
movement towards the thing: whereas the latter movement, which is
towards the image as an image, is one and the same as that which is
towards the thing. Thus therefore we must say that no reverence is shown
to Christ’s image, as a thing—for instance, carved or painted wood:
because reverence is not due save to a rational creature. It follows
therefore that reverence should be shown to it, in so far only as it is an
image. Consequently the same reverence should be shown to Christ’s
image as to Christ himself. (qtd. in Camille 207)
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Such tortured logic actually represents in many ways a significant shift in the Christian
interpretation of mimesis, since Aquinas finds grounds for responding to images as
sources of spiritual engagement rather than rejecting images outright. But the continual
effort to derive the power of the image from its “real” material/historical progenitor
reflects the Neoplatonic viewpoint that images are useful only inasmuch as they point us
back to the truth.
There is much danger in such a viewpoint when one is staging the events of the
Bible. Kolve points out that the religious function of medieval theatre specifically
brought to the fore the troublesome problem of representing the divine:
[A] player for the Waterleaders’ Guild in Chester could take the role of
Noah without jeopardy: since Noah was a man and is to be acted by a
man, the image and its referent are of the same nature. But a player for the
Drapers’ Guild chosen to enact God ran a certain risk […] . Here the
image and its referent are so different in kind that blasphemy or sacrilege
may be involved. (9)
Even as late as 1609, the “post-Reformation” Chester Banns went to great lengths to
justify how a mere human could figure the face of God by offering an argument based
largely on the function of the mask used by most performers who played God:
It is wrong, it [the Chester Banns] suggests, for any man to try to “act” or
imitate God, because no human being can proportion the Divinity. But, it
tells us, we can get round this problem if we think of the mask or gilded
face as an equivalent to the modern cloud-machine which completely
hides the actor, allowing a “voice of God” to speak. This comparison
urges that the mask, like the cloud-machine, must be thought of as
completely abolishing the man, the actor himself. We do not see him
representing or pretending to be God, but only hear the voice speaking
God’s words. (Twycross and Carpenter 173, emphasis in original)
Twycross and Carpenter here articulate how two dominant themes of medieval
perception related to each other—the emphasis on sight or vision, and the iconoclastic
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impulses to avoid representing God falsely. Note that the “loophole” which allows
performers to play the role of God stems from the notion that these performers are
(imaginatively) only heard, not seen. Representing the voice of God is acceptable within
this perspective; the sin emerges when one tries to take on God’s appearance.
The problem of mimesis was not only an issue for the performers but also for the
audience. As we noted in Chapter One, by witnessing Christ’s crucifixion during the
various biblical pageant plays, audience members participated in that desecration by their
inaction. Anne Higgins describes how the geography of medieval York could merge with
the geography of the Bible. Discussing the fact that the Last Judgment in York was
traditionally staged in The Pavement, an inner part of the city associated with the
butcher’s trade where “traitors were executed, drunks pilloried, rogues whipped, kings
and queens proclaimed, bulls baited,” she goes on to argue for the appropriateness of this
location for the concluding play of the Corpus Christi pageant:
Where better to proclaim judgment and to exact punishment after
separating the saved from the damned? But there’s more to the investing
of this medieval space with cosmological meaning. Audiences all along
the route were constantly brought into the play’s action, as nosy
neighbors, as crowds screaming for Barabbas, as the saved and the
damned.[…] So too the streets, houses, churches, and markets were
employed in a specific, sophisticated, and concrete anachronism in order
to bring home to the spectators the figural sense of the play’s
representation of history. (Higgins 89)
In this sense, the pageants’ mimetic efforts transformed the entire community, folding
time and space so as to allow past events to become present. But for audiences touching
that past time and space, their souls were at stake in the performance as they explored
multiple roles that they could play in biblical space and time. This transformation into
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“the saved and the damned” could just as easily mean that one was damned as that one
was saved.
In the earliest Christian explorations into theatrical representation, such problems
of mimesis were solved by their function as ritual rather than “play”: “The Latin drama
of the Church had avoided the Crucifixion and had little connection with game. The
church and the liturgy were its natural milieu. It was simple, dignified, ritualistic, limited
in its means” (Kolve 18-19). Latin liturgical drama therefore sidestepped the issue of
mimesis by merely celebrating the fact of Christ’s death and resurrection rather than
attempting to embody these events. But as performers continued to stage such dramatic
and moving moments, interpretive theatrical codes were developed to signal that such
representations were only “play” or “game”: “from a conception of drama as play and
game—as something therefore not ‘in ernest’—a drama involving sacred personages and
miraculous events could be born” (Kolve 17). Only when theatrical codes could signal
the presence of a second world, a metaworld of “let’s pretend,” could the problem of
mimesis be addressed so that divine stories could be told under the rubric of “play.”
Diller usefully contrasts the function of the imaginative second world of the
biblical cycle plays (or “mysteries”) in vernacular English with the ritual practice of the
Latin liturgical dramas:
In the vernacular drama […], one was always aware of the difference
between the representation and the things represented. In the mystery play
the history of salvation is not “re-presented,” not “made present” again,
but performed, told scenically. This changes the relationship between
actor and role. “Re-production” is replaced by “showing.” Whereas the
performer in a liturgical drama took his role upon him as a ritual task, the
actor in the mystery play seems, so to speak, to step “alongside” his role.
In contrast to the genuine liturgical performer, he is therefore able to talk
about the actions and the motives of the character he represents as he
would talk about a third person, he can describe what is difficult to see and
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explain what is difficult to understand. In the later plays we will even find
him responding to probable reactions of his audience. His theatrical
style—as far as we can gather from the texts—thus resembles that of the
epic theatre, where the actor is supposed to “narrate” his part. In the
medieval theatre, however, where the audience is always present as a
silent partner, the audience-address never brings about the destruction of a
dramatic illusion (as do its modern counterparts). Such an illusion is not
the intention of this drama[…]. (Diller, Middle English 112-113)
A certain reflexivity is created when one assumes that performance is not “in ernest,” and
this reflexivity allows for the bodies of the performers to address the bodies of the
audience and comment upon both the actions and the motives behind the actions of the
characters in the play. A major focus of chapters three through five of this study will be
to explore the degree and kinds of reflexivity each chronotope of performance allows for,
as the distinction between the first and second worlds of performance is variously
effaced, maintained, or transgressed.
The Bodies Living the Chronotope
Our experiences of space and time, along with our social experiences of
theatergoing, derive meaning in the context of our socially constructed bodies. In order
to obtain a richer phenomenal understanding of medieval theatrical experiences, we
should consider the various kinds of bodies that were routinely constructed, inscribed,
negotiated, and renegotiated in medieval England. Throughout our explorations of
various chronotopes of medieval performance, we will frame our discussion of bodies
using Harald Kleinschmidt’s concept of heterodynamic and autodynamic bodies as well
as Arthur Frank’s typology of “styles of body usage” (53). Kleinschmidt’s work offers a
sociopolitical interpretation of why certain images of the body were popularized at
various points throughout the Middle Ages, and Frank’s typology of body usage helps us
to conduct a detailed analysis of “how the body is a problem for itself” (52, emphasis in
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original) by exploring various ways one might come to terms with bodily issues of
control, desire, other-relatedness, and self-relatedness (53). The combination of these
two theoretical approaches will enable us to conceptualize how medieval bodies might
have understood themselves and their relations with other bodies during theatrical
performances.
Kleinschmidt argues that in medieval Europe, a shift occurred slowly but
perceptibly over the centuries which involved a gradual, sociopolitically motivated
transition from an emphasis on the body’s dependency on other bodies to a new emphasis
on a self-sufficient body. He describes this shift as “a change […] from heterodynamic to
autodynamic modes of behavior” (63). He defines the two body types in this way:
On the one side, persons can assume that their bodies are an autodynamic
instrument which they can and ought to use in accordance with their own
will, where they depend mainly on themselves and where the decision
upon the success or failure of an action depends mainly on the intensity by
which persons can act without the support of others. On the other side, the
human body can also be perceived heterodynamically, namely in such a
way that the willingness to act among persons and the initiative for
interactions among persons, groups, and the physical environment are
believed to originate in an external source outside a person’s body and
where the decision upon success or failure of an action or interaction
depends mainly on the degree by which a person can avail him- or herself
of the assistance of other human or non-human agents. (62-63)
We might describe the difference between these two bodies in ontological terms as an
ontology of self-sufficiency as compared with an ontology of need. The heart of
Kleinschmidt’s discussion here is that the sociopolitically motivated construction of
bodies as dependent upon each other shifted as we moved into the late Middle Ages to a
conception of the body as complete in and of itself, at least in its ideal form.
Kleinschmidt argues for this transition in three stages. In the early Middle Ages,
the generally risk-filled and contingent bodies of Europeans under early feudalism found
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themselves threatened constantly by raids, dangerous animals, long migrations, and
uncertain weather: “The human body was thus regarded as the recipient of various
external influences and pressures, negative as well as positive in kind” (Kleinschmidt 63).
The positive external influences that Kleinschmidt mentions here are natural and
supernatural helpers; an individual body’s strength lay in the kind and number of helpers
that body could obtain. In such conditions, the strength of an individual body was
negligible; bodies were strong only in numbers, and then only if they cooperated with
each other:
Group members conducted their lives under the impression that, whatever
they could or ought to accomplish, was possible only insofar as each
member acted in agreement with the behavioral and legal norms accepted
by the group and with the stipulations which were taken to have been
released by the divine agency or superhuman forces in the environment.
(Kleinschmidt 63)
Within this heterodynamic mode of bodily usage, kinship ties and the continuity of the
ruling lineage(s) provide the body with the greatest sense of stability; when such ties and
continuity are threatened, the body finds itself alone and at risk (Kleinschmidt 64).
Kleinschmidt documents numerous early medieval, largely pre-Christian images
where divine or supernatural forces are depicted as “victory helpers” that enable great
warriors to be successful. Warriors “seem to have perceived themselves as being in need
of more than technical skills and physical strength in the early Middle Ages”
(Kleinschmidt 66). Success or failure for these warriors, who formed the basis of the
leadership structures in early medieval feudalism, “depended upon the availability or the
lack of availability of supportive superhuman forces” (Kleinschmidt 66). Of course, the
early Middle Ages produced many images and tales of seemingly self-sufficient, even allpowerful warrior-kings, most notably Beowulf. But Kleinschmidt argues that these
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largely mythical bardic figures were understood as “the most extraordinary people,
predestined to become rulers or other persons of influence” (Kleinschmidt 68). Such
extraordinary figures, in turn, were re-interpreted as external forces acting upon the
bodies of the populace at large, working to mold the populace into a functional kinship
unit: “the givers of support or pressure were the rulers, divine agencies or superhuman
forces, and the recipients were the common people as the ruled” (Kleinschmidt 68).
As the Catholic Church grew in strength and importance in the Middle Ages, the
image of the body as dependent upon superhuman forces for its survival proved a useful
rhetorical tool, and the image of Jesus on the cross supplanted the pre-Christian “victory
helper” images:
Following this legendary tradition, Christ came to be displayed on early
medieval crucifixes as a winner who could convey safety and power to his
followers[…]. In these as in other crucifixes, Christ is not represented as a
human sufferer in great pain, but as the immortal divine triumphant victor
of earthly struggles. Christ’s extraordinariness is displayed through his
ability to accomplish deeds which ordinary human beings could not
without fear of death. (Kleinschmidt 69)
In short, Christ was often represented as something like an even better Beowulf—He
became the superhumanly powerful force that could guarantee victory and safety for
bodies in a dangerously contingent world. In turn, early feudal leaders could derive some
of the aura of invincibility that Christ and His Saints seemed to possess (by virtue of
Church rhetoric which framed these figures as invincible) by becoming prominent
patrons of this new religion. Thus the “spreading of Christianity was greatly eased
among those of high rank whose task it was to display and radiate the physical strength
which appeared as essential as a conveyor of energy for the ordinary people in their own
daily struggles” (Kleinschmidt 72).
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By aligning themselves with and publicly supporting this new religion, early
feudal leaders could acquire, by association as it were, some of the aura of bodily
invincibility associated with the Christian God and His Son. A second phase in the
development of heterodynamic bodies occurred as Catholic officials realized the threat
implicit in allowing feudal leaders to “borrow” the power of Christ: “the leading
representatives of the universal Catholic Church had to cope with self-reliant, intrusive
and power-acquiring particularistic local lay ruling elites who were themselves
determined to take possession of and control church institutions” (Kleinschmidt 73).
Rhetorically, the Church needed to construct its divine figures as the only self-sufficient
sources of power; by doing so, it could resist the tendency for lay leaders to claim
authority over Church properties and institutions.
As Christianity worked to assert its authority over secular organizations in the
heart of the Middle Ages, then, the new image of leaders and saints alike became an
impoverished and needy body, one that would be dependent upon God in Heaven for its
strength. “Since the tenth century, the image of physical strength of the bodies of Christ
and the saints gradually waned. The process first touched upon the representation of the
bodies of royal saints, that is those saints whose kin group was royal or who had been
kings themselves” (Kleinschmidt 73). Representations of these saints, both in visual art
and in literature, came to emphasize their frailties rather than their strengths, showing
them as dependent upon a higher authority: “Hence late tenth century hagiography
emphasized physical suffering and reinstalled the ancient image of the saint as the victim
rather than the victor” (Kleinschmidt 73).
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Kleinschmidt observes that the “same process of devictorisation and the
increasing sense of bodily frailty also became explicit in changes in the image of Christ at
the same time” (75). Margaret R. Miles describes the dominant image of Christ prior to
this shift, the image of Christ Triumphant whose victory outweighs his victimage:
Christ in Majesty, Christus triumphans, depicted in the half-dome of the
apse and in the tympanum of the main portal of a Romanesque church
informed the worshipper as she entered that the same Christ who presides
over the cosmos is the “door” by which worshippers enter the liturgical
gatherings of the faithful. (8, emphasis in original)
Yet as we move out of Romanesque art and architecture into the high Middle Ages
(1000-1300), a whole new image of Christ and Christianity develops, an image expressed
most profoundly in church art. Whereas “ecclesiastics wanted the traditional cross that
symbolized Christ’s triumph and victory, rather than the new pathetic type that evinced
his human suffering,” sculptors in the early 1300’s were “carving a ’terrifying crucifix’
[…] with a yoked or Y-shaped cross” which for the lay populace was all the more
appealing for its portrait of Christ’s embodied suffering (Camille 212). Indeed, in 1305
the bishop of London arranged for the secret removal and destruction of a “crux
horribilis” that portrayed an emaciated Christ, his head drooping down as if
contemplating his visible ribs, his arms and legs mere bones. The bishop may have
arranged for the crucifix’s removal, not because it offended his sensibilities, but out of
fear that this crucifix “excited too much devotion among the populace who flocked to the
city to see it” (Sekules 99).
In the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth centuries, the heterodynamic, desperately
needy body formerly associated with the common populace became the fashion for all
levels of society. As Christ transformed from Christus triumphans to Christus patiens, or
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Christ the sufferer, the heterodynamic image of the body took even stronger hold in the
public imaginary, emphasizing each individual’s sinful frailty when judged from God’s
(and the Catholic Church’s) perspective:
The new image was that of a Christ who was the pale, cadaverous bearer
of earthly sins with profusely bleeding wounds. It entailed a perception of
the human body as not only frail, but also as the sinful prison of the soul,
and led to an asceticism among believers who sought to castigate their
bodies in a Christ-like image with the ultimate goal of achieving a
mystical union between themselves and Christ. (Kleinschmidt 75).
In this most extreme version of the heterodynamic body, corporeality is understood as the
source of one’s weakness—the body is reconfigured as “rotting, worthless and no more
than the temporary earthen residence of the eternal spirit” (Kleinschmidt 75). In turn,
each body becomes absolutely dependent upon others for moral support in overcoming its
own corporeality—and, in a rhetorical sense, each body becomes dependent upon the
Christian Church for its salvation from itself.
Not all members of medieval society were equally affected by this heterodynamic
view of the body, however. Kleinschmidt argues that “during the high and late Middle
Ages, there were two groups which were only marginally affected by the otherwise
increasing mysticism and asceticism; they were the emerging military aristocracy of the
knights and the urban patriciate of merchant traders” (76). As urban communities grew
and developed a unique culture that differed more from rural culture with each passing
year, the chief participants in this new urban culture—the merchants mentioned above,
along with scholars and artisans—began to consider the body as a source of power,
energy, and worth.
For instance, whereas natural disasters, which had visibly greater impacts on
urban areas than on rural ones, had been for centuries regarded as proof of the body’s
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heterodynamic insufficiency, starting in the late Middle Ages, large communities found
themselves using their exceptional bodily resources to recover from and move beyond
such disasters:
Hence, much as the physical environment continued to be seen as a threat
to human activity, the urban traders, artisans, and scholars, as the three
major groups of inhabitants of urban communities, adopted an
autodynamic mode of behaviour and accepted it as their task to use their
own bodily energies and financial capabilities to overcome the disaster.
(Kleinschmidt 77)
What marks such behavior as particularly autodynamic was that, although the community
was still drawing upon multiple bodies for multiple resources as it had in a
heterodynamic mode, those bodies were now regarded as being productive and selfsufficient. Political leaders, the Catholic Church, and divine figures were no longer
conceived as necessary “victory helpers” who could provide energy to sustain and
strengthen the common populace’s weak bodies; instead, those bodies became celebrated
for being capable of taking care of themselves.
In a similar manner, the knightly class of necessity reconceptualized bodily might
as a personal virtue, similar perhaps to the physical elements of arête associated with
classical Greek warriors. For centuries, political leadership had come through physical
prowess, and the bodies of feudal leaders were thus understood as being sources of
compensatory bodily might which would protect the heterodynamically needy bodies of
the common populace. But in the late Middle Ages, political power was only loosely
based on physical might; political leaders largely acquired their military might by
purchasing it from an expanding professional military class of knights:
[C]ontrary to the early Middle Ages, during the thirteenth, fourteenth and
early fifteenth centuries physical strength no longer legitimised political
power, but was then a condition for recognition as a member of a knightly
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aristocracy. This aristocracy formed a social group of military
professionals who were employed for military service by the rulers, who
could themselves claim to be , but by no means always were, military
professionals. Next to the merchant traders, it is within this social group
of aristocratic military professionals that the autodynamic demand for the
physical strength of the body, coupled with a sense of self-reliance,
independence and competitiveness, was upheld against the ascetic image
of bodily frailty. (Kleinschmidt 78)
These knights expressed and propagandized their autodynamic bodily sufficiency (and
even bodily superfluity) at jousts and tournaments where they could both test and
advertise their bodies as commodities. Indeed, their bodies were the knights’ chief
commodities, rather than being a source of shame or weakness as the heterodynamic view
of the body would have them believe.
By 1500, as the knightly class began to train and study martial skills increasingly
in cities, urban culture began to be dominated by autodynamic merchant, artisan, and
knightly bodies:
While much of the traditional modes of behaviour continued among
peasant farmers and the growing underprivileged groups of poor residents
in the towns and cities well into the eighteenth century, the new demands
[for autodynamic behavior] became accepted by political, military,
ecclesiastical, trading elites and intellectual opinion leaders. From the
beginning of the fifteenth century in southern Europe and elsewhere,
eventually, around 1500, the majority of them underwrote the demand that
everyone should use his or her own energies for the purpose of acquiring
physical strength, intellectual skills and professional achievements.
(Kleinschmidt 81)
In training manuals for martial arts, in images of leaders and religious figures, and in
literary descriptions of the late Middle Ages, this autodynamic body came to dominate:
“The human body came to be depicted and described as energetic, enduring and as a
source of original, not divinely ordained, creative activity” (Kleinschmidt 82).
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In terms of how Kleinschmidt’s theory of hetero- and autodynamic bodies will be
used in the present study, two caveats must be kept in mind. First, as Kleinschmidt
argues persuasively, the distinction between hetero- and autodynamic bodies cannot and
should not be reduced to a distinction between collectivism and individualism:
While the concept of the autodynamic mode of behaviour focuses on
specific interactions between the human body and the social or physical
environment, the concept of individualism refers to a tendency of the
individual to emphasise his or her own significance, wishes and desires
vis-à-vis those of other group members. (Kleinschmidt 84)
In other words, while the collectivism/individualism continuum traces various efforts
either to fit in and work with the group or to stand out apart from the group, the
heterodynamic/autodynamic continuum traces the body’s understanding of its need for
others or its independence from them. One can be autodynamic and collectivistic at the
same time—consider, for instance, the knight who trains his body to maximize his
potential so that he may fight properly alongside his fellow warriors. Likewise, one may
be heterodynamic and individualistic at the same time—consider, for instance, crusading
church reformers like St. Francis whose ideas set them apart from others yet who
conceived their bodies as being insufficient and in need of both temporal support from
like-minded Christians and divine support from God.
Another temptation we must resist as we mobilize the hetero- and autodynamic
modes of behavior to explore the bodies of medieval theatergoers is the temptation to
view the movement from one kind of body to the other as an evolutionary transition
where the autodynamic body eliminates the inferior or no longer functional
heterodynamic body. In his research, Kleinschmidt essentially documents a shift in
demographics, not an evolutionary replacement of one ontological mode by another. The
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autodynamic body did not replace the heterodynamic body which, as mentioned earlier,
continued to be the dominant mode of bodily perception for long after the medieval
period. Instead, we might more accurately say that both body images co-existed
throughout the Middle Ages, and the shift from heterodynamic dominance to
autodynamic dominance reflected a shift in numbers and population rather than an
evolutionary erasure of a mode of being.
While Kleinschmidt’s theory of hetero- and autodynamic bodies helps us
conceptualize certain aspects of medieval bodily experience, it is limited to a discussion
of but one element of bodily experience—our sense of our bodily sufficiency or
insufficiency. Arthur W. Frank offers a more detailed typology of body usage which can
supplement and expand Kleinschmidt’s two bodily modes. Frank examines body issues
in terms of four problems that a body poses for itself—that is, a body’s search for control,
for the satiation (or endless replication) of its desire, for other-relatedness, and for selfrelatedness. With regard to the issue of control, a body may regard itself as predictable
(i.e., under its own control) or contingent (i.e., uncertain and tentative). With regard to
the issue of desire, Frank argues that a body can construe itself as lacking (and thus in
need of fulfillment) or producing (and thus blessed with abundance). With regard to its
relation to others, a body may regard itself as monadic (singular) or dyadic (i.e., working
in concert with others). Finally, with regard to the issue of its self-relatedness, a body
may either consciously associate the self with the body or may experience a sense of
dissociation of self from the body (Frank 51-52).
Some of the elements that Frank takes into account in his typology of bodily
usage are similar to those considered by Kleinschmidt—in particular, the monadic-dyadic
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binary resembles the autodynamic-heterodynamic continuum. Where Frank moves
beyond Kleinschmidt is in his exploration of how four different kinds of bodies are
constructed through various combinations of the four bodily problems described above.
Frank describes the disciplined body as regarding itself as predictable, lacking, monadic,
and dissociated from itself. The primary mode of expression for this body is
regimentation. The mirroring body, by comparison, also regards itself as predictable and
monadic but sees itself as producing rather than lacking and as associated with itself. The
primary mode of expression for this body is consumption. The dominating body regards
itself as contingent (i.e. unpredictable), dyadic, lacking, and dissociated from itself. The
primary mode of expression for this body is force. The communicative body regards
itself as contingent and dyadic but is producing and is associated with itself. The primary
mode of expression for this body is recognition (Frank 53-54).
More will be said about these types of bodies in the chapters that follow. For
now, it will suffice to observe that Frank’s typology helps us to consider multiple
dimensions of bodily experience, and by doing so it supplements Kleinschmidt’s
historically rooted observations about medieval bodily constructions. Taken in concert,
the work of Frank and Kleinschmidt allows us to theorize in some detail about the bodily
experiences of medieval theatergoers which, in turn, helps us “flesh out” the various
chronotopes of medieval performance.
One final kind of body must be considered, however, in light of my use of
Bakhtin’s work on the chronotope. Although he explores a variety of kinds of bodies and
their relations with each other, with words, and with time and space, perhaps the most
famous kind of body Bakhtin discusses is the carnivalesque body. This body, while
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discussed in other works by Bakhtin, is most associated with Rabelais and His World, a
study which explores (among other things) the passage from medieval to Renaissance
representations of the body. It would at first blush seem that the carnivalesque body
would therefore be an appropriate body for our discussion of medieval chronotopes of
performance. The carnivalesque body described in Rabelais and His World, however, is
not consistent with the majority of Bakhtin’s research on metalinguistics and the
chronotope, and as such is of limited usefulness in the context of my research here.
Bakhtin describes the carnivalesque body in Rabelais and His World in terms that
preclude both metalinguistic dialogism and chronotopic perception:
In grotesque realism […] the bodily element is deeply positive. It is
presented not in a private, egotistic form, severed from the other spheres
of life, but as something universal, representing all the people. As such it
is opposed to severance from the material and bodily roots of the world; it
makes no pretense to renunciation of the earthly, or independence of the
earth and the body. We repeat: the body and bodily life have here a
cosmic and at the same time an all-people’s character; this is not the body
and its physiology in the modern sense of these words, because it is not
individualized. The material bodily principle is contained not in the
biological individual, not in the bourgeois ego, but in the people, a people
who are continually growing and renewed. (19)
Such a body, as joyous, renewing, and utopian as it may be, is of necessity a singular
body, that is, one body made up of the unity of “the people.” A singular body cannot
engage in dialogue, since it has no partner with whom to converse: “Whereas dialogue
presupposes at least two responsible discrete selves, each outside the other, carnival
strives everywhere toward fusion, which makes true dialogue impossible” (Morson and
Emerson 227, emphasis in original). As we shall see shortly, the issue of how
performance speech is addressed to different individuals in the first and second worlds as
well as in the material and spiritual worlds will be a central concern for our study, and as

64

such the carnivalesque body’s movement away from dialogic relations would weaken the
current study rather than strengthen it.
Likewise, a singular body that encompasses “the people” has no specific, fixed
place in space and time, and as such, it cannot participate meaningfully in any specific
chronotope: “Inasmuch as the idea of the chronotope stresses the specific historically
bounded time and space that enables individual acts, carnival could be understood as an
antichronotope” (Morson and Emerson 228, emphasis in original). Rather than the
encompassing, decrowning, orifice-obsessed carnivalesque body of Rabelais and His
World, we will be better served to explore the specific needs of specific bodies who find
themselves working and playing with, against, for, and alongside each other.
The Eucharist as Flesh and Metaphor
In a world where flesh and spirit are intertwined as they often were in medieval
England, “flesh” included more than human bodies. Perhaps the most profound example
of the struggle over the meaning of materiality, image, metaphor, and spirituality in the
Middle Ages can be found in the enduring struggle over one short phrase: “Hoc est enim
corpus meum,” or “This is my body.” One of the greatest successes of the early Church
fathers in reifying Church doctrine in the early Middle Ages came in their efforts to
legitimate the doctrine of transubstantiation—the belief that the bread and wine served at
Eucharist, once properly consecrated, were literally transformed into the body and blood
of Jesus Christ. That this doctrine became standard throughout Western Christianity is a
remarkable achievement of doctrinal “spin,” as it were, given the various incongruities
that such a doctrine brings to the fore—what Gallagher and Greenblatt have called the
“threat that recalcitrant, ineradicable matter posed for eucharistic theology” (144). One
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must chew the flesh of Christ; one must deal with the crumbs left behind, crumbs which
may consecrate church mice who are blessed by receiving the Body of Christ as a
surprise snack; one must solve the riddle of digestion—does the Lord pass through our
entrails?
Despite this problem of “material residue,” as Gallagher and Greenblatt call it, the
doctrine of transubstantiation became central to Catholic theology:
In fact, the Host can be described as the single most important image to
Christians from the middle of the thirteenth century onward, perhaps even
overtaking veneration of the cross. Unlike the latter, which was only a
sign, the Host was a material substance that in countless places and at
different times was capable of transforming into God’s flesh. (Camille
215)
Indeed, the elevation of the Host after its consecration became not only the most popular
moment in the Mass, but became for some the only important moment: “In the cities
people ran from church to church to see the elevated Host as often as possible, since they
assumed that the more Elevations you saw, the more grace you would acquire” (Harris
75). Here we see in microcosm the problem that images, iconicity, and the materiality of
existence posed for Christian faith: Material substance (bread and wine) is valuable, but
only if it somehow “becomes real” in a spiritual sense through the act of worshipping the
One True God. But in “becoming real,” material cannot transcend its materiality no
matter how hard it tries—wine dribbles off lips and soaks into vestments; crumbs
disappear into corners to be sought by less-than-devout creatures.
Hence one might argue that the generalized movement throughout the Middle
Ages from a rejection of images, mimesis, and embodiment to an embracing of
materiality and enfleshed spirituality was, to some extent, written into the contradictory
qualities of Christian faith. Throughout medieval England, various pre- or proto-

66

Protestant impulses toward consubstantial doctrine urged participants to regard the
Eucharist as a metaphorical pointing to a spiritual reality. This view of the Eucharist as
representation can inform our understanding of the typical medieval distinction between
Latin liturgical dramas that could not abide “illusionistic” mimesis and the Corpus Christi
pageants that could represent embodied efforts to represent Christian doctrine as “mere
play”—that is, as metaphorical rather than literal embodiment. In this sense, the two
interpretive planes—spiritual/material and first world/second world—are inevitably
intertwined. Whenever one addresses issues of the relationship between spirit and matter,
one must also address issues of representation, since the representation of spirit can only
come through matter. When seeking relationships between the spiritual and the material,
we must always ask whether or not the spiritual entities we are referring to are
metaphorical expressions of our religious imagination or whether those entities are part of
the same world we live in, breathing the same air.
Addressivity and Theatrical Images
Bakhtin’s concept of addressivity allows us to consider in detail our relations with
various entities—whether they be part of our religious imagination or possessed of some
form of substance. Doing so will correct the tendency to view chronotopes as static
givens with no motives or communicative intentions informing them. In Bakhtin’s view,
all aspects of Being are addressed to me, as it were, and I must actively work to respond
to events as they are addressed to me: “In other words, addressivity is […] an activity,
the dialogue between events addressed to me in the particular place that I occupy in
existence, and my expression of a response to such events from that unique place”
(Holquist 48, emphasis in original). Narratives, as events, are likewise marked as
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utterances which are called into being as responses to other utterances and which in turn
summon forth other utterances in response. Narratives, and the chronotopes that in-form
them, are responses, not a priori givens. As such, any detailed discussion of chronotopes
will be concerned with questions of motive and interaction—who is being addressed from
within this chronotope, and why?
Bakhtin argues that the primary purpose of analyzing “utterances” rather than
“language” is to focus on the ways in which language exists, not in and for itself, but
within and for interlocutors to engage each other. “Thus, addressivity, the quality of
turning to someone, is a constitutive feature of the utterance; without it the utterance does
not and cannot exist” (Bakhtin, Speech 99). Or, as Morson and Emerson put it,
“[D]ialogue is possible only among people, not among abstract elements of language.
There can be no dialogue between sentences. An utterance requires both a speaker and a
listener (or a writer and a reader), who […] have joint proprietorship of it” (131).
Only by examining the influence of this “someone” that an utterance “turns to”
can we offer a meaningful response to the utterance as critics: “Both the composition
and, particularly, the style of the utterance depend on those to whom the utterance is
addressed, how the speaker (or writer) senses and imagines his addressees, and the force
of their effect on the utterance” (Bakhtin, Speech 95). Taking an addressee—or multiple
addressees—into consideration in one’s analysis of an utterance can lead to several
different kinds of messiness, but ultimately, each of these kinds of messiness in turn leads
to a richer and more nuanced interpretation of the utterance. Indeed, Morson and
Emerson argue that Bakhtin’s celebration of messiness as opposed to systematic
theoretism is one hallmark of his theory of language and dialogue: “For Bakhtin, the

68

attempt to explain away messiness by postulating still more systems and the higher order
of a system of systems is at best like adding epicycles to a Ptolemaic astronomy and at
worst a wholly unjustified leap of theoretist faith” (144). Like children playing in a mud
puddle, we cannot examine (or play with) utterances without getting messy.
One kind of messiness involved in taking addressees into account when
examining an utterance is that doing so inevitably involves taking several aspects of the
addressee and the addressee’s relation to the author/speaker into account. An utterance
is, essentially, only one side of what can sometimes be a very complicated argument or
discussion, and can anticipate responses from the addressee:
When constituting my utterance, I try actively to determine this response.
Moreover, I try to act in accordance with the response I anticipate, so this
anticipated response, in turn, exerts an active influence on my utterance (I
parry objections that I foresee, I make all kinds of provisos, and so forth).
When speaking I always take into account the apperceptive background of
the addressee’s perception of my speech: the extent to which he is
familiar with the situation, whether he has special knowledge of the given
cultural area of communication, his views and convictions, his prejudices
(from my viewpoint), his sympathies and antipathies—because all this will
determine his actively responsive understanding of my utterance.
(Bakhtin Speech 95-96)
The mere fact that an utterance, including a given theatrical performance in medieval
England, is uttered to and for someone introduces a meta-level of communication. The
author is both framing his/her thoughts and framing responses to the addressee’s
imagined responses in the same moment.
The fact that these anticipated responses from the addressee are for the most part
imagined or anticipated leads us to another kind of messiness involved in taking
addressees into account when examining an utterance. The addressee for a written work
is often the product of the author’s imagination rather than being an actual, historical,
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flesh-and-blood person. Of course, writers can and do take into account specific readers
and their responses when crafting a narrative—they can imagine the responses of editors,
patrons, friends, clerical superiors, other artists, and more in an attempt to craft their work
to fit the demands of these readers. Even in this instance, though, the writer is largely
taking into account, not an actual response from a reader, but rather an anticipated (and
thus imaginary) response. This is not always true, of course—the writer may, for
instance, listen to a patron’s comments about a first draft of a work and adapt the work
based on those comments. Still, a certain messiness is inevitable when trying to identify
the imagined interlocutors that writers and performers imagine they will be speaking to as
they craft their narratives.
A third kind of messiness involved in taking addressees into account when
examining an utterance is that an utterance can have multiple and even contradictory
addressees, both actual and anticipated, real and imaginary. Writers and performers are
not required to be consistent in how they envision their readers’ responses; indeed,
careful and talented writers and performers will take into account the often contradictory
responses that a diverse audience can produce. Such an awareness of the diversity of
audience responses can lead to a more subtle, rich, and textured work. And in the case of
medieval performance, as we have seen already, we must also consider spiritual entities
as possible addressees. Spiritual entities in fact might in some ways be considered more
significant addressees than human ones in medieval England, given that relatively few
humans contribute to one’s fate in the afterlife while most if not all spiritual entities are
conceived of as actively working to seal one’s fate either for Heaven or for Hell.
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Of course, the responses of divine beings are likely to be quite different from
human responses; spiritual entities seem likely to respond to an utterance either
completely maliciously (working to twist your words at every turn) or completely
benevolently (making sense of even those flawed or poorly phrased utterances that you
hoped would be understood as you had intended them to be). Such thoroughgoing malice
or benevolence rarely obtains with human beings, but spiritual entities seem capable of a
kind of completeness or fullness of response that human addressees are not. In addition
to actual and imagined respondents, Bakhtin argues that we must imagine another, special
kind of interlocutor in order to examine addressivity fully. For although we craft
utterances to and for people, we also realize that no “author (or speaker) can ever count
on perfect understanding by his listener” (Morson and Emerson 135). Yet Bakhtin argues
that we construct utterances in part with an eye toward this pure and perfect
understanding: “This follows from the nature of the word, which always wants to be
heard, always seeks responsive understanding, and does not stop at immediate
understanding but presses on further and further (indefinitely)” (Speech 127, emphasis in
original).
Bakhtin therefore describes another category of addressee, the superaddressee, in
order to be able to discuss this hope-filled search for complete understanding that drives
every utterance. Morson and Emerson offer one of the most detailed examples and
definitions of the superaddressee available:
In everyday speech between two people, one might turn to an invisible
third person and say about the person actually present, “Would you just
listen to him!” Or one of the two may gesture: roll up his eyes or put his
body into a questioning position, as if asking some invisible person for
guidance in understanding the recalcitrant other. At times, we speak to
someone as if our real concern is with a possible listener not present, one
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whose judgment would really count or whose advice would really help us.
Stated more positively, the superaddressee embodies a principle of hope.
It is present, more or less consciously, in every utterance. (135, emphasis
in original)
In medieval England, spiritual entities are likely to play the role of these superaddressees,
although as Bakhtin is careful to emphasize, there is nothing particularly or specifically
mystical or religious about the superaddresee, which is first and foremost a product of the
hopeful nature of utterances (Speech 126-127). We can even qualify and extend
Bakhtin’s development of the concept of the superaddressee by noting that such voices
can be imagined as responding with perfect understanding or with “perfect” (that is,
demonic and maliciously thoroughgoing) mis-understanding.
Conclusion: Ownership and Ontology
Issues of addressivity lead us to questions of power and control over theatrical
images as forms of discourse. Who is the image being produced for, and who holds what
kind of authority over that image? Theatrical performance produces images, and with all
images, one question we can ask would be, “What is my relationship to this image?”
There are an almost infinite number of relationships one can have with a theatrical image,
ranging from those of complete disinterest to those of intense longing, obligation, even
need. Images can be phantasmal and thus relatively insignificant, or they can be
“ghostly” in the medieval sense—that is, infused with the Holy Spirit—and thus come to
possess ontological authority over those who view the images. Theatrical images can
speak to us as ontologically equal, ontologically inferior, or ontologically superior
entities. One can own the image, or one can be owned by the image. One of the major
areas for exploration in this study, then, is the variety of ontological relationships that
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medieval notions of spirituality and mimesis can bring into being in a theatrical context.
In other words, how do our bodies relate to divine images as representations?
Each of the three chronotopes to be examined in this study locates itself uniquely
with regard to two interpretive planes, the spiritual/material plane and the firstworld/second-world plane. The sacramental chronotope of early liturgical drama
assumes a fundamental equation of the material and spiritual worlds while allowing for
less distinction between the audience-sphere (first world) and the play-sphere (second
world). In this sense, the sacramental chronotope collapses distinctions that modern
theatergoers routinely make between what is “real” and “not real.” Within the context of
such ritual performances, the supposedly or typically imaginative metaworld created in
and through performance comes to acquire a greater ontological authority than the
ontological authority of the performers and other participants in liturgical dramas.
In contrast, the consubstantial chronotope of the later morality plays and Tudorera interludes such as Fulgens and Lucres functions more comfortably (at least to modern
minds) within the dichotomies of matter versus spirit, “real” world and “pretend” worlds
that characterize much of our current theatergoing experience. The consubstantial
chronotope thus assumes an almost absolute distinction between first and second
worlds—a distinction strong enough to allow for the boundary-breaking violations of the
“fourth wall” which often characterize modern metatheatrical play. This chronotope also
begins to divide the material and spiritual worlds, which in turn usurps some of the power
of the second world by severing its ties to the invisible world of the spirit.
Functioning as a sort of middle ground between the sacramental and
consubstantial chronotopes is the transubstantial chronotope associated with the Corpus
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Christi biblical pageants. This chronotope maintains the interconnectedness of the
material and spiritual worlds while negotiating a tenuous and often-blurred distinction
between the first world of the audience and the second world of the play. In the process,
the transubstantial chronotope takes full advantage of the powerful connection between
the invisible world of the spirit and the invisible “world” of the play to reach out to the
visible world of the audience. As noted earlier in this chapter, then, in medieval
experience it was fairly common to blur the distinction between what is real and what is
imagined in such a way as to have each frame inform the experience of the other frame.
In the process, the transubstantial chronotope grants a certain ontological authority both
to the world of the audience and the performers and to the fictive metaworld created in
and through performance, allowing each world to speak to and with the other.
An essential difference, then, between these three chronotopes is the way each
constructs, enables, or denies the agency of the performative metaworld to claim
ontological authority with regard to the performers and audience members in the moment
of performance. We might say that different chronotopes construct the ontological
substance of that performative metaworld differently. In our daily lives, we can regard
various entities as either possessing Being and thus possessing the power to speak to and
with us or as fundamentally lacking Being in the phenomenological sense that most
entities, in our daily experience, are regarded as existing but not Being. For most of us, a
tree in our front yard has existence but no Being, no capacity to challenge or contest our
world views—a power which we routinely grant to the people in our lives whose views
and concerns we value. Yet we might easily imagine a neo-pagan who worships trees
and whose orientation toward the tree in his/her front yard is essentially the same as
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his/her orientation toward the neighbor next door. In such a case, the neo-pagan actively
“gifts” the tree with ontological substance, an ontological substance that it might not
possess for you or for me.
By “substance” here, I refer not to any Aristotelian concept of fundamental
reality, but rather to the more everyday notion of substance as something with weight,
agency, and its own inertia. Relationally, a tree that I gift with ontological substance has
become “weighty” for me, and I must take the tree into account as I go about interacting
with the various Beings around me. In dialogical terms, I cannot simply “overlook” the
tree or dismiss its concerns—I can try to silence the tree or to ignore its pleas for water
and sunlight, but I cannot convince myself the tree is irrelevant. Once the tree acquires
ontological substance in its relation to me, I can no longer walk past it without, as it were,
at least waving “hello” in its direction.
The sacramental chronotope associated with Latin liturgical dramas grants the
imaginative metaworld with a profound ontological substance—the divine world that the
sacramental chronotope brings into contact with the participants in such dramas possesses
ontological superiority in comparison to the merely human clerics worshipping in their
meager way. The consubstantial chronotope, in contrast, actively denies the imaginative
metaworld any ontological substance—performance creates only “the stuff of dreams,”
and the world conjured in and through performance exists for my benefit rather than
having a “life of its own.” The second world of performance, in such a view, is like any
other object purchased for pleasurable or practical use, and it has no more ontological
substance—and thus no more capacity to engage me in dialogue—than any other
purchased object has, such as the computer I am writing on/with at this moment.
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The third possibility for ontological substance, and the most intriguing one for me
personally, is the possibility of the imaginative metaworld acquiring an ontologically
equal footing with me in the moment of performance. In the transubstantial chronotope,
as I will argue in Chapter Five, the second world achieves such an equal ontological
footing. Such an ontological footing is functionally similar to the more dialogic impulses
Bakhtin ascribes to the “serio-comical” genres which followed in the wake of the epic
and which preceded the development of the novel:
The shift of the temporal center of artistic orientation, which placed on the
same temporally valorized plane the author and his readers (on the one
hand) and the world and heroes described by him (on the other), making
them contemporaries, possible acquaintances, friends, familiarizing their
relations […], permits the author, in all his various masks and faces, to
more freely into the field of his represented world, a field that in the epic
had been absolutely inaccessible and closed. (Dialogic 27)
Just as the dialogic relations among author, audience, and created world that Bakhtin
refers to here require an active doing, a creation born of effort, so too ontological
substance is the result of effort and activity, something that is given or acquired or
obtained rather than something that existed prior to the event of performance. And in the
transubstantial chronotope, I would argue, the ontological substance of the imaginative
metaworld has as much interactional weight as does our neighbor—but not nearly the
interactional weight of an omnipotent God.
In the same manner that Kenneth Burke claims dramatism is not a metaphor for
but is rather a description of symbolic action, I would argue that my use of the terms
“transubstantial” and “consubstantial” here is not metaphorical—or, at least, I would
argue that the metaphor extended so deeply into the experience of medieval theatergoers
that it was no longer understood as a metaphor. In the transubstantial chronotope, infused

76

with figura, the word does indeed become flesh; just as bread and wine are transformed
into the body of Christ, the metaworld of a mystery play is transformed by the
transubstantial chronotope into an enfleshed historical reality as substantial as anything
else in the medieval audience’s reality. In the consubstantial chronotope, however, the
relationship between substance and spirit is purely symbolic; in the Tudor era interludes
of Henry Medwall, for instance, this sundering of substance and spirit transforms the
theatrical metaworld into a dreamworld with less ontological substance than that of the
audience. One might say, then, that a unique and powerful miracle occurs within the
transubstantial chronotope—a miracle facilitated by figural interpretation in the Middle
Ages.
By comparison, the term “sacramental” describes that particular chronotope of
performance not simply because such performance occurred during or in association with
Catholic sacraments during medieval church services. Rather, I wish to call upon the
way sacraments are constructed as ritual conduits which temporarily connect the human
and the divine. The sacrament of marriage, for instance, was (and in many cases still is)
understood as an invitation or a plea for God to come down to earth and to grant his
blessing and favor upon a given union. The sacrament of Extreme Unction beckons God
down to bring aid, comfort, and/or spiritual guidance to one who is sick or near death.
The sacramental chronotope, then, is one wherein symbolic action serves to bring the
world of humans into contact with the world of the divine as opposed to serving as a tool
for the creation of an imaginative metaworld.
The sacrament of the Eucharist, as we have seen, is a special sacrament in this
sense because it involves a transformation of substance into spirit. The transubstantial
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and consubstantial chronotopes, therefore, involve some sort of symbolic—and perhaps
even material—transformation rather than the symbolic instantiation involved in what I
call the sacramental chronotope. Through ritual sacra, the Latin liturgical dramas of
medieval England connected a congregation to the world of the divine without moving a
single step from the sacred space of the church, literally or figuratively. And it is to this
chronotope, one which is paradoxically the most literal and at the same time the most
spiritual, that we will turn our attention now.
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CHAPTER 3
THE SACRAMENTAL CHRONOTOPE
After this, any brother who is conscious of having committed some fault
shall humbly ask forgiveness and indulgence. But a brother that is
accused, no matter for what reason, by the abbot or by one of the senior
officials, shall prostrate himself before speaking. And when asked by the
prior the reason for this, he shall answer by admitting his fault, saying
Mea culpa domine. Then, when bidden, let him rise. If he acts in any
other wise he shall be deemed guilty. Thus whoever, when rebuked by a
superior for anything done amiss in the workshops, does not immediately
prostrate himself as the Rule ordains, must undergo the greater
punishment.
--from the Regularis concordia anglicae nationis
monachorum sanctimonialiumque by Aethelwold, c. 970973 A.D. (qtd. in Kobialka, This Is My Body 62)
This quote, taken from the same Regularis concordia containing the text of what
has often been considered the first medieval English drama, suggests that the bodies of
those religious who were both the performers and the primary audience members for
Latin liturgical dramas of the high Middle Ages (c. 1000-1300) were highly disciplined
bodies. Such discipline was provided both from without and from within; monastic
practices provided a rigid chain of authority that commanded absolute obedience, just as
God required such obedience from all His followers, and in turn monastic practice aimed
to instill an inner discipline that would express itself in outward obedience. Christian
humility, driven by a pious fear of God, required those who followed the monastic life to
commit themselves to constant regulation and submission, as is reflected in the Rule of
St. Benedict, written around 540 A.D.: “The first step of humility is attained by
unhesitating obedience” (Herlihy 58). An analysis of the Latin liturgical dramas of
medieval England—dramas which are frequently found alongside such strict monastic
regulations—must take into account the technologies of discipline that were not only
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written into monastic rules but also, and in the most thoroughgoing way, into all of the
practices of a given monastery, including performance practices.
Mary Curruthers usefully describes monastic disciplinary practices as
“orthopraxis,” that is, as an orthodox set of daily practices for becoming and remaining a
monk. Her description of monastic training as orthopraxis helps us to understand the
bodily technologies of teaching and learning discipline that dominated medieval monastic
life:
Orthodoxy explicates canonical texts, whereas orthopraxis emphasizes a
set of experiences and techniques, conceived as a “way” to be followed,
leading one to relive the founder’s path to enlightenment. Because it
seeks an experience, an orthopraxis can never be completely articulate;
instead of ritualized dogma, it relies upon patterns of oral formulae and
ritualized behavior to prepare for an experience of God, should one be
granted. Like chance, grace also favors a prepared mind.[…]
Monasticism is one such practice.[…] Any craft develops an orthopraxis,
a craft “knowledge” which is learned, and indeed can only be learned, by
the painstaking practical imitation and complete familiarization of
exemplary masters’ techniques and experiences. Most of this knowledge
cannot even be set down in words; it must be learned by practicing, over
and over again. Monastic education is best understood, I think, on this
apprenticeship model, more like masonry or carpentry than anything in the
modern academy. It is an apprenticeship to a craft which is also a way of
life. (Carruthers 1-2)
Monastic practice involved each young monk’s utter dependence upon masters of bodily
practice who would (at least ideally) provide, through example and through physical
training, initiation into a way of life. By following such practices of discipline, monks
could manufacture, as it were, the most important product of monastic work: “Monastic
meditation is the craft of making thoughts about God” (Carruthers 2).
One acquires such training communally, rather than through individual effort and
learning: “In medieval monasticism, the individual always had his or her being within a
larger community, within which a single life was ‘perfected,’ ‘made complete,’ by
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acquiring a civic being and identity” (Carruthers 2). In such a context, most monks found
themselves lacking in strength and meaning without the presence of others who could
provide the leadership required to master the monastic life. In Kleinschmidt’s terms,
these monastic bodies were driven by a heterodynamic sense of incompleteness and
vulnerability, always reliant on others for power, safety, and comfort. For such bodies,
meaning was authored largely, if not indeed exclusively, from above, both in terms of
one’s earthly superiors and in terms of the ultimate superiority of the Father, Son, and
Holy Spirit.
In such a context, the notion that one can own or author meaning, or even that
meaning is of necessity debated by ontological equals, was not necessarily in force at
various times in various places in medieval England. While from our contemporary
perspective, we often take for granted that we are in charge of the “care of souls” for
ourselves, medieval culture was for the most part dominated by the notion that the
individual could not produce meaning, could not author redemption, and could not make
sense of the world without reference to an ontologically superior being. This chapter is
an exploration of how an ontology of need might have informed the way participants in
Latin liturgical drama made sense of theatrical representation. Theatrical representation
means something very different if one thinks of oneself as author of one’s own meaning
(or co-author of a co-constructed meaning) than if one thinks of oneself as ontologically
incomplete and/or incapable of making meaning by oneself. In the latter case, the
imaginative “second world” created in and through performance might come to possess
an ontological superiority that we would likely find oppressive today precisely because
we frequently strive to author our own interpretations. But the history of medieval
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religious practices, from sacraments to sermons, suggests that the average person
regarded him/herself as functionally incapable of the care of his/her own soul, and thus
perhaps as being functionally incapable of making meaning out of existence.
Such people would look outside themselves for meaning, and they would find
such meaning in the space and time around them. As was noted in the previous chapter,
spiritual meaning was often localized in space and time, written into or “trapped” in
specific sites such as churches, shrines, and other holy (or unholy) places. Likewise, the
rhythms of monastic life assigned specific meanings to various hours of the day, to
various days of the week, and to various calendrical holidays. Monastic bodies,
therefore, moved through a powerfully ritualized space according to the rhythms of ritual
time. In this performance context, space and time become infused, as it were, with divine
meaning. The sacramental chronotope associated with Latin liturgical drama thus does
not need to author a fictional “second world” which it then brings it into contact with the
“first world” of the performers and audience. Instead, the sacramental chronotope,
through religious ritual, opens a doorway to correspondences between the first world and
the pre-existing and immanent divine world. The movement of liturgical dramas through
church space and time was in this sense both a pointer to and reflection of the allencompassing world of the spirit.
In this chapter, then, I will first describe the ontology of need that dominated the
everyday experience not only of clerics in medieval England but also the everyday
experience of most of the laity as well. From there, I move to recontextualize the texts of
Latin liturgical dramas in light of their frequent inclusion in larger works describing
monastic rules, regulations, and practices. A fuller appreciation of how Latin liturgical
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dramas were understood chronotopically can be gained by describing in detail the
disciplined bodies of those clerics who participated in the life of a monastery. The
discipline of such bodies and their daily regimentation might make us question whether
or not Latin liturgical dramas were understood as independent theatrical texts or “plays”;
as a result, I will explore definitions of “theatre” and “drama” that informed medieval
performers and audience members in the high Middle Ages. In the eyes of those engaged
in producing Latin liturgical dramas, “theatre” was addressed to humans, while the
dramas staged in monasteries to celebrate the love of Christ were addressed to God, thus
making their dramas more holy than debased secular “theatre.” With this understanding
in place, I end the chapter by discussing relations between the world of the spirit and the
world of matter, as well as relations between the first and second worlds of performance,
in the context of the religious rituals that we now call the Latin liturgical drama of
medieval England.
An Ontology of Need
The tenth century in England was an era of widespread monastic reform, where
laws, rules, and regulations proliferated to provide the clergy with a strict hierarchy and a
clear relationship with secular leaders:
The new monastic reform movement drew its inspiration from the
leadership of a triumvirate: Dunstan, archbishop of Canterbury,
Aethelwold, bishop of Winchester, and Oswald, archbishop of York and
bishop of Worcester. Backed by the king, they revolutionized the spiritual
geography of England. New hierarchies were introduced. A special
relationship was now seen to link Christ and his saints with the King and
his monks. As Christ ruled in heaven, so on earth did [King] Edgar, the
“vicar of Christ.” His monks meanwhile guarded the tombs of the saints
and sought their spiritual support. (Leyser 179-180)
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Significantly, all three of these monastic reformers were closely associated with the
creation of the Regularis concordia that provides us with the text of the Visitatio
Sepulchri, which is often regarded as the first English medieval drama (Kobialka, This Is
My Body 41). Equally significantly, we see here a relationship between the clergy and
the King which demonstrates the heterodynamic neediness that Kleinschmidt argues was
so prevalent in the high Middle Ages. The King relied on the Church for his status as the
“vicar of Christ,” which provided him with divinely granted secular power; meanwhile,
the Church relied on the King’s patronage to enforce its monopoly on spiritual practice.
Part of this mutual interdependence derived from Edgar’s project of uniting all of
England into a single kingdom:
While in the past there had been times when kings and monks had been at
loggerheads, jealous of each other’s power bases, partnership now seemed
mutually advantageous. The monks gained endowments for their
foundations, and the king, crucial support. The kings of Wessex, it must
be remembered, were only newly kings of England. In the unification of
England—in the surmounting of factional and local loyalties and
rivalries—the monks of the new foundations had a major role to play.
(Leyser 181-183)
The sweeping monastic reforms of the tenth century in England were in large part driven
by efforts to centralize political control. Such extensive political control could only be
achieved in the context of medieval culture if religious powers were granted to secular
rulers while secular rulers equally enhanced the power and status of the church.
At the heart of these monastic reforms, therefore, was a centralizing impulse
which expressed itself in monasteries as an almost iron-fisted effort to standardize
monastic practices. Prior to these reforms, monastic practice in England had been
characterized by a notable diversity and a lack of centralized regulation (Leyser 180).
Aethelwold, Dunstan, and Oswald, working through King Edgar, changed all of this,
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bringing monasteries to heel and requiring absolute adherence to a specific code of
behavior:
The climax of the enterprise came with the issuing of the Regularis
Concordia (“The Monastic Agreement”) at the synod of Winchester of c.
970. Summoning his bishops, abbots, and abbesses, Edgar “urged all to be
of one mind as regards monastic usage…to avoid all dissension, lest
differing ways of observing the customs of one rule should bring their
holy conversation into disrepute.” All monks and nuns accordingly swore
to live according to “one uniform observance.” Rejecting the overlordship
of any layman, they yet accepted royal protection and gave to the king the
right to control the election of their superiors. Every day, indeed eight
times every day, their liturgy prescribed prayers for the king and queen
(and unless there was some special need the king got a ninth prayer too).
(Leyser 181)
Monastic practice, from this point on in medieval England, was defined by specific and
uniformly observed rules that informed the lived experience of every cleric; these rules in
turn required specific practices and observances which imposed physical and mental
regulation on each cleric. Obedience became the watch word for monastic practice in
England, as reflected in the Rule of St. Benedict:
With the prompt tread of obedience they follow in deeds the command of
the superior. It is as if in one moment the command of the master and the
completed work of the disciple are both of them rapidly executed together,
with speed brought by the fear of God, by persons urged forward by the
desire of attaining eternal life. (Herlihy 58-59)
Bodies in need of guidance and training in order to avoid the fires of Hell and attain the
joys of Heaven were required to engage in a most thoroughgoing conformity to hierarchy
and religious practice. I say “bodies” here because true discipline and obedience to
Christ required a holistic transformation, as is reflected in the description of St. Francis of
Assisi by Thomas of Celano as being changed “in mind, not in body” in the early (and
thus incomplete) phase of his religious pursuits (Shinners 43). Both mental and bodily
discipline were required as one sought the love of God.
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The ontology of need so firmly established in monastic life came, in the early
thirteenth century, to inform the lived experience of the laity as well. The year 1215
marks a watershed moment in the history of the Catholic Church:
In 1215 Pope Innocent III (1198-1216) gathered several hundred
archbishops, bishops, abbots, and prelates from across Europe at Rome to
discuss the state of the church. The decrees issued by this Fourth Lateran
Council […] defined the basic religious duties required of all Christians
and established procedures for the administration of the church at the local
levels of the diocese and parish. (Shinners 6)
The decrees passed during the Fourth Lateran Council defined spiritual practice in a way
that paradoxically both uplifted the largely illiterate laity and at the same time placed that
laity in a position of dire need. This council regularized and reformed certain sacraments,
such as the sacrament of confession, and reified interpretations of previous sacraments,
such as the doctrine of the living presence in the Eucharist—i.e., transubstantiation. The
cumulative effect of these decrees was to focus the attention of the Church more squarely
on the needs of the laity while defining spiritual practice in such a way that the laity
would have a greater need for the Church.
Take, for instance, the sacrament of confession, which “obliged all adult
Christians to make confession and receive holy communion at least once a year. This
obligation, in turn, required priests themselves to be more meticulous in their exercise of
the cura animarum, or care of souls” (Shinners 6). On the one hand, the decision to make
confession a sacrament was a means of urging local clergy to take seriously their task of
caring for the souls of their parishioners; on the other hand, making confession a
sacrament created yet another ritual obligation for good Christians who wished to enter
heaven. That sacrament of confession, in other words, enhanced the individual’s
dependency on the Church for the care of his/her soul.
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After the Fourth Lateran Council, priests became more active in their
communities: “steps were taken to ensure that all priests were educated in pastoral care,
trained not only to celebrate rituals correctly but also to preach to the people” (Leyser
189). This new preaching would be directed at the laity for the benefit of the laity.
Likewise, in order to facilitate acceptance of confession as a sacrament, the Church began
“the production of works telling people how and what to confess” (Pearsall 263). The
increased emphasis on preaching skill following the Fourth Lateran Council might be
best understood as a recognition of the importance of rhetoric and persuasion:
parishioners had to be convinced that they needed to confess.
Before parishioners could confess their sins, they needed to know which
sins they were expected to confess, what kinds of penance they could
expect to receive, who exactly was authorized to hear their confessions,
and, above all, what advantages would accrue to them from regular
confession, and what punishments would be imposed on them if they
remained unrepentant. (Harris 84)
In short, the laity had to be taught that they were sinners. And to teach them this, the
Church found it necessary to speak directly to the laity.
On one level, the Church’s need to speak to the laity reflected its dependence on
the laity for its survival. The Church’s dependency meant that the laity possessed some
power and could influence, at least in small ways, the spiritual practices of the Church.
On another level, however, the Church’s efforts to speak to the laity and to construct new,
mandatory sacraments merely sustained an ontology of need that the Church held over
the laity for hundreds of years. The reforms of the Fourth Lateran Council worked to
define spiritual power as the ultimate power, one which reduced parishioners to beggars
before the Lord—and thus beggars before the Church clergy. This ontology of need is
best summed up in the “the doctrine of the power of the keys”:
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[T]his was derived from a passage in the Scriptures where Christ
delegated his authority to bind and loose all souls to St Peter, later the first
leader of the Roman Church—that is, he symbolically gave Peter the keys
to Heaven and Hell and the power to allocate people’s souls provisionally
to one or the other in anticipation of the Last Judgement. This authority
was now understood to apply to all anointed priests because they were St
Peter’s direct successors. (Harris 84)
The Church reached out to the laity, but only to reinforce the laity’s dependence on
Church officials, institutions, and practices.
For most of the Middle Ages, then, European women and men found themselves
in an ontology of need in terms of their relationship to the divine. This profound sense of
need and incompleteness informed medieval experience throughout the early Middle
Ages, and the revisions to Church practice in the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 reified
and institutionalized this ontology of need by insuring that the only path to divine
forgiveness passed through the hands of priests. With regard to the most fundamental of
all questions—what is my standing with my God?—most members of the lay populace
lived with a constantly present absence, with an ache that required others to address. And
most of those clergy who were expected to address this yearning were likewise in need of
both divine and temporal guidance in order to remain part of this special class of
individuals who were both empowered and entrusted with the “care of souls.” Thus an
ontology of need permeated church space in the high Middle Ages, with bodies seeking
out other bodies in search of the means to save their souls.
Discipline and Monastic Bodies
The fact that such disciplinary practices were often encoded in the same monastic
texts that contained Latin liturgical dramas tells us a great deal about how the
performance of those texts was likely to have been understood. Since the foundational
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work of E. K. Chambers in 1903, Aethelwold’s Regularis concordia has typically been
regarded as offering the first text of medieval “theatre” in Europe: the Visitatio Sepulchri
intended as part of the Nocturns (or Matins) observance on Easter Sunday. “The
Regularis concordia […] is treated as the earliest medieval record of a theatrical
representation in which a merger between some form of mimetic action, dialogue, and
setting unequivocally take place” (Kobialka, “Staging Place/Space” 130). Often
overlooked in the rush to identify theatrical origins, however, is the principal nature of
the Regularis concordia as a consuetudinary (or “customary”) which “presents us with a
series of monastic codes” (Kobialka, This Is My Body 69). As we explore the
sacramental chronotope associated with many Latin liturgical dramas (or “tropes”) of the
Middle Ages, we should note that these tropes are most frequently described in
documents which function to discipline monastic bodies by establishing clear routines
and rituals for every hour of every day. The Regularis concordia was not intended as an
anthology of dramatic literature; it was designed instead as a regulatory tool—and a tool
which had clear political functions, as we have already seen. Any performances arising
out of it and other consuetudinaries must be understood in this light as political, ritual,
and spiritual devices.
Consider, for instance, the bodily discipline imposed in the following passages
from St. Aethelwold’s work:
When the Chapter has been held, having taken off their shoes, they shall
enter the Church and as an act of obedience wash the pavement thereof
while the priests and ministers of the altar wash the sacred altars with holy
water[…]. For the first three weeks of these days of Lent the brethren
shall be unshorn; but in the middle of Lent the common duty of shaving
shall be carried out and all excess of hair shall be utterly removed. (qtd. in
Kobialka, This Is My Body 74)
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Dicta such as these are the heart of the Regularis concordia; indeed, the consuetudinary
describes the appropriate rituals and behaviors for each brother or sister in whatever rank
he or she may fill, for the sick and for the healthy, for every day of the year, for all Holy
Day celebrations, and for the changes in the seasons (Kobialka, This Is My Body 57).
Indeed, the reader is even instructed in what actions to take upon rising and “having
provided for the necessity of nature, if at that time he must” (Kobialka, This Is My Body
58).
The Regularis concordia was developed in response to several political
exigencies in late tenth century England. Many religious institutions had at that time
become almost entirely secularized and corrupt (Kobialka, This Is My Body 44). Led by
St. Aethelwold and St. Dunstan, with the backing of the pope and King Edgar, zealous
reformers staged a takeover of church institutions in England: “The [secular] canons
were given an alternative: they could either give the place to the monks or take the
monastic habit” (Kobialka, This Is My Body 44). After this takeover,
to prevent a great diversity of practice among the many religious houses
that then existed in England, the need arose for the unification of the
whole movement. This need for unification resulted in a call for a synodal
council, which […] produced the Regularis concordia. (Kobialka, This Is
My Body 52)
The primary rhetorical function, then, of the Regularis concordia was to institute and
reify a unified monastic code for England. The majority of the documents that provide us
with the texts of Latin liturgical dramas are similarly crafted efforts to shape, re-shape, or
concretize religious practice. Any discussion of the lived experience of participants in
liturgical drama must begin with an understanding both of the degree to which the bodies
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of these participants were regulated and the degree to which that regulation was a sociopolitical necessity.
We might describe these monastic bodies using both Kleinschmidt’s
heterodynamic bodies and Franks’ disciplined bodies. We can observe, for instance, that
King Edgar’s rhetorical appropriation of the Church’s approval of this leadership
participated, in an ontological sense, in the medieval search for “victory helpers,” or for
divine powers to grant the ruler with the strength to protect and lead. As Kleinschmidt
notes, the need kings had both for spiritual license and for spiritual strength to lead was
eventually appropriated by Church authorities through a clever inversion of bodily
images. In the early, pre- or partly Christian era of England’s growth, leaders had been
regarded as the sources of strength upon which the remainder of the people relied
(Kleinschmidt 68). As the Church struggled to convert kings in what was developing
into a unified and relatively large kingdom in the tenth century, the image of the human
body—and thus, the image of the temporal ruler’s body—was transformed:
[T]he leading representatives of the universal Catholic Church had to cope
with self-reliant, intrusive and power-acquiring particularistic local lay
ruling elites who were themselves determined to take possession of and
control church institutions. Consequently, immediately after the
conversion of the ruling elites, the Church had to make a difficult choice
between its own acceptance of the superiority of the ruling elites and the
delay of the conversion process. Initially, the Church opted for the first
choice, but it later made extensive efforts towards regaining control of its
own institutions and enforcing abidance by the universalistic beliefs which
the Church took to be its major task to promote. These efforts included
the revision of the bodily image of Christ and of the saints as the major
ecclesiogene symbols for modes of behaviour. Since the tenth century, the
image of physical strength of the bodies of Christ and the saints gradually
waned. The process first touched upon the representation of the bodies of
the royal saints, that is those saints whose kin group was royal or who had
been kings themselves. (Kleinschmidt 73, emphasis added)
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What Kleinschmidt traces here is a political/rhetorical link between church-state relations
and the images of bodily debasement, distrust, and disgust the proliferated in the high
Middle Ages. Such an image can be summed up in a famous medieval description of the
human body as “a night soil pail with nine holes” (Kleinschmidt 75).
This debased image of the human body, combined with the belief that individuals
were essentially incomplete and were dependent upon help from above and from other
humans, provides a meaningful contexts for understanding the thoroughgoing, selfmortifying disciplinary practices observed in medieval monasteries, especially after the
tenth century. As Frank notes, the contingent nature of the human body, so emphasized
in the high Middle Ages—that is, the body’s unreliability and fallibility—is conceptually
overcome through self-discipline:
With regard to control, the disciplined body makes itself predictable
through its regimentation. So long as the regimen is followed, the body
can believe itself to be predictable; thus being predictable is both the
medium and outcome of regimentation. That this predictability may
reflect an unconscious fear of the body’s real contingency is probable, but
so long as the technique of the regimen is successful, the disciplined body
consciously knows itself as predictable; what else could discipline be but
predictability? (55, emphasis in original)
Discipline and self-mortification become means of control over the absolutely flawed
human body, and monastic regulations and observances provided the orthopraxis
necessary to attain such regimentation.
As a result, the disciplined body regards itself distantly, as it were: “the
disciplined body is dissociated from itself. The ascetic can tolerate the degradation of her
or his body because she or he only observes that body; the ascetic is in but not of the
body” (Frank 56). Since the body is not the ultimate site of oneself, the will must also be
disciplined, since will and motivation should be the ultimate rulers over the body. Thus
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when fasting, what matters is not simply the mortification of the flesh but also the
motives for such self-mortification: “Within the institutional church’s discourse of
medieval theology, the contest was whether the source of the inspiration to fast was
divine or demonic” (Frank 59). Hence both body and spirit must be trained to perform
correctly and to perform for the correct reasons.
One might argue, however, that the creativity and aesthetic joy produced during
Latin liturgical dramas could provide something of a carnivalistic release from bodily
discipline. Certainly there must have been some bodily delight that both performers and
audience members experienced during these performances, but their role within the
liturgical structure of the church calendar was, I would argue, never forgotten. Take, for
instance, this commandment from the Rule of St. Benedict to remember the holy function
of all religious rituals:
The twelfth step of humility is attained if the monk not only in his heart
but with his whole body is a lesson in humility to those who see him. We
mean: in the performance of the liturgy […] at church, in the monastery,
in the garden, on the road, in the field or anywhere. Whether sitting,
walking or standing he should lower his head, and keep his eyes cast
downward. Every hour, thinking himself guilty of his sins, he should
imagine himself brought before the awesome judgment of God. (Herlihy
63)
The joy of performance, in such a context, comes mainly from being able to continue to
observe bodily discipline during these heightened moments of religious discourse. This
desire to continue self-regimentation throughout even the most artistic and celebratory
liturgical observances should make us call into question how the monastic bodies would
have understood their performances—that is, we should wonder whether the participants
in these liturgical rites would have regarded what they were doing as “theatrical.”
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Addressing such concerns requires a detailed exploration of the concept of “theatre” as it
was understood in medieval England.
Theatre and Drama
In this light, it is helpful to return to that first example of Latin liturgical drama
from the Regularis concordia, which will serve as the primary text for analysis in our
discussion of the sacramental chronotope. This passage, quoted almost universally in
analyses of Latin liturgical drama, merits the space needed here for us to reconsider the
meaning of such performances in light of the regulated bodies of the performers and
audience members. Imagine attending the first of the church offices of Easter morning in
a cold cathedral when the following occurs:
While the third lesson is being said, let four brothers dress themselves, one
of whom, dressed in an alb, as if for another purpose, shall enter and
secretly go to the place of the sepulcher and there, holding a palm in his
hand, sit quietly. And while the third respond is being spoken the
remaining three shall follow, all dressed in copes, having censers with
incense in their hands, and hesitantly, as if seeking something, shall come
to the place of the sepulcher. These things are done in imitation of the
angel sitting in the monument, and of the women coming with spices to
anoint the body of Jesus. When, therefore, the one sitting there shall see
the three as it were wandering and seeking something, he shall begin in a
low voice to sing sweetly: “Whom do you seek [Quem queritis] [in the
sepulcher, companions of Christ?] When this is sung to the end, the three
shall reply with one voice: “Jesus of Nazareth [the crucified one, O
heavenly being.”] To which he [replies]: “He is not here. He has risen as
he foretold. Go, announce that He has risen from the dead.” At the sound
of this command the three turn to the choir, saying: “Alleluia. The Lord
has risen.” This said, he who is sitting, as if calling them back, says this
antiphon: “Come and see the place [where the Lord was laid, alleluia.”]
Saying this, let him rise and lift up the covering and show them the place,
with no cross, but with the linen cloth there in which the cross had been
wrapped. When they have seen this let them put down their censers which
they brought into the sepulcher, and pick up the linen cloth and open it
before the clergy and, as if showing that the Lord had arisen and was no
longer wrapped in it, they sing this antiphon: “The Lord has arisen from
the sepulcher [he who hung for us on the wood [of the cross], alleluia!]
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When the antiphon is finished let the prior, rejoicing in the triumph of our
King, that having overcome death, He had arisen, begin the hymn Te
Deum laudamus [O God, we praise thee]; at the beginning of which all the
bells shall ring together. (Tydeman, Medieval European Stage 82-83) 3
Such a performance, one can easily imagine, would be powerfully moving, the medieval
equivalent of a multimedia extravaganza, with candlelight, singing, sumptuous costumes,
incense, and pealing bells. But it is questionable whether or not it would have been
understood in any meaningful sense as “theatrical” in the context of medieval English
monastic practice.
In fact, Lawrence Clopper has compiled significant evidence that such
performances would not have been understood or interpreted as “theatrical.” In his recent
book Drama, Play, and Game, he analyzes the competing and sometimes contradictory
uses of Latin terms such as theatrum that modern critics typically translate as “theatre.”
“[W]e have applied modern senses of theatrical terms to medieval texts and documents
with the result that we have ‘theatricalized’—made into theater—activities that did not
properly belong in that category as we understand it” (Clopper 4). After extensive
examination of many descriptions of theatrum throughout the Middle Ages, Clopper
comes to the conclusion that “Christian Europe in the later Middle Ages was able to
develop a drama—an enacted and staged script—because most persons did not associate
such dramas with the theatrum either in mode or in content” (Clopper 2).
For much of the Middle Ages, between the acceptable “theatre” of Terence and
Plautus and the existing concepts and practice of theatrum lay an unbridgeable chasm.
According to the dominant medieval understanding of theatre history, in the latter days of
the Roman Empire, “legitimate drama was forced into retirement” according to John of
Salisbury (c.1110–1180), to be replaced, as Clopper notes, “by undesirable persons who
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inflamed the eyes and ears of the beholders” (30). The term histriones, often translated
today as “actors,” therefore acquired multiple meanings beyond that of what we now
consider an “actor” as the term moved from antiquity to the Middle Ages. John of
Salisbury categorized histriones into three groups: 1) those who “transform and
transfigure their bodies through foul movement and gesture or by baring themselves
lewdly or by wearing horrible masks”; 2) those who “follow the courts of the great and
amuse by satire and raillery”; and 3) those who “use musical instruments” (qtd. in
Clopper 30-31). Of the musicians, John identified two kinds: those who “sing wanton
songs at public drinkings and lascivious congregations” and “others who are called
ioculatores who sing the deeds of princes and the lives of saints and give solace to men
either in grief or anguish” (qtd. in Clopper 31). Of these histriones, all but the last group
are “damnable unless they relinquish their office” (qtd. in Clopper 31).
Thus, in the medieval understanding of theatre history, reputable performers had
been replaced by mostly disreputable histriones who practiced a myriad of performance
forms in a variety of contexts, and many of those contexts would not be considered
“theatrical” in modern terms. The words ludus and “play” possessed multiple meanings
in the Middle Ages, involving not merely “an enacted and staged script” but any sort of
communal physical recreation: “Both ludus and ‘play’ include all kinds of games and
sports; in addition, a ‘player’ may not only be a participant in any of these activities but a
musician or even a player at dice and cards” (Clopper 12). In this context, a “stage play
is not necessarily a scripted drama; it may be a king game or some other rowdy
entertainment used to raise money, which may account for the persistence of orders
against ludi in churchyards” (Clopper 17).
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In contrast to these rowdy and often secular forms of ludi, the Visitatio sepulchri
described by Aethelwold seems to belong not only to another category, but almost to
another world. The medieval “theatrical” term that most closely corresponds to the
Visitatio sepulchri is perhaps “drama,” which in the early and high Middle Ages referred
not to “a script for enactment by persons assuming roles; rather, we should think of it as a
formal and visual representation of responding voices” (Clopper 9). The Song of Songs
and the Psalms were the primary Biblical examples of what medieval thinkers regarded
as “drama” because they understood that term almost exclusively as “one of three modes
of narrative”: “The ‘dramatic’ mode is that in which the author or narrator is not
represented in his own or narrative voice; instead, there are speakers alone” (Clopper 6).
By “dramatic mode,” Clopper refers primarily not to spoken discourse, but rather to a
literary mode such as is often taught in beginning performance of literature classes.
What made a literary text “dramatic” for medieval thinkers was the visual alternation of
voices in the absence of a controlling narrator voice, and the interchange of these voices
was not necessarily intended to be staged by live performers.
The distinction Clopper offers between theatrum and drama in the Middle Ages is
crucial for our understanding of how regulated monastic bodies would make sense of and
respond to Latin liturgical drama. Clopper notes that dramatic discourse was also
understood as a more sober and serious style of speech than theatrical discourse:
There is a formal similarity between the dramatic and the theatrical—
persons sing or speak in response (without the intervention of the poet)—
but there are also distinctions: psalms are not frivolous, as are comedies
and tragedies; psalm singers do not simulate but express true devotion.
(Clopper 8)
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The Visitatio sepulchri clearly presents alternating voices designed to “express true
devotion” and would be understood by the monks in Winchester Minster not as a
disgraceful, secular/pagan “play” but as a holy, antiphonal drama. While the use of
monk’s bodies and voices to stage such scriptural dramas was, no doubt, revelatory,
exciting, and intriguingly different from traditional monastic practice, the decision to
embody that discourse through multiple bodies engaging in dialogue with each other
would not necessarily have been regarded as theatrical. Such staging practices were more
likely to be understood simply as a bodily extension of the logic already present in the
written texts of such dramas.
One useful way of exploring the differences in tone and purpose that
characterized the Latin liturgical dramas as compared to the secular “theatre” that so
disturbed the monks of medieval England would be to consider the addressivity of each
performance form. As we saw in Chapter Two, texts and performances are always
addressed to someone, and in general they can be addressed to actual human beings, to an
author’s imagined vision of how humans might react to her or his work, and to the
author’s ideal of a “perfect” audience who will understand the text or performance just as
he or she would wish for it to be understood. While texts are inevitably addressed to a
variety of addressees, and while this multitude of addressees usually if not perhaps
always renders such addressivity “messy” and complex (often in fascinating ways), we
can say at any given moment, a text has a principal addressee whose role in shaping the
text is greater than that of other addressees. Perhaps the most important distinction
between the drama staged by monks in church space and the crude and unsettling theatre
those same monks condemned lay in the principal addressee that clerics understood was
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addressed by the two distinct performance forms. For impure and sinful theatre, the
addressee was understood to be the immediate audience, and the performers used every
resource to appeal to that addressee, no matter how disgraceful the means, as John
Bromyard, a fourteenth century friar, warns us: “Again, dancers are like that dancing
daughter of Herodias [Salome], through whom John the Baptist lost his head; thus,
through dancers, many lose their souls” (Tydeman, Medieval European Stage 260).
For the devout practice of Latin liturgical drama, however, performances were
understood to be directed more to an ideal superaddressee, in this case God, than to the
merely mortal addressees of those who participated in the dramas as performers or as
audience members. The thirteenth century complaint of William of Wadington illustrates
the difference between addressing performances theatrically to an audience and
addressing liturgical drama to God:
Foolish clerks have devised another clear folly which are called
“miracles.” These mad ones have disguised their faces in masks, which is
forbidden by [church] decree; so much the greater is their sin. They may
make representations—but let it be done reverently in the office of holy
church when one performs the service of God—as when Jesus Christ the
son of God is placed on the sepulchre, and the Resurrection, in order to
increase devotion. (Tydeman, Medieval European Stage 116)
The theatrical appeal of masks, coupled with their capacity to hide the “truth” of the
performer’s faces, made the “miracles” that William of Wadington objects to here sinful.
Pope Innocent III condemned such behavior as a “playful spectacle” in 1207, thus
explicitly connecting the sensual pleasures of spectatorship to the practice of theatre:
From time to time theatrical entertainments are put on in these same
churches and not only are masked shows introduced into them as playful
spectacles but also in three feasts of the year which follow directly after
the Nativity of Christ, deacons, priests and subdeacons in turn, exercising
their scandalous stupidities, through the obscene revellings of their
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behaviour, make clerical dignity worthless in the sight of the people.
(Tydeman, Medieval European Stage 114)
By virtue of its visual appeal for audience members, theatre was understood to be
addressed to sinful humans rather than to the Holy Trinity. Such performances, even if
executed by men of God (indeed, especially if executed by men of God), were regarded
as being inevitably impure because performance must wade around in the sort of muck
that human bodies find appealing.
In contrast, the performance of Latin liturgical drama reflected the hopeful intent
that such performances would be understood “purely,” that is, would be understood and
approved by God. Consider, for instance, Diller’s observations about the “purity” of the
discourse in Latin liturgical dramas:
A “normal” conversation, whether on stage or in our daily lives, always
reveals more than its words express. A competent observer can gather
from it information concerning the social position, the mood, and the
intentions of the interlocutors, even if these subjects are not overtly
mentioned. In every conversation we assume a tacit substratum which we
may interpret correctly or incorrectly but which we cannot ignore if we
want to grasp the meaning of the conversation.
Such a tacitly assumed substratum is largely absent from the liturgical and
by implication from the “hierarchical” dialogue. Relationships between
interlocutors exist only to the extent that they are verbalized. This
becomes evident in the formality of the addresses: Christicolae, celicolae,
socii, pastores. Never do the sentences express anything beyond their
overt function; they are always pure questions, pure answers, pure
communications, pure commands. (Middle English 22)
Diller’s point here is that the general messiness we associate with everyday
conversation—the rich complexity of social status, relational intonations and yearnings,
rhetorical motives and techniques, and other socio-political aspects that inform the
“substratum” of everyday conversation—is largely if not indeed entirely absent from
Latin liturgical drama. The performances exist in a world alien to our prosaic world of
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complex discourse, and they speak to, with, and for a divine realm of pure and perfect
communication unhampered by such prosaic concerns.
Bakhtin describes the hopeful efforts of authors to speak with a superaddressee in
terms that strongly resemble the “pure” discourse of Latin liturgical dramas. The
superaddressee is someone
whose absolutely just responsive understanding is presumed, either in
some metaphysical distance or in distant historical time[…]. In various
ages and with various understandings of the world, this superaddresee and
his ideally true responsive understanding assumes various ideological
expressions (God, absolute truth, the court of dispassionate human
conscience, the people, the court of history, science, and so forth).
The author can never turn over his whole self and his speech to the
complete and final will of addressees who are on hand or nearby (after all,
even the closest descendants can be mistaken), and always presupposes
(with a greater or lesser degree of awareness) some higher instancing of
responsive understanding that can distance itself in various directions.
Each dialogue takes place as if against the background of the responsive
understanding of an invisibly present third party who stands above all the
participants in the dialogue (partners). (Bakhtin, Speech 126, emphasis in
original)
The superaddressee that Bakhtin describes here is “a constitutive aspect of the whole
utterance” (Bakhtin, Speech 126), and thus all utterances reflect this hopeful yearning for
“true responsive understanding.” Nonetheless, most utterances are more prominently
marked by the sorts of prosaic social markers Diller identifies, social markers that reflect
the messy addressivity of everyday discourse. By comparison, the discourse of the Latin
liturgical dramas of the high Middle Ages was directed more purely at the presumptive
superaddressee of all Christian discourse, God.
Seen in this light, we can perhaps appreciate the distinction that most medieval
clerics made between the spectacular, sensual appeal of “theatre” (as such clerics defined
it) and the sober, “pure” discourse of religious ritual, to which Latin liturgical drama was
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understood to belong, as is evident in the following quote from the local council of Sens
in 1460:
Although, if they [church officials] seem to be putting on something as a
remembrance of feasts and in veneration of God and the saints, according
to the customs of the church, at the Nativity of the Lord, or Resurrection,
let this be done with decency and peaceably without extending, hindering
or cutting short the service, [without] masking and blackening of the face,
by special permission of the ordinary and with the good will of the
ministers of that same church, so that the improprieties of [these] games,
especially around the Feast of the Innocents, prohibited in other of our
provincial statutes (which prohibition we renew), may be contained,
observing the order of the sacred council of Basel. (Tydeman, Medieval
European Stage 117)
The carnivalesque “improprieties” of the Feast of the Innocents, also known as the Feast
of Fools, were to be avoided in those religious performances around Christmas and Easter
which were designed to speak for and with God. In this sense, Latin liturgical dramas
were understood to speak to a whole different realm of experience than theatre.
Indeed, once we strip away our modern concepts of the “theatrical,” there appears
to be little to distinguish the Visitatio sepulchri from other ritual observances described in
Aethelwold’s Regularis concordia. As Kobialka notes:
The Quem quaeritis passage has been assigned a significant place in
theater history because it contains extraliturgical elements that could be
viewed as a theatrical description of a performance. These extraliturgical
elements are not, however, present only in this passage, as they can be
found in the documentation of other offices, for example, in […] the Cena
Domini celebrated on Maundy Thursday. Both texts [i.e., the Quem
quaeritis and the Cena Domini] describe some form of movement and
make use of what is specifically labeled as “outward representation.”
During Nocturns [i.e., Matins] on Maundy Thursday, two children stand
on the right-hand side of the choir and two of them are positioned on the
left-hand side of the choir. During [the Quem quaeritis celebration held
on] Nocturns on Easter Day, one of the brethren is seated near a
“sepulchre” and three others approach him. Both of the offices make use
of the antiphonally sung chant. (This Is My Body 81)
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Descriptions throughout the Regularis concordia of the appropriate outfit for the
celebrants, sometimes regarded as the “costuming” for the Visitatio sepulchri, would
seem only to stipulate clerical garb, not “theatrical” costumes (Kobialka, This Is My
Body 80). And the rubrics which suggest the attitudes, movements, and behavior of the
four brothers in the Visitatio sepulchri such as “as if seeking something” and “as if
calling them back” were not unique to this office; Kobialka identifies other offices which
“refer to some form of imitation and representation” (This Is My Body 82).
This research is offered not to suggest that the Visitatio sepulchri was simply
another monastic office which would have been experienced in the same ways as all the
other offices, but rather to establish that there are far more continuities between the
Visitatio sepulchri and other monastic offices in the Regularis concordia than
discontinuities. Rather than being regarded as a rupture in the ritual rhythm of monastic
discipline, the Visitatio sepulchri would first and foremost have been understood as an
extension (albeit an especially exciting and intriguing one) of the technologies of bodily
discipline that defined monastic practice throughout the Middle Ages.
A significantly unremarked aspect of medieval liturgical tropes is how they take
for granted the reader’s familiarity with these ritual practices. Throughout the
consuetudinaries one finds descriptions of antiphonal chants or responsorial readings
similar to this one, taken from the Regularis concordia: “Then, as is the custom, a
deacon shall bless the candle saying, in the manner of reading, the prayer Exultet iam
angelica turba coelorum. Presently, on a higher note, he shall sing Sursum corda and the
rest” (qtd. in Kobialka, This Is My Body 77). Two phrases here which are found
frequently in monastic consuetudinaries are important: “as is the custom” and “and the

103

rest.” Both phrases, or highly similar ones, suggest the degree to which all members of
the order would have been intimately familiar with the prayers, chants, gestures, and
movements appropriate for each office.
The common practice throughout these consuetudinaries was to reference only
part of chants and prayers and to assume the reader’s familiarity with the entire work.
Consider, for instance, the frequent references to the remainder of antiphonal works
which is translated here as “etc.” in these passages from the 14th century Easter
ceremonies from Barking Abbey:
Then they still doubting the Resurrection of the Lord shall say mourning
to each other: “Alas, misery etc.” Then Mary Magdalene sighing shall
join in with: “I sigh for you etc.” Then on the left-hand side of the altar
the Persona [representing Christ] shall appear, saying to her, “Woman
why do you weep, whom do you seek?” She, thinking him to be a
gardener, shall reply: “Lord, if you have carried him away etc.”
(Tydeman, Medieval European Stage 86)
Monks, nuns, and other clerics would have regarded such “dialogue” as extensions of
their everyday reading and singing activities, rather than as a new “script” for a theatrical
performance.
The Material and the Spiritual in the Sacramental Chronotope
In this context, we can begin to describe the sacramental chronotope in terms of
the two axes of interpretation discussed in Chapter Two: the material/spiritual axis and
the first world/second world axis. We will consider the material/spiritual axis first by
exploring the various ways in which matter was infused with spiritual presence in the
context of medieval church time and space. Both temporally and spatially, the
participants in the Visitatio sepulchri and other Latin liturgical dramas would have
understood these performances in terms of enduring, underlying spiritual
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correspondences. Within a figural world view, any particular Easter celebration of
Christ’s resurrection in the tenth century would be understood as an umbral echo of the
original Event itself. Moreover, the performance occurred within the ritual “body-clock”
of the monastic participants, according to rhythms which had been long engrained into
their bodies. Waking, reading, eating, working, singing, confessing, sleeping—all these
activities and more were written into schedules on the tablets of the monks’ and nuns’
bodies, and while Easter celebrations might merit special excitement as a reminder of the
Resurrection of Our Lord, they involved not a break from the great seasonal calendar of
the monastery but rather an extension of its progression.
By participating regularly and willfully in such rituals, monks and nuns could
delve the depths of their souls in a search for truth:
Every spiritual or temporal action was never haphazard but in accord with
a new or existing monastic custom and began with a blessing. When a
monk arose from bed, for example, he began with the sign of the Holy
Cross and a prayer. The self-examination was thus directed inward toward
the thoughts rather than toward physical, external actions. A prayer was to
come “from the heart rather than the lips”[…]. This particular mode of
operation and representation, furnished to expose and externalize thoughts,
was present in all monastic actions throughout the day. (Kobialka, This Is
My Body 64)
External acts within a monastic community, including participation in liturgical tropes,
thus involved a corresponding internal, spiritual self-examination that was written into
every daily activity. “For a monk, as the Regularis concordia asserts, the act of exploring
the self, purification of the soul, and compunction of the heart provided the pardon for the
sins, the grace of Christ, and, ultimately, the access to the divine light” (Kobialka, This Is
My Body 64). Every movement through the day brought one, at least ideally, closer to
the divine.
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Likewise, movement through the sacred (if also material) space of the church
grounds was fraught with underlying spiritual correspondences. The ground plan of most
churches where liturgical tropes were performed, including the Old Minster in
Winchester associated with Aethelwold and his Regularis concordia, was in the shape of
a traditional Latin cross, with the length of the cross running west-east and the shorter
transepts running north-south (Ogden 25-30; 41-57). Thus, as one entered through the
main doors in the west, one moved through both the instrument of Christ’s death and the
symbol of His Resurrection.
The geographic arrangement of medieval church architecture was consciously
symbolic as well. “Christian altars were always located at the eastern end of the church
so that the congregation was facing the place of sunrise, which symbolized the
Resurrection” (Harris 38). The eastern parts of the church therefore became associated
with the most holy practices and objects. Likewise, the nave and “the great western
doors through which most important people always entered the building became strongly
associated with the non-spiritual, material world of mutability, or constant change, of
which death was an important part” (Harris 39). Moving through the church doors was
an admission, in this light, of one’s own sinfulness, which would presumably be shed as
one traveled from the sullied western space to the shining eastern parts of the church.
Similarly, the north and south sides of the church acquired spiritual significance,
with the south—on the Bishop’s (and thus God’s) left hand—being “strongly associated
with evil,” while the north side (at God’s right hand) was “associated with joy and good
fortune” (Harris 25). Despite the fact that these spatial correspondences were “merely”
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spiritual, clergy and members of the congregation arranged their bodies in accordance
with the dictates of that underlying spiritual reality:
The women of the congregation invariably sat on the “good” side of the
church and the men on the “bad” side—a practice explained by the
argument that women, being the weaker sex, and more liable to
temptation, as was shown by the behaviour of Eve, needed the protection
of the “good” side of the church, while the men were strong enough to do
without it. (Harris 25)
Movement through church space was thus influenced by underlying spiritual realities
which took advantage of such natural rhythms as the rising and setting of the sun to shape
perception and to move the spirit.
At times, these correspondences proved troublesome in the context of actual
church practice, such as when the traditional pair of lecterns from which the Old and New
Testaments would be read were reduced, for practical reasons, to a single lectern from
which all Bible readings were conducted. This single lectern, as it turned out, was
eventually located on the south side of the church, which presented a dilemma for those
who wished to persist in the traditional interpretation of the stage left, or “sinister,” side
of the church:
Why should the Gospel be read on the less honourable side of the church?
Ivo of Chartres provided an acceptable explanation: it was the Jews who
had originally been the “chosen people” of God, so the Jews should be
seen as associated with the stage right of the altar, but they rejected
Christ’s ministry, so he had to preach instead to the gentiles, who were not
God’s “chosen people” and who should therefore be seen as associated
with the altar’s stage left[…. I]n medieval terms, Ivo’s explanation makes
good Christian sense, for Jesus said himself that he did not come to preach
to the converted, but to call sinners to repentance, and symbolically
sinners must surely be related to the dishonourable side of the church.
(Harris 74, emphasis in original)
Here we see the time-honored medieval practice of engaging in tortuous thinking in order
to reinterpret physical reality in light of spiritual correspondences rather than
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reinterpreting spiritual truths based on material practices and facts. More importantly, we
can see here an example of the pervasiveness of spatial and spiritual correspondences on
medieval thought and practice even in the face of good reasons for abandoning or
revising such thought.
Liturgical tropes staged in medieval churches participated in this pattern of spatial
and spiritual correspondences. The most striking example of this may be the location of
the “Hellmouth” that was used in many English churches for liturgical dramas and other
purposes, a large set-piece often represented by a demonic face with a gaping open mouth
waiting to receive damned souls. Appropriately, this Hellmouth was located in the south,
where medieval practice taught that sinners would be located (Leacroft 3). Likewise,
performances of liturgical dramas typically “invaded the nave,” located west of the altar,
indicating
perhaps a desire to move these rather materialistic presentations of
spiritual truths away from the altar [in the east] and its holy mysteries,
perhaps a realisation that the congregation would see and hear better if the
plays were nearer to them, and quite possibly an artistic realisation of the
power of the symbolism of east and west and a desire to use it to underline
aspects of the plays which the north-south symbolism could not cope with.
(Harris 39)
Perhaps the most famous example of this use of geographic symbolism comes from the
Easter Matins celebration at Barking Abbey in the 14th century, when the officiating
priest hammered upon the western door chanting antiphons which referenced the
Harrowing of Hell, taking advantage of the association of the western portion of the
church with death. Katherine of Sutton, who wrote the description of this Matins
celebration, made her symbolism explicit here: “This priest indeed shall represent the
person of Christ about to descend to Hell and break down the gates of Hell” (Tydeman,
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Medieval European Stage 84). The movement of this celebration, as was true for most
medieval liturgical tropes, generally went from the debased west to the divine east, a
progression from the material/corporeal realm to the realm of pure spirit.
First and Second Worlds in the Sacramental Chronotope
The sacramental chronotope of Latin liturgical drama is therefore marked by the
collapse of or lack of motivation to maintain a division between the material and the
spiritual. For the ritualized bodies participating these ceremonies, material and spiritual
meanings were fused. Liturgical drama never left the space and time of the church, nor
did it create a new space and time within the church. Instead, performances in the church
space drew upon preexisting spiritual correspondences to enhance the experience of
various performances. In this sense, the first and second worlds of performance might
also be said to be fused in Latin liturgical dramas.
Diller’s analysis of the “dialogue” in the Visitatio sepulchri demonstrates how the
“characters” in this “play” stubbornly remain in the first world of the ritual rather than
creating a more “realistic” second world. Taking note of the fact that the three women
immediately celebrate the Resurrection without examining the tomb for proof, Diller
observes, “Instantaneous jubilation is not in the gospels. And that the Women should
report the Resurrection before looking into the grave is entirely without dramatic logic”
(Middle English 16). Of course, within the context of a ritual celebrating the fact of
Christ’s resurrection, there is no need for recourse to a second world where that discovery
is “made anew.” The ritual is its own self-contained universe which draws upon the
“finished” narrative of the gospels as merely one part of a larger church service.
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As noted in Chapter Two, and as will be discussed in further detail in coming
chapters, both Diller and V. A. Kolve identify the development of an imaginative “second
world” created through the act of performance as one of the primary contributions of
vernacular drama of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in Europe. In contrast, Latin
liturgical drama did not encourage or rely upon the creation of an imaginative second
world: “The liturgical significance of the church building and of the time of the divine
service remains too powerful to give much rein to the imaginative development of the
forms of perception” that would allow for the creation of a metaworld (Diller, Middle
English 65).
Examples of this dominance of the first world to the near-exclusion of a second
world abound throughout the liturgical tropes. In Aethelwold’s Visitatio sepulchri, for
example, the three women turn towards the choir to announce that the Lord has risen,
even though the choir never participates as “characters” within the performance.
Similarly, in the Barking Abbey version of the Visitatio sepulchri, the three sisters who
are to play the Marys must stop before entering the stage and “say their confession
[Confiteor] to the abbess, and, absolved by her, they shall take their stand in the
appointed place with candles” (Tydeman, Medieval European Stage 85), thus reinforcing
the distinction between the performers and the characters they portray. At the end of the
Visitatio sepulchri, the prior, who has up to that point merely observed the ceremony,
begins the Te Deum laudamus, emphasizing his role as leader of the ceremonial
observance and diminishing the theatrical value of the three Marys and the angel, who
virtually disappear from the ceremony at that point.
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It is, however, unfair and simply inaccurate to argue that such performances could
never conjure up a fictive metaworld. Medieval audiences, like audiences today,
certainly responded to performances in multiple, contradictory, and “disencouraged”
ways, and the sheer theatricality of these events would have inspired many to imagine the
dusty streets of Jerusalem and the salt tears of the Marys even if such theatrical illusion
was not intended to be evoked. So in what sense might we understand the relationship of
the first world of the performers and audience to this imaginative second world that might
arise out of this liturgical service?
Taking a cue from Richard Schechner, I would argue that the key issue regarding
the fictive metaworld-in-performance of medieval theatre is not its “presence” or
“absence” but rather is the efficacy of that metaworld within the context of religious
ritual. As he works to differentiate ritual performance from theatrical performance,
Schechner develops his “efficacy-entertainment braid,” arguing that the context and
function of a performance helps determine the degree to which it might be “ritual” versus
“theatre.” “If the performance’s purpose is to effect transformation—to be efficacious—
then the […] performance is a ritual” (120). Likewise, Schechner argues, if the primary
purpose of the performance is entertainment—that is, if the performance lacks the
transformative efficacy associated with rituals—then the performance can be considered
theatre.
Schechner works to complicate this “efficacy-entertainment braid” in useful ways,
noting that “[n]o performance is pure efficacy or pure entertainment” (120). Professional
theatre productions are indeed concerned with efficacy—filling the seats, for instance,
making money, and perhaps even affecting substantive socio-political change—while on
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the other hand, a ritual performance can potentially have more entertainment value than
spiritual efficacy if the participants are not driven by spiritual concerns. Building on
Schechner’s vocabulary, then, we might observe that while all performances aim for
efficacy, the source of efficacy differs for ritual performances as compared to theatre.
And in this context, we can reconsider the function of the second world of performance in
terms of its crucial function in the efficacy of theatre.
Broadly speaking, theatrical performances require the existence of a metaworld in
order to be efficacious. To be understood as “theatre,” at least in our contemporary
Western context, a performance traditionally requires that the audience be able to
perceive a world other than the world of the performers and audience. We must, for
instance, be able to “look beyond” the two people we see onstage in The Temptation in
order to “see” Christ and Satan instead, arguing in the wind-swept desert. As Bert States
puts it:
If we approach theater semiotically we must surely agree with the Prague
linguists that ‘all that is on the stage is a sign,’ and that anything
deliberately put there for artistic purposes becomes a sign when it enters
illusionary space and time. That is, it becomes an event in a selfcontained illusion outside the world of social praxis but conceptually
referring to that world in some way, if only in the fact that the illusion is
about hypothetical human beings. (19, emphasis in original)
States spends the rest of his book Great Reckonings in Little Rooms tempering and
complicating this early statement, arguing that theatrical signs “achieve their vitality […]
not simply by signifying the world but by being of it. In other words, the power of the
sign […] is not necessarily exhausted either by its illusionary or its referential character”
(20, emphasis in original). But at the heart of the phenomenology of the theatre is a “dual
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vision” wherein signs can and indeed must escape their purely referential/material
qualities.4
By comparison, we might argue that most ritual performances do not require an
imaginative metaworld in order to be efficacious. While it is certainly possible for a
participant to escape to an imaginative metaworld during the Eucharist and to visualize
Christ at the Last Supper, such dual vision is by no means necessary to the ritual. Indeed,
the rhetorical and political function of the doctrine of transubstantiation was to unite the
participant, not with some imaginative concept of Christ, but with His Body as
transformed in the moment of partaking. In the process of actual (not imaginative)
transformation lay the saving power of transubstantiation, as Paschasius Radbertus wrote
in the early ninth century: “If the word had become flesh, and we truly consume the
Word as flesh in the Lord’s food, how can it not be justly judged that He dwells in us by
His nature[?]” (qtd. in Kobialka, This Is My Body 70).
Hence one might temper Diller’s observations by noting not the absence of a
second world, but rather the relative unimportance of that world in the ritual
performances of Latin liturgical drama in the Middle Ages. Any metaworld created
during these performances would have been incidental, not essential. Yet it is clear that
these performances did reference some “other world”—the performances were narratives,
and they referred to events that were regarded at the time as historical facts. Moreover,
one aspect of ritual performance in Schechner’s “efficacy-entertainment braid” is a “link
to an absent Other” and the presence of “symbolic time” (120). Ritual performances
connect participants to or with something, if not necessarily an imaginative metaworld.
One way of getting at the “something” that Latin liturgical dramas connected their
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participants to would be through a consideration of the medieval distinction between res
and verbum.
Words and Things in Latin Liturgical Drama
As Rainer Weiss notes, the scholastic philosophy of the eleventh and twelfth
centuries, as illustrated in the works of the aforementioned John of Salisbury as well as
Pierre Abelard (1097-1142), assumed a fundamental distinction between res and verbum,
or “thing” and “word” (27). In the Neoplatonic “realism” of the Middle Ages, the goal of
philosophy, understood as an adjunct to the search for God’s Truth, was to see “through”
the symbolic, material, historical world of appearances to the thing itself, that is, the
divine, eternal “real thing” underlying all transitory appearances. “Thus the word
[verbum] in the philosophical statement can be only an adjunct, an accessory of the
logically derived res” (Weiss 28).
The distinction between res and verbum is not merely a distinction between
signifier and signified; it involves a more fundamental split between the material and the
Ideal: “Corporeality, which is directly related to distance from God and imperfect
contemplation of him, is not a norm of existence but an indication of inferiority on the
[medieval] scale of creation” (Erickson 12). Macrobius, a scholar of the late fourth and
early fifth centuries A.D. whose thought remained influential throughout the high Middle
Ages, described the link between the “pure” res and the material verbum in this way:
Accordingly, since Mind [nous] emanates from the Supreme God and Soul
from Mind, and Mind, indeed, forms and suffuses all below with life, and
since this is the one splendor lighting up everything and visible in all, like
a countenance reflected in many mirrors arranged in a row, and since all
follow on in continuous succession, degenerating step by step in their
downward course, the close observer will find that from the Supreme God
to the bottommost dregs of the Universe there is one tie, binding at every
link and never broken. (qtd. in Erickson 12)
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Of importance here is not only that the pure Ideal forms present in Mind degenerate as
they pass through corporeal existence, but also that there remains an intimate connection
between res and verbum despite their distance/difference. Whereas a more rigorously
Platonic world view might more or less sunder words from their Ideal counterparts, the
scholastic Neoplatonism of the Middle Ages saw correspondences as well as differences
between Ideal Truth and the symbolic or material accidents we encounter in life.
So in a sense the scholastic philosophy of the age described a universe where
there was always a “first world” of material experience and an underlying “second
world” of eternal and Ideal forms. It would seem more accurate, then, to describe the
“something” that Latin liturgical performances aimed to connect their audiences with as
“thing”—that is, res, or the underlying reality reflected in a myriad of ways through the
words, images, movements, and songs of the ritual performance. When one searches for
Ideal reality through performance, mimesis becomes irrelevant, since (as Plato taught us)
mimesis must inevitably lead us away from the real, rather than towards it. Thus
medieval monastic practice turned away from mimesis and toward what Carruthers calls
mneme:
Monastic art is, as monastic authors themselves talked about it, an art for
mneme, “memory,” rather than one for mimesis. This is not to say that the
aesthetics of “representation” were unknown to it, only that in it mimesis
was less of an issue, less in the forefront of their conscious practice, than
mneme.[…] The questions raised about a work by mneme are different
from those questions raised by mimesis. They stress cognitive uses and
the instrumentality of art over questions of its “realism.” (Carruthers 3)
Medieval monastic practice aimed to “re-member” the past, to bring the divine Truth of
the past to the forefront of everyday experience, rather than to portray that past. In such a
context, Latin liturgical drama did not seek out correspondences between the sense
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objects of the past and the sense objects of the present—and such correspondences are
part of “realism” or verisimilitudinous theatrical practices, evident in statements such as
“the costumes didn’t fit the period” or “their accents sounded phony.” Rather, medieval
monastic practices sought fundamental and nonsensuous correspondences between “then”
and “now,” working towards ways in which the “now” is the past in some fundamental
way.
In his analysis of the embodiment of iconoclastic controversies in Byzantine
architecture, Andrzej Piotrowoski offers a useful concept, “nonfigurative representation,”
which describes how medieval thinkers might have understood this less literal connection
between symbol and thing:
Figurative representation assures that a depicted form is recognizable as an
appearance of something known from physical reality or as a figural form
commonly associated with a particular interpretation. The concept of
nonfigurative representation, which I would like to introduce, refers to the
mode of representation that establishes the relationships between given
material forms or visual phenomena and symbolic reality without resorting
to specific figures and familiar appearances. (107)
Nonfigurative representation, in other words, is an artistic mode seeking to express
relationships between Ideal and material reality more directly, not via an equation
between image and referent but through an effort to trace back through the mirrored links
between res and verbum.
Piotrowski’s most compelling example of nonfigurative representation comes in
his description of the walls at Hosios Loukas, a Byzantine chapel built in Greece in the
late tenth and early eleventh centuries. Due to the material used in many of these walls
and due to its thinness, the “white marble is semitranslucent and even today, despite the
artificially high intensity of the light in the interior, it is possible to observe that these
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panels transmit daylight” (Piotrowski 112-113). The light shining eerily from within the
solid walls functions nonfiguratively to represent the idea of the Ideal:
Because light glows from within its most solid parts, solid matter is
presented as filled with this unusual light. This phenomenon can be seen
as a physical analogue to John of Damascus’ idea that a material body can
veil the soul. I believe that this interpretation, the possibility that the
material form of a church could embody a sense of spiritual reality, was
explicitly prompted by the designers of this church. (Piotrowski 115)
Rather than portraying human bodies with golden halos, the shining walls of Hosios
Loukas conveyed the Truth of the Ideal contained within the material.
As an example of how nonfigurative representation might function in a Latin
liturgical drama, we might consider how performances featuring a permanent sepulchre
within the church architecture often took advantage of the sepulchre’s structure to create
a sense of mystery and wonder. For instance, the Church of Gernrode in Germany,
dedicated in 961, featured a sepulchre built against the southern wall near the transept
that was used in performances of liturgical tropes. Significantly, the Marys’ encounter
with the angel would have occurred in this hidden space:
Originally a window-like aperture in the north wall at about sarcophagus
height opened into the church. It would emit candlelight from the grave
into the nave, or from the nave one could see moving shadows and light
and hear voices within the grave room. From outside in the nave one
could peer in […]. As in the case of other replicas [of sepulchres …]—at
Aquileia, Magdeburg, and Constance—in early times an onlooker from
outside the sepulchre could make out something of whatever sights and
sounds and odors were within. Perceived in this atmosphere, events
taking place inside were rather hidden and thus mysterious. (Ogden 56)
We have here a clear violation of the contemporary theatrical emphasis on sight lines
which works against figurative representation but which fits perfectly within the scope of
nonfigurative representation. Whereas a figurative representation of the visit to the
sepulchre would make certain that the audience could not only see the performers but
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could also (and more importantly) see how closely the performers resembled the
characters they portrayed, the nonfigurative representation aims at conveying the
experience of the story on the level of spirit and mystery.
Conclusion: The Ontological Superiority of the Divine
Seen in this “light,” the sacramental chronotope forces us to reconceptualize
mimesis, not as material/imaginative duplication, but as a nonfigurative, ritual
heightening of existing correspondences between material and spiritual realities. While
what we today typically call “theatre” visibly and purposefully authors a metaworld that
audiences then engage with in multiple ways, the sacramental chronotope instead points
to another world, one which none of the participants authored, but which was created by
The Author, God. In terms of chronotopic consciousness, the space and time of the
invisible spiritual world were always already co-chronotopic with the space and time of
the visible material world, and the function of Latin liturgical dramas was to bring these
two worlds more clearly and meaningfully into contact with each other. In other words,
the efficacy of liturgical tropes lies not in the creation of a metaworld, but in their serving
as a conduit that connects two ontologically real universes.
Thus, if we can imagine the material/spiritual axis and the first world/second
world axis of interpretation as intersecting lines, the sacramental chronotope lies at the
very heart of this cross, in a place where spirit and matter are so fused that the first world
can, with artistic and philosophical skill, be made to reference an even more Real second
world. The ontological substance of the world of ideas nonfiguratively represented
through the sacramental chronotope is actually greater than the world of the performers
and participants. Concepts such as a “willing suspension of disbelief” become heretical
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in this understanding of theatrical performance, since what would otherwise be
“disbelieved” is the ultimate reality of God’s divine realm.
The ontology of need that dominated the everyday experience of monks in
medieval England thus informed the performance experience of the participants in Latin
liturgical drama. Because heterodynamic monastic bodies used self-discipline to
overcome their own fragility in order to be judged worthy of receiving strength from
God, the “second world” they sought to experience through performance was a world
which was ontologically superior to their own. From such a position of desperate need,
there is no space for a dialogue between the first and second worlds of performance;
instead, performance functions to bring the individual to a contemplative silence where
he/she can reflect upon his/her connection to divine reality. Performance, in such a
context, duplicated the ontological inferiority the most medieval individuals likely felt in
their daily lives. Where Latin liturgical dramas served to inspire and reassure was in the
way they brought strength from the divine realm to the bodies and souls of the
worshippers who were present for the performance.
In the next chapter, we will make a 180 degree turn by exploring the
consubstantial chronotope, where purely metaphorical links between first and second
world allow the corporeal, material world of the performers and audience to retain
ontological authority over the imaginative metaworld. While the world of the spirit in
essence “owned” the participants in Latin liturgical drama, we will find that humans
owned the divine as an object for their contemplation in the consubstantial chronotope
associated with late medieval Tudor-era interludes.
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CHAPTER 4
THE CONSUBSTANTIAL CHRONOTOPE
By the fifteenth century, however, the faithful were no longer going on
pilgrimage in the numbers that they had [….One] reason for the change
was that people were collecting their own relics. Sir John Fastolf put
together a collection that included a relic of the true cross, an arm of St
George, and a finger of St John the Baptist […]. For the better-off, so it
seems, by this period pilgrimage no longer mattered. The Fastolfs of this
world had all that they wanted in their homes—not only relics, but bibles,
psalters, books of hours, and smaller works of devotion as well; and, being
literate, they could read them for themselves.
--Nigel Saul, “Medieval England: Identity, Politics, and
Society” 17-18
As we saw in the last chapter, in the early and high Middle Ages in England, the
divine was located somewhere else, somewhere one must travel to in order to have access
to spiritual salvation and aid. This was true even for most but not all nobles, the
wealthiest of whom might have chapels built specifically to meet the needs of their
families. Building these private chapels involved enormous expenses, and certainly no
one of less than the most noble birth had the wherewithal to purchase the divine, in
essence, for home use. For the vast majority of those living in England during the high
Middle Ages (1000-1300 A.D.), then, ownership of the Christian Divine was out of the
question, and thus many souls found themselves reliant upon the kindness (and/or greed)
of others (priests, nobles, high clergy) for the cure of their souls.
As the example of Sir John Fastolf demonstrates, however, religious relics,
devotional aids, and images were increasingly construed as objects for private ownership,
contemplation, and devotion as we move into the later Middle Ages in England (13481500). By exploring shifts in the relations between the religious image and its viewer
during this period, we can begin to theorize how differing ontologies of power might
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have informed the experience of theatergoers in medieval England. In turn, we can
consider how an ontology of self-sufficiency—that is, an ontology which dictates that
each individual has all that he/she needs in order to function in both the material and
spiritual worlds—informs and shapes the consubstantial chronotope of performance.
This chapter begins by examining the shift from an ontology of need in the high
Middle Ages to an ontology of self-sufficiency after the first plagues of the late Middle
Ages. This ontological shift transformed both religious and representational practice, and
we will consider the impact of some of these transformations by examining in detail the
diverse functions of the illustrations in the Books of Hours that were extraordinarily
popular in the late Middle Ages. From the orthodox practice of Books of Hours we move
into a discussion of England’s only major heretical faction, the Lollards, and how their
theology represented an extreme version of the ontology of self-sufficiency that informed
late medieval England. Lollard theology constructed both the Eucharist and theatrical
practices as “consubstantial,” that is, as “real” only to the extent that the contemplator’s
meditative efforts made them real.
From our examination of these theological and representational disputes, we can
piece together a continuum of ontologies of performance that can be described as various
relations between the “mask” of performance and the performer who “wears” that mask.
From there, we shift our focus from masks to bodies, exploring various aspects of the
bodies constructed within the consubstantial chronotope. We conclude the chapter with
an exploration of first-world/second-world relations and addressivity in the context of the
consubstantial chronotope. To explore these issues of mimesis and addressivity in depth,
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we will look at two Tudor-era interludes, Henry Medwall’s Fulgens and Lucres and John
Heywood’s The Play Called the Four PP.
The End of the Ontology of Need
The early and high Middle Ages were dominated by an ontology of need
characterized by heterodynamic bodies that relied upon each other for survival. After the
Black Plague of 1348, this situation began to change noticeably in England. The plague
of 1348 and subsequent plagues affected the ontology of need in England in two ways.
First, by reducing the number and quality of priests, the plague reduced the overall
quality of the “care of souls.” Second, the plague created labor shortages which
distributed economic power into more hands, allowing commoners access to literacy and
to devotional aids and relics that had once been the exclusive domain of the nobility and
the clergy. The shift from a sophisticated and elite priestly class dominating a largely
unlearned commoner class to an often inept, corrupt, or overtaxed priestly class being
judged harshly by an increasingly sophisticated commoner class whittled away at the
ontology of need that had defined medieval experience for centuries.
First, “the mortality among the priesthood as a result of the Black Death generated
a crisis in the provision for the care of souls” (Keen 251). As the ranks of the everyday
clergy, who were obliged to attend to the needs of the sick and dying and who thus
became sick and died themselves, grew thinner, fewer and fewer replacements filled the
ranks. In England, those interested in clerical employment who had either the money or
the education (or both) to do so preferred to join the ranks of the “clerical elite” whose
duties were largely administrative rather than priestly. Such occupations earned more
money and were fast paths to political preferment. As a consequence, those few who
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chose to perform the everyday role of caring for the cure of souls in the parish were often
undereducated, underpaid, and under-inspired (Keen 248-260).
The decline in both the numbers and the quality of the everyday clergy in part
explains the growing dissatisfaction with the clergy reflected in late medieval literary
portrayals of corrupt, incompetent, lecherous, and lazy friars, chaplains, and priests.
Such fictional portrayals were, in many cases, not far from the mark, as reflected in this
excerpt from Hereford records of 1397:
The parishioners say the vicar of Langwardine is supposed to find two
chaplains to take the services at St. Wenard’s, but he does not; item, that
Sir John the chaplain at St. Wenard’s haunts taverns and there his tongue
is loosed, to the great scandal of all; item, the said Sir John is incontinent
with one Margaret, no one knows her surname; item, the common fame is
that the said John is illiterate, and incapable of the cure of souls. (qtd. in
Keen 257-258)
While not all parish clergy were so scurrilous, the general state of such thinly stretched
clergy was poor: “It was unfair to blame on these counts men who through no fault of
their own were not well off, had limited command of Latin and very limited access to
books, and who had a ministry to discharge that was exacting” (Keen 258).
Unfair or not, the lay populace did blame such everyday clergy, and the growing
literacy of the lay populace exacerbated the situation. At the same time as the ranks of
the everyday clergy were growing smaller and less sophisticated, the church was faced
with the problem of “the growing literacy and religious sophistication of the laity” (Keen
251). Such figures as the allegedly illiterate Sir John were losing credence “in the eyes of
a laity of whom steadily more were coming to be able to read religious books and form
their own religious attitudes” (Keen 259). In an indirect way, the Black Plague
contributed to this increasing literacy and religious sophistication.
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A rise of the merchant class occurred in the late Middle Ages in England and
throughout Europe, due largely to the impact of the plague of 1348 on the available labor
population and thus on labor practices (Keen 27-47; Dyer 163-4). Starting even before
the plague and gaining steam as the reduced labor force gave commoners increased
negotiation power for pay, a new distribution of wealth allowed those of common birth
growing access to literacy and to devotional objects:
By the beginning of the thirteenth century there had been many changes
and developments in society as a whole, very important amongst which for
the arts of book production was the foundation of the earliest universities.
A more general distribution of wealth at the higher end of the social scale
and a gradual increase in the number of people with some claim to literacy
led inevitably to a greater demand for books.[…] The gradual change in
market was reflected in a corresponding change in emphasis in the types
of book commonly produced. Fine liturgical books for public worship
were still of course made, but liturgical books for personal use, such as the
Psalter and the Book of Hours which was to supersede it, and works of
scholarship and literature became more common. The Book of Hours was
the greatest medieval and renaissance best-seller[…]. (Backhouse 9; see
also Sponsler 54)
This shift in emphasis from books for public worship to private devotional aids brings us
back to Sir John Fastolf and his collection of relics mentioned at the beginning of this
chapter. In the late Middle Ages, an increasingly dissatisfied lay populace began to reject
the often corrupt and inept church functionaries and began to seek their own spiritual
cures and answers in books, private devotional practices, and relics and religious art
purchased for private home display and use.
Owning Divinity: An Ontology of Self-Sufficiency
Such ownership of the divine represented a major movement away from medieval
England’s dominant ontology of need. For most of England’s history, the majority of the
population found the divine elsewhere, not at home. One traveled to the church, to the

124

monastery, to the pilgrimage site, in order to reach the divine. Here we can fruitfully
return to Erickson’s quote mentioned in Chapter Two: “[T]hroughout the Middle Ages
the earth was conceived as embracing the geographical locus of unseen truths” (6). For
most of the Middle Ages, the divine was regarded as situated, that is, the divine was set
or rooted in space and time. While wealthy nobles often purchased relics for devotional
use throughout the Middle Ages, and while such noble patrons could also afford to build
their own chapels—thus taking at least partial ownership of the divine by including it in
one’s own geographic sphere—for most medieval English people, the divine was
something one traveled to, not something one owned.
This early and high medieval tendency to fix the divine in time and space can be
most powerfully seen in the various cults of the saints, where the saints’ power was
presumed to be concentrated within the geography of the shrine and the surrounding
church property. Such sanctified space became embodied, as it were, by the saints whose
remains were interred therein:
The localism of medieval religion was powerfully reinforced by the cult of
the saints. The secret of the saints’ popularity in everyday piety was that
they made the practice of religion accessible to people. The saints were
patrons, protectors, mediators: people with whom ordinary folks could
identify. Commonly they were perceived as a living presence. It was
widely believed that they inhabited the places where their relics were
preserved. St. Cuthbert was considered a living presence at Durham, St.
Aetheldreda at Ely, and so on. (Saul 15)
The ontology of need that dominated the early and high Middle Ages was steeped in a
chronotope of fixed divinity, a situatedness and groundedness of the spirit. Within such
an ontology, the average person in medieval England occupied an almost powerless
position regarding ultimate meaning—the divine called you to it, not the other way
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around, and the only cure for your sinful soul (or, for that matter, for your sick body) was
to seek out divine sites and sacraments administered by priests.
On a practical economic level, the practice of purchasing or securing rights for
saints’ bones and relics had been, for the most part, almost the exclusive privilege of the
clerical estate in the early and high Middle Ages. By the late Middle Ages, this clerical
monopoly on relics was no longer in force. Once one can as a private individual
purchase the divine—including relics such as bones of the saints and devotional aids like
the books of hours—and once one can possess the divine in one’s home, an ontological
shift occurs, as well as a shift in power relations. Does the relic command you, or can
you achieve the power of the relic through your own command, i.e., through your
ownership and contemplation of the relic? Such an ontological shift moves from locating
spiritual power in a specific place and time to locating spiritual power in the act of
contemplation of an owned object. “Along with such furnishings as the prie-dieu and the
petit tableau, books of hours thus formed the centerpiece of a ritual of domestic,
household devotion, part of a private culture of worship that focused inward on
contemplation and meditation” (Sponsler 110). Following the plague of 1348, then,
many English people moved from an ontology of need to an ontology of self-sufficiency.
Books of Hours: The Divine Cradled in One’s Hand
As a case study to illustrate the importance of such an ontological shift, we can
examine Claire Sponsler’s research on the Books of Hours. As noted earlier, these books
functioned as lay liturgical aids. They described prayers and other religious practices
which the reader could engage in throughout the day, week, and year. Such books were
also lavishly illustrated:

126

Books of Hours are splendid objects of art. For men and women of the
fourteenth, fifteenth, and early sixteenth centuries, however, they were
also prayer books, and prayer was as central to medieval life as art was.
Books of Hours tell us much about the art and material culture of the
world that produced them, but for twentieth-century viewers they are also
windows onto the interior, spiritual lives of ordinary lay people of the late
Middle Ages. (Reinburg 39)
For these reasons, Claire Sponsler chose to focus on Books of Hours as exemplars of both
the spiritual and socioeconomic transformations ongoing in late medieval England.
Sponsler begins her study of the Books of Hours by noting one of the most
striking features of these books: “From royalty to anonymous bourgeois owners, those
with the means to do so routinely had themselves painted into the books of hours they
commissioned, claiming the book as their own and projecting themselves into its
sanctified devotional space” (104). At the heart of her research is the argument that such
books functioned to commodify the divine:
At the simplest level, having a self-portrait painted into the book was one
way of taking possession of it. Like a signature, a nameplate, or scribbled
marginalia, the portrait marked the owner’s presence in the book and
ownership of it. One effect of this act of ownership marking was to confer
commodity status on the book, reinforcing its position as an item of
consumption and casting it as an object possessed by the owner rather than
as a tool, an aid, or a mechanism that could be used to attain spiritual
satisfaction. (Sponsler 113)
Sponsler goes on to offer a richer and more complex interpretation of this ownership, one
that acknowledges that the Books of Hours could function both as spiritual aids and as
commodities and/or technologies of commodification. She notes, for instance, that
figures such as Henry VI, Margaret Beaufort, and Cicely, Duchess of York all consulted
their books of hours daily and devoutly observed the liturgical practices found therein
(110-111).
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Despite the fact that these books were thus designed as “the lay equivalent of the
monastic breviary” (Sponsler 110), their more prominent function in the increasingly
commodity-conscious late Middle Ages was as status symbols and overt signifiers of
piety:
The subjectivity staged in owner portraits was part of a general
commodification of devotion in the late Middle Ages. As commodities
that were bought and sold, bequeathed and inherited, books of hours were
more than just devotional texts. Conspicuous consumption in fact figured
prominently into their popularity as they became desirable props in a
social drama of public exhibition and status display. (Sponsler 108)
Sponsler acknowledges the paradox inherent in the spectacular subjectivity of these
books—purchasing and carrying them allowed one to perform both status and faith even
though they were designed for private meditation and self-transformation, not public
performance: “Needless to say, this situation was not without irony, given that the books
of hours were supposed to encourage the user to lose him- or herself in the spiritual
experience” (112-113, emphasis added).
By inserting themselves into books of hours specifically produced for them, the
patrons who purchased these books transformed them and their associated
practices/performances of faith into commodities. Equally importantly, the spectacular
self-representation in these books functioned to turn the purchaser’s self into a
commodity: “In these owner-portraits the devout worshiper’s body is taken as itself an
object of consumption, something that could be contemplated—consumed without ever
being used up—over and over again whenever the owner wished” (Sponsler 108). And
completing a trinity of commodification, the divine itself becomes consumed along with
the book and the purchaser: “As the owner was inserted into sacred scenes, witnessing
the crucifixion, gazing at the virgin and child, or being presented to God, sacred space
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was itself commodified, transformed into a devotional object that could be owned and
consumed” (Sponsler 113).
Such an ontological shift in one’s relation to the divine participated in a general
privatization of religion in the Middle Ages. Religious practice and religious thought
underwent a general “laicization and privatization of religion in the late Middle Ages”
(Sponsler 111; see also Keen 251-260). It would be an exaggeration, however, to view
this laicization and privatization of religion as an abrupt and totalizing change in social
consciousness in England. Rather than inferring what Bakhtin might call a “Galilean
shift in consciousness” in the late Middle Ages regarding ownership of the divine, we
might instead note a shift in demographics. Throughout the Middle Ages, there were
always wealthy people who owned relics and devotional aids; moving into the late
fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, there were simply more of these people due to the
rise of the merchant class. The shift from an ontology of need to an ontology of selfsufficiency was one of numbers; both ontologies existed throughout the Middle Ages, but
as the population experiencing the former waned, the population experiencing the latter
grew in numbers and in strength.
Ownership of devotional aids and sacred relics was not the only way in which the
increasing popularity of an ontology of self-sufficiency expressed itself in late medieval
England. At roughly the same moment in English history, the only major heretical
movement to challenge the Catholic Church in England prior to Henry VIII arose and
gained strength. This movement’s principal tenets regarding the need for lay literacy and
the metaphorical function of the sacrament of the Eucharist extended the ontology of self-
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sufficiency by offering theoretical justifications for religious beliefs and practices that
were already present in late medieval England.
Lollardy and the Ontology of Self-Sufficiency
At the same time as the rapidly expanding middle class made an ontology of selfsufficiency a more popular religious attitude, England experienced its most notable
period of religious discord during the medieval era:
England underwent only one major outburst of heresy in the Middle Ages:
the wave of Lollardy that swept through the country in the late fourteenth
and early fifteenth centuries, partly inspired by the writings of the priest
John Wycliffe (c. 1330-1384). (Shinners 491)
Wycliffe (or Wyclif), who had been a noted Oxford scholar, developed several religious
tenets which were considered heretical by orthodox authorities but which nonetheless
found widespread and fervent support from a populace frustrated by corrupt or
incompetent everyday clerics, by a greedy and smugly self-confident clerical elite, and by
an obfuscatory shield of Latin literacy that restricted access to the word of God (Leyser
195-199). Eventually, followers of Wycliffe’s beliefs became known as “Lollards,” who
were “apparently named for a Dutch word for ‘mumbler’ (of prayers),” thus suggesting
something of the ongoing, fervent dedication to prayer throughout the day exhibited by
Wycliffe’s followers (Shinners 491).
The new religious tenets offered by Wycliffe reflected an ontology of selfsufficiency, arguing that “church endowments should be pared down to the barest
minimum,” that “it was the duty of the king to reform the church and not vice-versa,” and
that “power was nullified unless exercised by the virtuous” (Leyser 197). As opposed to
the traditional medieval hierarchy of power flowing from God to the Pope to the clergy,
Wycliffe envisioned a spiritual meritocracy where virtue, not title or ordination, granted
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one access to heaven: “the true pope, in consequence, was not necessarily the man with
the title, but simply whoever happened to be the most righteous man on earth” (Leyser
197).
Building on Wycliffe’s ideas, Lollard followers developed even more radical
tenets than Wycliffe might have himself supported, in particular arguing that “priests ‘in
deadly sin’ had no sacramental powers and, conversely, that all true good Christians, men
and women, were in fact priests” (Leyser 198). Such phrasing reminds us of the
Protestant slogan that developed during the Reformation calling “every man a priest.”
This attitude is demonstrated in court documents of eyewitness testimony from a 1429
Norwich heresy trial describing conversations with a suspected Lollard named Margery
Baxter: “Margery told her [the witness] she had never done harm to any priest, so she had
never wanted to confess to a priest or be obedient to any priest, since a priest had no
power to absolve anyone from sins; in fact priests sinned more grievously every day than
other people” (Shinners 495). While not desiring to start anything resembling the
Protestant movement, which would develop out of broader sociocultural issues much
later in England’s history due largely to King Henry VIII’s political exigencies and
political might, the Lollard movement articulated a Protestant-like vision of one’s relation
to the divine. Such a world view constructs the individual’s unique relationship with God
as being of paramount—or perhaps even sole—importance.
Within the Lollard world view, each individual must strive to make him/herself
right with God. As opposed to the communal, hierarchical, and situated faith that
dominated much of the Middle Ages, this new individualistic vision gave each person the
opportunity to author his/her own unique relationship to/with divinity, and to do so at a
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time and place of his/her choosing. Given its emphasis on the individual, Lollardy
demanded that the individual be able to read and to study scripture him- or herself.
“Lollard theology was based on a belief in the supreme value of scripture—sola
scriptura—and on the right of all Christians to be able to read and understand it” (Leyser
198).
Access to holy writ had been a major theological issue in England for some time
even prior to the growth of the Lollard movement. As part of Catholic Church reforms
following the Black Plague, Archbishop John Thoresby had for some time prior to the
Lollard movement advocated lay literacy and use of the vernacular in sermons as tools
for winning the hearts and souls of an increasingly cynical lay populace. In 1357,
Thoresby introduced his Lay Folks’ Catechism in vernacular English as part of a broad
effort to educate and involve the populace through literacy and use of the vernacular:
Thoresby issued his Catechism with the admonition that all clergy teach
and preach “openly on Inglis opon sononndaires.” […] By such means,
Thoresby moved to correct those clergy whose piety was not always
apparent and who were held in low estimation by the laity for their lack of
learning and their excesses.[…] While Thoresby's doctrine was hardly
new, since it was an extension of Archbishop Peckham's position of 76
years previous, it did reflect the idea of reform that was the countermotion
of that period to abuses by the clergy. (Emblom 52)
Lollardy increased popular support for such reforms. Despite the fact that Thoresby
himself was not a Lollard,
the presuppositions upon which Thoresby's original work was initiated
were consistent with Wyclif's own beliefs and the beliefs of his followers:
the common man was capable of learning what was necessary for his
salvation if he were taught in English, and to that end, he should have
available to him various simple statements of those beliefs as well as
clergy who could explicate those beliefs in a tongue he could comprehend.
(Emblom 53)
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Lay literacy and use of the vernacular in worship, two key elements of spiritual selfsufficiency, thus became theological flash points in early fifteenth century England.
Indeed, only fifty-two years after Thoresby’s English Catechism first appeared, a
new Archbishop, faced with a Lollard movement which had moved far beyond
Wycliffe’s writings and which seemed determined to reject wholesale the most essential
tenets of the Catholic Church, turned the Church away from lay literacy and use of the
vernacular:
It was awareness of the crucial role [in the Lollard movement] played by
the reading, memorizing, and discussion of such texts which led Thomas
Arundel, archbishop of Canterbury, to pass stringent laws controlling the
production of vernacular literature, in his Constitutions of 1409. Vital
though Arundel may have conceived these measures to be, it was bound to
put a damper on what had up to then been the Church’s own policy, those
attempts spearheaded by the Lateran council of 1215 to educate the laity
through the use of vernacular. Ironically, the very ability to say the Our
Father, the Creed, or Hail Mary in English now began to arouse suspicions
of heresy. (Leyser 198-199).
The efforts of Thoresby and others to make Christian scripture and teachings more
accessible for the lay populace—efforts intended to reinvigorate the flagging health of the
Catholic Church in England—had over the years become associated with the shocking
and (for the Church) frightening notion that the individual should relate to/with the divine
directly, without intervention from the Church hierarchy.
The tension created by the desire to increase the individual’s access to the divine
was felt by all clergy throughout England, and this tension sparked frustration not only in
the hearts of Lollards but also in the hearts of staunch supporters of the traditional
Church. Despite his many other contributions to Church doctrine and practice,
Archbishop Arundel came to be remembered almost solely for
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the rigour of his persecution of the Lollards, his banning of the reading by
the laity of the Scriptures in English and his visitation of Oxford to purge
it of Wyclifite heresy. This activity earned him sharp criticism, not only
from heretics but from some orthodox churchmen too; to Gascoigne he
was one who had “stopped the mouths” of good priests and worthy
preachers. (Keen 255)
The fact that Arundel’s orthodox persecution of the Lollards was unpopular largely
because it prevented the Word of God from being shared with the people in and of itself
reflects the creeping failure of the medieval ontology of need in the face of a more
popular ontology of self-sufficiency in the later Middle Ages.
Whatever the strength of the Lollard movement itself, and regardless of whether
its effects were long-term or were simply a short-term by-product of dissatisfaction with
Catholic clergy, the impulse to provide more widespread access to the divine word
transcended boundaries of heresy and orthodoxy in England. By learning to read—
which in most cases meant purchasing literacy training—and by having access to
vernacular examples of religious learning, the expanding middle class in late medieval
England came to “own” the catechism and other religious practices, came to be able to do
for itself rather than having to seek out another temporally and spatially situated person
(i.e., a member of the clergy) to engage in these practices. The Catholic Church in return
began to stamp literacy and vernacularism as “heretical” precisely when such practices
became a tool which released the individual from his/her ontology of need.
The Eucharist as (Mere) Metaphor
Perhaps the most devastating attack launched by Wycliffe and the Lollards upon
the ontology of need in the Catholic Church, however, was their attack on the sacrament
of the Eucharist, commonly referred to in England the “sacrament of the altar”: “By
denying the doctrine of transubstantiation—claiming it to be an invention of the Lateran
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council of 1215—and the need, prescribed by the same council, for oral confession, he
[Wycliffe] had at once diminished priestly power” (Leyser 198). Wycliffe dismissed
transubstantiation as a “philosophically untenable doctrine” (Leyser 197) in large part
due to the practical and logical paradoxes that come from assuming that the true body of
Christ is eaten.
Gallagher and Greenblatt describe the way the Catholic Church had tried to
explain away the material messiness that develops when one eats Christ’s body. Their
observations here merit extensive quotation in order to explore the range of intellectual,
physical, and spiritual tensions produced by the material messiness inherent in the
doctrine of transubstantiation:
Committed as they were to the Aristotelian distinction between substance
and accidents, Catholic theologians had always recognized that there was
in the Sacrament of the Mass a material residue, and committed as they
were to a principle of exhaustiveness, they had vigorously debated its
status. The issue of digestion was officially resolved by the argument that
after the consecration, the bread was miraculously changed in substance
into Christ’s body, but the appearance of bread, the accidents or species,
was unchanged. The substance, Albertus Magnus declared, remained only
as long as the form of the Eucharist continued intact; once the wafer was
dissolved in the mouth (or, in Gratian’s formulation, once it was touched
by the teeth) and was no longer Christ’s body. But this sophisticated
doctrine did not entirely resolve the problem of the leftover [such as
crumbs left in the wafer dish], even for church intellectuals, and heresy
trials throughout the late Middle Ages, along with conflicting practices
within the Church itself, suggest that it continued to be a vexing problem
for a wide spectrum of people. The consecrated bread had been
transformed by the touch of the transcendent, but its material accidents
stubbornly persisted and were unnervingly subject to the disgraces to
which all matter is vulnerable. (147)
In short, if the wafer becomes Christ from the moment of the blessing to the moment it
touches the teeth, then what is the status of the leftover crumbs? What happens if a
mouse eats one of those crumbs—is the mouse now blessed? Such questions were far
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from playful issues in the late Middle Ages. Both life and afterlife were at stake in the
debate over transubstantiation.
Lollard theology outright rejected the orthodox Catholic view of the Eucharist, as
reflected in eyewitness testimony at the Norwich trial of Margery Baxter:
Then the witness said Margery asked her what she believed about the
sacrament of the altar. And the witness answered her, so she said, saying
she believed that after the consecration, the sacrament of the altar is the
true body of Christ in the form of bread. Then Margery told her “You’re
wrong to believe that. If every such sacrament were God and the true
body of Christ, there would be an infinite number of gods since every day
a thousand or more priests consecrate a thousand such gods, and then they
eat these gods and, having eaten them, they excrete them from their rear
ends into foul stinking privies where you can find these substitute gods if
you want to poke around. Know for sure that, with God’s grace, what you
call the ‘sacrament of the altar’ will never be my God because priests
falsely and deceptively set up that sacrament in the church to lure simple
people into idolatry since that sacrament is only material bread.”
(Shinners 492)
Two aspects of Margery’s argument are notable here. First, she rejects transubstantiation
on the grounds that such a belief cannot resolve the problem of “material residue.” She
cannot mutely except the Church’s sophisticated efforts to explain away the material
residue via ever-elaborate philosophical inventions. She cannot, in other words, accept
by faith alone—faith in the Church’s hierarchy and its inherent wisdom—that which her
senses perceive and which her own sense of reason cannot settle.
Second, Margery’s argument against transubstantiation implicitly constructs the
Eucharist as a show, more specifically as an illusory show designed to lead followers
away from the true faith of the true God. In Margery’s view, priests have “deceptively
set up that sacrament in the church to lure simple people into idolatry”; the sacrament
thus functions as a confidence game, stealing hearts and minds from God by having the
people worship images and rituals rather than worshipping God himself. In Margery’s
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view, and in the view of most Lollards, the Eucharist was the foremost of many
performance tools used by the medieval Church to maintain an ontology of need at the
expense of the people’s relationship with Christ.
An iconoclastic note is sounded here; images, icons, and rituals are denied real
power, as well as being denied real “substance” in an Aristotelian sense. Lollard
theology generally repudiated “the veneration of saints and their images” (Shinners 491).
The 1429 Norwich deposition of accused heretic William Colyn articulates the
vehemence of this iconoclasm:
Also, when the churchwardens of South Creake church were asking the
parishioners to contribute toward painting the images in the church, the
said William Colyn told them that he would sooner give twelve pence to
burn an image than a halfpenny to paint one. (Shinners 497)
Such iconoclasm is at the heart of the ontology of self-sufficiency and at the heart of the
Lollard (and subsequent Protestant) attacks on the Eucharist. Within this ontology of
self-sufficiency, the Eucharist, like other religious practices, is simply a means of
spiritual meditation. Such iconoclasm does not deny the spiritual value of the
Eucharist—or, for that matter, the spiritual value of other religious devotional practices,
including the purchase of devotional aids or relics for the purpose of religious
contemplation. Rather, the iconoclastic urge expressed by the Lollards refuses to accept
that such practices or objects can be infused with a spiritual presence that grants the
practice or object authority over and above the contemplator. Granting the Eucharist—or
any other religious practice or object—power beyond the ability to encourage devout
contemplation perverts that practice or object into an idolatrous “false god” of the sort
Margery Baxter finds in the privy pits.
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Lollard heretics resolved the problem of the material accidents left behind after
transubstantiation by transforming the Eucharist into an act of “pure” representation:
For the Lollards, as later for Calvinists and others, the Supper of the Lord
continues to include the ritual eating of the consecrated bread—the sign
must pass into and through the body—but the ritual now eschews the
miraculous transformation of matter. The emphasis is on remembrance
through representation: the symbol enters into the body as an exalted
mnemonic device (Gallagher and Greenblatt 146).
Such an approach to the Eucharist not only articulates a radical theological precept but
also articulates a radical theatrical notion, since it offers a vision of representation as a
tool for contemplation of the divine. Performance, in the form of ritual, no longer creates
a divinity or brings one in contact with the divine; instead, performance is denied
performativity and transformed from creative act to intellectual exercise. Rather than
producing actual material change in the world, the sacrament of the Eucharist, within an
ontology of self-sufficiency, becomes “pure” trope designed to encourage contemplation,
and with this transformation we see a new attitude towards representation generally.
In a world where the Eucharist is a “mere” trope, performance makes or creates
nothing of Aristotelian substance—instead, performance only encourages contemplation
and remembrance. Whatever transformation a performance enacts on the hearts and
minds of worshippers/audience members is enacted in/on their hearts and minds alone—
nothing material is transformed; nothing “real” happens. Whatever sense of the divine is
brought into being through the performance comes only from the individual’s
contemplation; no actual divine presence is brought to earth and given flesh during the
performance or as a result of the performance.
This attitude undergirds the Lollards’ iconoclastic attack on the veneration of
images. Writing against such veneration, one Lollard tract ridicules the common folk for
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believing that images and relics have any spiritual power: “For summe lewid folc wenen
þat þe ymagis doun verreyly þe myraclis of hemsilf, and þat þis image of þe crucifix be
Crist hymsilf, or þe seynt þat þe ymage is þere sett for lickenesse” (Hudson 87). (“For
some lewd folk believe that the images verily do the miracles of themselves, and that this
image of the crucifix is Christ himself, of the saint that the image is there set for a
likeness of.”) In Lollard theology, God, Christ, and the Saints in heaven produce
miracles—images are unnecessary and even deceitful, as they can fool us into thinking
that they have the power to bring about real change in the material world.
From Ritual to Theatre, Medieval-Style: The “Tretise of Miraclis Playinge”
Lollard critics extended this kind of reasoning beyond religious ritual to address
theatrical performance practices. The attitude toward performance that it creates nothing
real lies at the heart of one of the most famous (or infamous) antitheatrical tracts of the
Middle Ages, the Wycliffite “Tretise of Miraclis Playinge.” Despite the fact that it was
most likely written by one of Wycliffe’s early disciples, the treatise is not necessarily
representative of the views of most Lollards; the “subject of miracle plays is not one that
seems to have attracted much attention from the Lollards” (Hudson 187). Wycliffe
himself conceded “the usefulness of images to the illiterate laity” as tools of instruction
(Hudson 181), thus holding to the conservative church line that argued images—
especially performed images—could serve as living books for the illiterate. The treatise
does, however, articulate an antimimetic argument which contrasts performance with
“real works” and which, by doing so, constructs performance as inconsequential play—
or, worse yet, as play that leads one away from one’s duty to care for others and to
respect and fear God. Such an interpretation of mimesis, which harkens back to Plato’s
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attacks on mimesis as a “lie twice told,” further undermines an ontology of need by
denying religious performance any spiritual substance, that is, by denying the efficacy of
religious ritual to render the divine incarnate.
The “Tretise of Miraclis Playinge” begins by contrasting the “effectual” miracles
of Christ and his saints with the false “miracles” accomplished “in bourde and pleye.”
The central difference between effectual and ineffectual miracles as described in the
treatise lies in the earnest and serious character of true miracles: “Myraclis þerfore þat
Crist dude heere in erþe, ouþer in hymsilf ouþer in hise seyntis, weren so efectual and in
ernest done þat to synful men þat erren þei brouȝten forȝyuenesse of synne, settynge hem
in þe weye of riȝt bileue” (Hudson 97). (“Miracles therefore that Christ did here on
earth, whether in himself or in his saints, were so effectual and so earnestly done that to
sinful men that err they brought forgiveness of sin, setting them in the way of right
belief.”)
In contrast, the performances of “miracle players” are done in a wrongful mind
and spirit, and thus what appears as an outward show of piety and as a representation of
God’s works is travestied in the playing:
Þanne, syþen myraclis of Crist and of hyse seyntis weren þus ef[f]ectual
(as by oure bileue we ben in certeyn), no man shulde vsen in bourde and
pleye þe myraclis and werkis þat Crist so ernystfully wrouȝte to oure
helþe; for whoeuere so doþ, he erriþ in þe byleue, reuersiþ Crist and
scornyþ God. (Hudson 97) (Then, since miracles of Christ and of his
saints were thus effectual (as by our belief we are certain), no man should
use in play the miracles and works that Christ so earnestly wrought for
our health; for whoever does so, he errs in the belief, reverses Christ, and
scorns God.)
The author of the treatise admits that travestying Christ’s miracles through performance
may “accidentally” convert those who need salvation, but that such accidents are still the
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fruit of sin, which leads far more often to evil than to good: “myraclis pleyinge, al be it
þat it be synne, is oþere while occasion of conuerting of men, but, as it is synne, it is fer
more occasion of peruertyng of men” (Hudson 101). (“Miracle playing, albeit is sinful,
is otherwise an occasion for converting men, but, as it is sin, it is far more an occasion
for the perverting of men.”) As a consequence of this argument, even the productive
aspects of religious performance lack Aristotelian substance, being mere accidents of an
otherwise teleologically evil practice.
Performance, in this world view, produces nothing but bodily excitement, which
leads inevitably to sin: “it makiþ to se veyne siȝtis of degyse, aray of men and wymmen
by yuil continaunse, eyþer stiryng oþere to leccherie and debatis as aftir most bodily
myrþe comen most debatis” (Hudson 99). (“It makes visible sights of disguising, arrays
men and women in evil countenance, either stirring others to lechery or to debates, as
after most bodily mirth, debates will follow.”) Such “bodily mirth” encourages a
distinctly unsober attitude towards the works of God: “syþen þes miraclis pleyeris taken
in bourde þe ernestful werkis of God, no doute þat þei scornen God as diden þe Iewis þat
bobbiden Crist, for þei lowen at his passioun as þese lowyn and iapen of þe myraclis of
God” (Hudson 99). (“Since these miracle players take playfully the earnest works of
God, there is no doubt that they scorn God as did the Jews that condemned Christ, for
they laughed at his passion as these [players and audience members?] laugh and jape
over the miracles of God.”)
In the chronotope of performance constructed by Lollard theology, performance
by its very nature provokes laughter and mockery inasmuch as it is inevitably “false.”
Our bodies delight in this game of pretend because we know it to be inconsequential. Yet
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Christ’s passion was the most consequential act in the world within Lollard theology, and
so those who became involved in miracle plays could be constructed within that theology
as resembling the Jews, who were almost universally regarded by Christians in the
Middle Ages as having condemned Christ without realizing the true consequences of
their behavior. The references in the treatise to “disguising” by “evil countenance”
suggest a consubstantial view of performance by implying that performance hides a true
reality underneath of layer of pretend, be it a mask, a costume, or merely a trained
performer’s voice and body. Just as one must see “through” the bread and wine via
active contemplation in order to perceive their spiritual equivalents, in performance one
must see “through” the fictive metaworld to the real bodies of the performers who are
ridiculing the miracles of Christ.
Of course, the main thrust of the Lollard argument here—that performance creates
nothing real—can in turn be used as a justification for performance practice. After all, if
performance creates nothing and does nothing, what harm can there be in a little
entertainment? Yet at the heart of the Lollard rejection of performance is a broader
rejection of bodily pleasure generally, which thus renders “a little entertainment” sinful in
and of itself:
And ȝif men axen what recreacioun men shulden haue on þe haliday after
þeire holy contemplacioun in þe chirche, we seyen to hem two þingis:
oon, þat, ȝif he had verily ocupiede hym in contemplacioun byforn, neyþer
he wolde aske þat question ne han wille to se vanyte; anoþer we seyn, þat
his recreacioun shulde ben in þe workis of mercy to his neyebore […].
(Hudson 103) (“And if men ask what recreation they should have on the
holiday after their holy contemplation in the church, we say to them two
things: one, that if he had verily occupied himself in contemplation
before, neither would he ask that question nor would he want to see
vanities; also we would say that his recreation should lie in works of
mercy towards his neighbor[…].”)
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The good Christian body thus should be dedicated to good deeds, not to empty and
unproductive play.
Yet even if one rejects this rather severe vision of the human body—even if one
rejoices in bodily play—one can still detect a loss of ontological force as a result of the
rejection of the “reality” of performance. Such a defense of performance—that it creates
nothing and therefore can be of no harm—undercuts the ontological authority of
performance. Within the consubstantial chronotope, performance only has power when
the audience yields it power, that is, when the audience chooses to engage in the
performance. Compare this lack of ontological force to the sacramental chronotope,
wherein performance speaks directly to (and for) God, whether or not any audience is
present, and whether or not the audience cares about or even attends to the performance.
By exploring the ontological consequences of Lollard thought, I do not mean to
suggest that Lollardy was the only—or even the primary—religious movement of late
medieval England, nor am I suggesting that England was somehow inevitably chugging
along towards Henry VIII and the Protestant Reformation. I also do not mean to suggest
that Lollardy provided anything resembling aesthetic theory for those in medieval
England. Rather, I offer Lollardy as an exemplar of a broader socio-cultural shift from an
ontology of need to an ontology of self-sufficiency. As England’s only major heretical
faction, Lollardy offered/authored a distinct attitude towards the Eucharist and towards
faith generally, one that differed greatly from the attitude towards faith that defines an
ontology of need. This attitude toward faith, while by no means dominant or
unchallenged in medieval England, indicates two tendencies relevant for this analysis.
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First, there was a growing tendency in late medieval England to focus on the
needs of the material world rather than on the “needs” and power of relics and images.
Another Lollard treatise, one which argues against the veneration of images and relics,
contrasts the money and effort spent on “dead images” with the good deeds and material
aid that could result if the same money and effort were expended on the living: “And
hereby þe rude puple tristus vtterly in þes deade ymagis, and louen God and hese
comandementis þe lesse, for men skateren þere loue in siche stokkis and leeuen precious
werkis of mercy vndone til here pore neȝeboris, whiche ben Cristis ymagis” (Hudson 87).
(“And thereby the rude people trust utterly in these dead images, and love God and his
commandments all the less, for men scatter their love in such stock and leave precious
works of mercy undone toward their poor neighbors, which are the [true] image of
Christ.”) Chronotopically, such arguments construct the imaginative metaworld conjured
through art and performance as mere phantasm. Additionally, in political terms, Lollard
iconoclasm refigures the phantasm of art and performance as a deceptive lure designed to
steal attention and material support away from the real material needs of common people.
Second, there was a corresponding and interrelated tendency to see the spiritual as
being located, not within a specific individual or at a fixed site, but rather in the act of
contemplation and prayer. Chronotopically, the spirit now travels with the contemplator
and lives in the act of contemplation rather than being grounded in a specific space and
time that most medieval people had relatively limited access to. More importantly,
within the consubstantial chronotope, individuals become empowered to author meaning
themselves, in their private acts of contemplation, rather than relying on divine and
temporal superiors to provide meaning for them. Just as the Host can be understood as
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no longer containing God’s flesh, but instead can be refigured as an opportunity for
personal reflection on His Sacrifice, so too can we say that theatre might in a similar vein
be understood less as a container or creator of a specific reality and more as an
opportunity for individuals to contemplate an image of reality.
This shift from an ontology of need to an ontology of self-sufficiency had two
main effects on the experience of theatergoing in late medieval England. First, as we saw
in Sponsler’s analysis of the ownership of Books of Hours, the shift to an ontology of
self-sufficiency constructed a body that was accustomed to consumption and that viewed
consumption in the material world as a reflection of the consumer’s self. From within
such a body, theatrical experience becomes less a communal celebration of (usually
spiritual) belief than an ephemeral item purchased to display one’s social status, one’s
values, and one’s power. Second, as we saw in my analysis of Lollard theology, the shift
from an ontology of need to an ontology of self-sufficiency transformed the perception of
representation, locating meaning in the individual’s interpretive act rather than in the
spiritual reality contacted through religious performance. Whereas the sacramental
chronotope constructs representation as a tool to contact an omnipresent divine realm—a
realm that is in itself the “meaning” of the performed representation, and thus a realm that
sanctions the performance from outside the sphere of the performers and audience—the
consubstantial chronotope constructs representation as an exchange of ideas between
performer and audience, locating the sanction for the performance in the pleasure that the
audience derives from their personal, private acts of interpretation. Of these two main
effects of the shift to an ontology of self-sufficiency, we will first explore the ontological
implications of the assumption that performances are only as real as the audience makes
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them through their interpretive acts. We will then describe the consumption-oriented
bodies that purchased performances for their own consumption through contemplation.
Mass and Masks: Diverse Ontologies of Performance
In their analysis of various traditions of masking in medieval theatre, Twycross
and Carpenter explore a variety of functions of masks which can in turn help us to
theorize about various relationships between image and observer and between image and
performer. While masks can call attention to the gap between the “false face” and the
performer, Twycross and Carpenter argue that the use of masks in the biblical cycle plays
of late medieval England might have functioned differently:
Partly because of their popular, “native” element, and partly because of
their religious material, they [the biblical cycle plays] come much closer to
ancient traditions of masking such as we see in Greek, Roman, Oriental,
Asian and African popular religious theatre. These traditions do not seem
to encourage their audiences to look behind the mask, or recognize a
tension between it and the actor. The concentration is on the character,
often a god, mythical hero, or evil spirit, who is represented by the mask,
not on its relationship to the wearer. Once the mask is on, the actor as an
individual man simply disappears behind or into it: only the character is
left. (175)
We might argue that within such traditions, the masks themselves are performing, not the
performers “underneath”: “They demonstrate a character, or an idea: they do not
conceal or disguise anything”—or anyone (Twycross and Carpenter 176). Such
traditions thus render masks essential for performance; indeed, the performer is more
dependent upon the mask than the mask is dependent upon the performer.
In this sense, as compared to an ontology of self-sufficiency, an ontology of need
offers a unique conception of the power relations not only between the spiritual and the
material, but also offers a different conception of the power relations between image and
contemplator. Within an ontology of need, the sacred image has its own power, a power

146

localized in space and time and “owned” by the image itself. The contemplator of the
image is subservient to the image itself. The wafer and wine become flesh and blood
whether or not the worshiper believes in the transformation. Within the sacramental
chronotope, the performer needs the mask, but the mask does not need the performer.
Within the consubstantial chronotope, however, the mask is a mere tool, a false
face used by the performer to create a purely imaginative metaworld:
This interest in mask as concealment or disguise has persisted in the postRenaissance European theatre, right through until the twentieth century.
The interest seems most often to be in the relationship between the mask
and the face behind it. This tends to encourage the audience to look
behind the mask to try to discover the man beneath. (Twycross and
Carpenter 175)
Just as within a consubstantial interpretation of the Eucharist, the wafer and wine remain
wafer and wine and must be consciously read as signs (that is, as masks or
representations) of Christ’s last supper, so too can performance be construed as “mere
sign” superimposed over the visible bodies, set pieces, props, and so forth “underneath”
the illusion.
In the consubstantial chronotope, it is these bodies and set pieces which, in their
materiality, are real and have substance; the fictive metaworld has consequence only in
the minds of the audience. Building on Christ’s declaration in Matthew 12:39 that the
wicked seek miraculous signs of love but not deeds of love, the author of the Lollard
treatise on miracle plays articulates just such a view of representation: “So siþen þise
miraclis pleyinge ben onely syngnis, loue wiþout dedis, þei ben […] contrarious to þe
worschipe of God, þat is boþe in signe and in dede” (Hudson 100). (“So since this
miracle playing involves only signs, love without deeds, such plays are […] contrary to
the worship of God, that is both in sign and in deed.”) Rather than indulging in
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inconsequential play, Lollards seek to move beyond signs into deeds, such as those
implied in the Lollard dictum mentioned earlier that a man’s “recreation should lie in
works of mercy towards his neighbor” such as the giving of alms or the communal effort
of helping others work their land.
As we shall explore in more detail in Chapter Five, there is yet one more
relationship possible between performer and mask—one of interdependence and
ontological equality. Twycross and Carpenter suggest that the presence of a mask can
compel a performer to work with the mask, rather than viewing it as merely a tool or as
an entity of greater communicative and ontological value (177). Such a relationship, as
we will see, creates the grounds for a dialogue, in the Bakhtinian sense of the word,
between the mask or representation and the performers who “wear” that mask. Yet for
the purposes of the current discussion, it is enough to note that within the consubstantial
chronotope, the performer and the audience have ontological authority over the mask—
that is, the performed image—which is thus a tool and which has no Being other than that
with which it is temporarily animated by the wearer.
In theatrical terms, we might say that within an ontology of need, a
performance—as an image, an object of contemplation—has ontological superiority over
the audience, as was the case in many of the liturgical dramas discussed in Chapter
Three. The performance speaks “above” the audience, as it were, with no real need for
any audience to be present. A sacred ritual is valid with or without an audience, yet
within the ontology of need created by Catholic liturgical practices of the Eucharist and
confession, the audience—that is, the laity trying to avoid an eternity in hell—desperately
needs the ritual performance.
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Within an ontology of self-sufficiency, however, the contemplator’s own efforts
at meditation and meaning-making assume priority over any “inherent” power the image,
relic, or performance might seem to possess. Instead of conceiving the image or
performance as possessing power independent of human acts and interactions, within an
ontology of self-sufficiency the image is now powerful only in relationship to the
observer’s level of engagement with the image. In other words, representations become
powerful—or, more accurately, are made powerful—only in the moment of interaction
with the owners and viewers, and such representations have at best only “potential
divinity” prior to or outside of that interaction. This attitude towards power over the relic
is the essence of the consubstantial chronotope—the spirit now travels with the
contemplator, neatly contained in the space of his/her mind.
The Constructed Body of the Consubstantial Chronotope
If the spirit is constructed as traveling with the contemplator, and if meaning is
constructed as residing within the contemplator, then we must consider what sort of
bodies are constructed within the consubstantial chronotope. Considering the bodies
constructed within an ontology of self-sufficiency will help us move these bodies out of
the church into the theatre—we can consider how a body constructed by shifts in
religious ontology would behave in a secular environment. Or more accurately, we might
say that we can explore how the same chronotopic and ontological forces expressed
themselves not only in religious behavior but in secular behavior as well. For although it
is tempting to argue that shifts in religious practice “gave birth to” an ontological shift in
consciousness, it is perhaps more accurate to view the ontological shift in consciousness,
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a shift driven by multiple forces, as expressing itself both in religious and in secular
patterns of bodily action made meaningful within a specific chronotope.
The first observation that we might make about bodies within the consubstantial
chronotope—especially the bodies of the secular and financial leaders of late medieval
England—is that these bodies were strongly inclined toward Kleinschmidt’s autodynamic
mode of being. Analyzing manuals for combat techniques and for dance from various
periods throughout the middle ages, Kleinschmidt describes two very different sets of
bodies. In the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth centuries, “the preferred aristocratic way
of fighting was the straightforward, unilinear strike against the opponent, and the rules
for the tournaments strictly prohibited bodily twists, turns, bents [sic] and feints”
(Kleinschmidt 78). Combat on the battlefield was likewise linear, rigid, and
straightforward: “military strategy consisted in the choice and preparation of the
battlefield so that it was best suited to stand against the primal shock of the opponent”
(Kleinschmidt 78).
Likewise, dance movements were similarly wooden:
In the course of the fourteenth century, dancing masters began to compose
choreographies with precisely measured paces and sequences […] and to
train their aristocratic lords and urban customers in the art of enacting
them. The preferred dances were slow and straightforward ceremonial
step dances[…]. These dances were processions in the course of which
the dancers were expected to observe meticulously the prescribed steps to
the front or backwards or some little hops as they moved on.
(Kleinschmidt 80)
Such simplified, straightforward uses of the body for combat and for dance reflected a
more heterodynamic mode of the body moving in unison in a line with other bodies. The
body employed in this manner was not understood as an expressive “free agent,” capable
of exploring the full range of its possible motions. Instead, we might metaphorically
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describe this heterodynamic body as something like part of a wave—working together,
the bodies of those in the community move forward, their shared monodirectional force
providing the might behind their action. Were these bodies to go spinning off wildly,
twisting and bending as they pleased, the force of the wave would be dissipated.
Yet in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, fighting and dancing offer
the body new realms of autodynamic self-expression:
Participants of many walks of life thus joined in displays of their bodily
energies. In doing so they adopted equilibrium positions which allowed
twists and turns into may different directions as well as jumps and other
extravagant and energetic movements. Legs stretched out to the back and
did not any more form a straight line with the upper parts of the bodies,
which were kept upright and flexible. Dancers were trained not only to
move forwards or backwards, but also to enact circular movements.
Fencers and dancers tried to act independently and to keep as much space
around themselves as possible so as to be able to move freely.
(Kleinschmidt 87-88)
This autodynamic mode of bodily action views the body as an independent agent and as a
source of energy from within. Bodies reach out to each other for pleasure or to cause
pain, but they are no longer constructed as links in a chain—links which cannot move
independently of each other. This self-sufficient body might choose to work with other
self-sufficient bodies—or it might not. It might, instead, merely twist, twirl, and dance
away, seeking to meet its own ends with its own forces.
In terms of Arthur W. Frank’s typology of body use in action, the body that is
constructed for interaction within the consubstantial chronotope at first resembles the
“disciplined body” that was associated with the sacramental chronotope. The most
notable resemblance between Frank’s disciplined body and the bodies living within the
consubstantial chronotope is the ascetic belief that bodies are not real but merely cover or
hide the truth—the soul that lies “inside.” The ascetic impulse in the consubstantial
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chronotope relies upon a mind-body dualism which subordinates the body to the demands
of the spirit: “the disciplined body is dissociated from itself. The ascetic can tolerate the
degradation of her or his body because she or he only observes that body; the ascetic is in
but not of the body” (Frank 56, emphasis in original). Within this chronotope, bodies are
merely tools, tools which should be put to the best possible use. Within the strict Lollard
vision of Christianity, providing this tool with pleasure through performance is a waste of
energy and resources; instead, the body should service the needs of the soul as well as the
needs of other bodies. Note here that the concern ultimately is with economics and
consumption, however; the issue is not simply that a good Christian should help others,
but also—and more importantly—that good Christians should not waste their resources in
frivolous enterprises.
The same bodily discipline present in religious thought and Christian doctrine
also pervaded secular treatises on proper moral behavior. The secular counterpoint to the
Books of Hours would be the various conduct books that informed the growing upper
class, largely composed of merchants, how to behave appropriately in polite society.
Sponsler examines some of these medieval English conduct books in light of scholarly
arguments that during the Middle Ages, “public control over the individual body was
absolute and unquestioned” and that it was not until the early modern era that control of
the body shifted “from a public to a private sphere” (52). Sponsler’s research suggests
otherwise: “Despite the assumptions of Elias, Bakhtin, and Foucault about medieval
bodies, these conduct books reveal that long before the sixteenth century the ‘civilizing’
work of bodily discipline was already well under way” (53).
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The discipline of these consubstantial bodies, however, was far different from the
monastic discipline exhibited in the sacramental chronotope. In the budding consumer
culture of medieval England, one purchased a disciplined body—or the training required
to obtain it—by purchasing conduct books. Rather than learning an orthopraxis through
time-consuming acts of repetition and modeling, secular consumers of discipline in the
late Middle Ages simply bought a book and read it. As such, discipline becomes
reconstructed within the consubstantial chronotope not only as something available for
purchase, but indeed as something desirable to purchase. Sponsler’s primary argument
regarding medieval English conduct books is that they were rhetorically constructed to
make discipline seem desirable, even pleasurable: “Conduct books work ideologically to
make bodily control something the rational subject wants, even as they position that
subject within the social order, working to create categories and hierarchies based on the
marketing of acquirable traits such as manners” (57, emphasis in original). These books
employ several rhetorical devices to transform discipline into pleasure. The two most
significant of such devices for our analysis here are scare tactics and the promise of
rewards. Fear appeals are evident in the conduct poems that Sponsler analyzes because
they “frame their advice within a social world that is figured as hostile and threatening.
The weapon to use against the dangerous world, the poems promise, is the well-governed
body, which helps protect the vulnerable self and offers safety” (70).
Medieval conduct poems appeal to rewards in much the same way that “self-help”
books today sell themselves on the premise that self-discipline and a “new” outlook on
life will lead to extraordinary personal, social, and financial rewards:
Self-governance is […] presented as the mechanism by which an
individual can, through personal initiative alone, attain success and
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happiness. The optimism and confidence of this position are breathtaking.
Potential barriers—such as lack of wealth, absence of employment
opportunities or marriage prospects, low social standing, or poor health—
are never mentioned. Instead, the assumption is that learning to control
one’s own behavior is the definitive factor in determining one’s happiness,
with the individual’s own enthusiastic participation as the only
requirement. (Sponsler 71)
Sponsler’s line of argument here suggests an interesting connection between Frank’s
disciplined body and his mirroring, or consuming, body. Medieval English conduct
books construct discipline as a tool which can be consumed and which, once consumed,
will lead to greater possibilities for consumption—that is, to increased status and wealth.
“If the disciplined body made itself predictable against an unconscious fear of its
own contingency, the mirroring body is endlessly producing desires in order to keep its
lack unconscious,” Frank tells us (62, emphasis in original). This endlessly produced
desire in turn drives an endless consumption:
The mirroring body finds its paradigmatic medium of activity in
consuming, but consumption is less about actual material acquisition than
it is about producing desires. The paradox of the mirroring body’s
consumption is that it need not, as it were, be consummated. As the body
see the object it immediately aligns itself in some fit with that object; its
desire is to make the object part of its image of itself. Thus the object
becomes a mirror in which the body sees itself reflected, but only [...] on
its own terms. (Frank 62)
The seemingly disciplined body of the consubstantial chronotope functions, I would
argue, more significantly as a mirroring body in the sense that its discipline is derived
from consumption and maintained through consumption. Various laws such as Edward
VI’s sumptuary laws of 1463 provide some indication of how important consumption was
for displaying the self-disciplined body’s new status, as such laws articulated a
straightforward connection between the clothing one could purchase and the appearance
of possessing high social status. “Townsmen were sharply conscious of the stratifications
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of wealth in their world, and had their own names for them, ‘men of degree,’ ‘honest
commoners,’ ‘mere commoners’ and so on. In some towns […] the gradations were
reinforced by local sumptuary laws” which insured that one’s dress matched one’s social
standing (Keen 98). The fact that such laws were created in the first place suggests that a
frequent practice in late medieval England, especially in the larger towns, was to
purchase clothing which would suggest that one was of a higher station than one had, in
the eyes of the ruling elite, “earned.” Consumption of a material object becomes, in the
context of such practices, a route for social advancement.
But material objects were not the only objects for consumption in medieval
England. As ephemeral as they are, theatrical performances were perhaps the perfect
example of an object for consumption under the paradigm of the mirroring body. Always
disappearing in the act of consumption without being forgotten, always summoning forth
desire for more productions (in both senses of the word) which in turn are consumed and
then produced again, theatrical performances fit well with the mirroring body’s impulses.
And in medieval England, there were a variety of consumers available for these
performances.
For simplicity’s sake, we might divide theatrical consumers in late medieval
England into five groups: the common folk paying to see a performance by a touring
troupe (Bristol; Greenfield); the university dons watching children perform for their
edification and entertainment (Nelson; Elliott, Jr.); the courtly class that sponsored
performing troupes and commissioned entertainments (Parry; McLuskie and Dunsworth);
the clergy who arranged for the ongoing religious drama within the church space
(Wasson); and the townsfolk who watched guild-produced civic theatre (Higgins) and
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civic spectacles (Kipling). The clerical audience has already been addressed in Chapter
Three of this study, while the audience for civic theatre will be discussed in Chapter Five.
All three of the remaining audience groups (commoners, university wits, and nobles)
arguably functioned as mirroring bodies who viewed performance as a mirror—one that
simultaneously reflected, demonstrated, and produced their refinement or tastes. A full
discussion of the consumption practices of all three of these medieval theatre audiences is
beyond the scope of the present study. In this chapter, therefore, we will focus on upper
class theatre spectators—the newly wealthy merchants and the nobles who arranged for
household performances. A wealth of dramatic texts designed for performance in these
household entertainments gives us ample room to explore these consumers and the
images they consumed.
As we move into an era where more and more wealthy individuals own relics,
religious images, and devotional aids, we observe that the surviving theatre scripts are
predominantly consubstantial in their approach to the “reality” of the fictive metaworld
created in performance. As opposed to the interconnectedness of the Host and Christ in
the transubstantial vision of the Eucharist, the consubstantial chronotope assumes a less
literal, more metaphoric relationship between spirit and matter, and thus in theatrical
terms assumes a purely metaphoric relationship between “play” and “reality.” In keeping
with our discussion of the mirroring or consuming body, we might say that in the
consubstantial chronotope, the theatrical spectator is merely “window-shopping” through
the world of ideas being presented for his or her pleasure. A purely metaphoric
relationship between play and reality therefore implies a very different relationship
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between the first and second worlds of performance in the consubstantial chronotope than
the relationship between those two worlds in the sacramental chronotope.
Consubstantial Phantasms: First and Second Worlds
Henry Medwall’s Tudor-era interlude Fulgens and Lucres offers a useful example
of the consubstantial chronotope in action, as it illustrates multiple ways in which the
world of the performers and the audience interacted with the imaginative metaworld
created in/through the performance. If the sacramental chronotope represents absolute
indivisibility—the perfect unity of the church as the eternal locus of the divine—then the
consubstantial chronotope might be characterized as absolute divisibility. The
consubstantial chronotope assumes a clear division between the first and second worlds
of performance while exploring various ways for those two distinct worlds to “play” with
each other.
A late fifteenth-century play, Fulgens is in many respects a more or less secular
version of the traditional morality play familiar to most theatre audiences in medieval
England. Set in classical Rome, perhaps “during the closing period of the Republic”
(Creeth 538), the main plot of Fulgens essentially presents “little more than a medieval
debat, or disputation, on what makes a gentleman” (Holzknecht 2). A young daughter of
a Roman senator is compelled to choose between two suitors for marriage—one who is of
noble blood but of questionable morals, and one who is of common birth but is wise,
trustworthy, and of sound moral character. Yet the play’s comic sub-plot, which
unusually surrounds the moral commentary of the main plot and frames it, is set not in
classical Rome but in the “here-and-now” of Tudor England, and this allows for the play
to become something much more than a mere debat. The first lines of this play
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demonstrate a sophisticated manipulation of audience-performer conventions. “A,“ an
intentionally unnamed character masquerading as an audience member, begins the play
by addressing the audience as if he were one of them:
A:

For Goddis will,
What meane ye, syrs, to stond so still?
Have not ye etyn and your fill
and payd nothinge therefore? (I.1-4; Creeth 5)

In his guise as a fellow member of the audience, “A” chastises them for their silence and
(presumably) their decorum—the very silence and decorum we would expect at the start
of a play.
The joke here works only if the audience knows how it is supposed to behave and
in fact behaves with, if not decorum, then at least a dramatic shift in attention when the
show begins. The joke, in other words, depends upon the audience possessing a certain
theatrical sophistication; audience members must be refined consumers of theatre in order
to enjoy these metatheatrical games, and by virtue of their laughter they in turn display
their theatrical sophistication for other audience members. Throughout the play, “A” and
his fellow-rogue “B” toy with the established conventions of the audience’s passive role
by presenting themselves as mere audience members—but audience members who
involve themselves actively in the work of the play. As we saw in Chapter One, “A” and
“B” choose to become involved in the events of the play, with each becoming a servingman to one of the suitors. Since “A” and “B” are established as coming from “our”
world—the world of those in the Tudor banquet hall where the play is being performed—
we are encouraged to think of “A” and “B” as our representatives within the metaworld
of performance.
As Meg Twycross points out, it “is difficult to say how long this deception could
have been kept up in practice—not for very long, one suspects, as genuine members of
the audience do not usually speak in rhymed verse” (75). Indeed it would seem that this
“deception” in fact is designed to fail from the start—after all, for the audience to be able
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to attend to the first speech by “A,” they would have to be aware that “A” was
functioning as a player. When “A” begins spouting rhyming verse, the audience’s
suspicions would be confirmed. We may assume, then, that the audience is “in on the
joke” when “A” questions the identity of “B”:
A:
B:

I trowe your owyn self be oon
Of them that shall play.
Nay, I am none.
I trowe thou spekyst in derision
To lyke me therto. (I.44-48; Creeth 6)

In fact, “B” is a player who nonetheless takes insult in being called a player; the
audience’s awareness of this fact creates an ironic commentary of the perceived
disreputable status of players.
Fulgens is in many ways a clear example of the consubstantial chronotope.
Although there is much interaction between the first and second worlds in a performance
of this play, in the end this interaction merely confirms their separation—the performance
is pure theatrical gamesmanship based on the audience’s familiarity with their role as
spectators. “A and B are not malicious, and their subversion of the rules seems to be
done out of pure high spirits and opportunism. Medwall’s great tour de force with them
is merely the logical extension of the audience game” (Twycross 75). And by showing
how well they play this “audience game,” spectators in turn display their intelligence, wit,
and sophistication for other audience members. In the rarified atmosphere of a wealthy
Tudor banquet hall, impressing other spectators with one’s taste and wit offered real
material rewards.
Yet this gamesmanship to some extent undercuts the ontological substance of the
“second world” of performance. In Fulgens, various players offer disclaimers which
suggest that their words are merely entertainment which have no authority over the
spectators. As Twycross notes:
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These polite disclaimers give one the sense that both author and actors are
walking warily. At the very beginning of the play, B goes out of his way to point
out that no one present is personally involved: “here is no man of the kyn or sede
/ of either partie” (Part I, lines 178-9), as of course they [the characters in the
play] were all ancient Romans. The reminder that this is only a fiction keeps
topicality at a safe distance, just as the generalizations of allegory (usually)
protect the author and actors from the charge of slander. (78, emphasis in
original)
Whatever moral commentary about the behavior of the nobility which might be offered
by Medwall’s play is offered only as a “play-ful” suggestion. Granted, the play explores
issues that were fiercely debated in late medieval England about the true nature of
nobility by constraining the young gentlewoman Lucres to choose between either the
nobly-born but morally suspect Cornelius or the common-born but virtuous Gaius for her
husband. Yet A and B’s ironic metacommentary throughout the performance helps
remind us that the long-dead world of Lucres, Gaius, and Cornelius has only as much
substance and authority as the audience grants that metaworld. In the figural conception
of time that informs both the sacramental and transubstantial chronotopes, past events are
always “present,” and thus the past can always affect the present; in the consubstantial
context of Fulgens and Lucres, however, past events are functionally “dead” and are
relived only imaginatively and mostly (if not entirely) for the purpose of entertainment.
While concerns about slander remind us that plays such as Medwall’s posed a
threat to those in power by virtue of their ability to comment on or satirize contemporary
affairs, the threat here comes, not from the imaginative metaworld crossing a boundary
into our “first world” of performance, but rather from the actors in the first world
speaking lines that clearly have meaning and relevance in the first world. In other words,
in the consubstantial chronotope the performers and author(s) can comment on the
audience and the larger society, while the imaginative metaworld is purposefully
distanced from the audience, set aside as a functionally insubstantial, phantasmic space
and time. Ontological authority thus firmly remains the province of the first world of the
audience and performers in the consubstantial chronotope.
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The audience of such a consubstantial performance is in a sense windowshopping through the ideas portrayed onstage, sitting in ultimate judgment over the
metaworld, a metaworld that they can choose to “buy” or not to buy. Medwall, as a
shrewd salesman, has chosen well in constructing a metaworld that meets with the tastes,
interests, and needs of his customers/patrons, as Creeth points out:
The problem de vera nobilitate was not merely academic in early Tudor
England. Humanists [such as Erasmus] held the Platonic ideal of the
philosopher-ruler but were ruled by an aristocracy based on heredity rather
than on learning, the avenue to virtuous discipline. [… One] means of
improving the ruling class was to grant favor and place to the Tudor
equivalent of Gayus Flamyneus. By leaving the choice of suitors up to the
lady, Medwall was able […] to imply the superiority of mere virtuous
accomplishment over mere ancestors. (xiii-xiv)
Having shrewdly judged his audience, many of whom were either nouveau riche
merchants or nobles who benefited from the new mercantile wealth, Medwall chooses to
suggest that virtuous acts outweigh noble blood. Yet Medwall is always careful to give
himself a “loophole” through which he can escape should the audience turn against him:
“Medwall’s Lucres is careful to say that she is but a woman, that her decision offers no
sort of general precedent, and that moreover the nobility which a member of the
hereditary aristocracy can achieve if he will is beyond that accessible to any commoner”
(Creeth xiv). Medwall knows who his buyers are, and he aims his discourse at those
buyers with a thoroughgoing sensitivity to the full range of responses they might offer.
Addressivity in the Consubstantial Chronotope
In this sense, performance within the consubstantial chronotope is addressed
directly to the audience, with all the messy communication problems implied by such
addressivity. In Bakhtinian terms, while all utterances possess the “hope” of being
understood “purely” by the superaddressee, utterances are also clearly marked by their
efforts to communicate, however “impurely” or “messily,” with the actual audience
present at the moment:
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As the need to posit a category such as “super-addressee” outside the
present moment makes clear, conditions for creating meaning in the
present moment are not always the best. A dialogic world is one in which
I can never have my own way completely, and therefore I find myself
plunged into constant interaction with others—and with myself. (Holquist
38)
As we saw in Chapter Three, within the sacramental chronotope, every effort is made to
focus the energy of the performance’s addressivity on the superaddressee, ignoring as
much as is possible the messy realm of dialogue between human beings. The world
addressed by the sacramental chronotope is not the ever-changing world of constant
interaction with flawed human beings, but the perfect and eternal world of the divine,
wherein understanding is ever-present and ever-true.
In the consubstantial chronotope, however, it is the human audience—what
Bakhtin called the “second person”—toward which the utterance is primarily inclined.
Of course, this “second person” is to some extent always a fiction in the mind of the
“author” of the utterance, especially in the written discourse of the novels that Bakhtin
sought to valorize. As I write a novel or a play, I have not an actual audience but rather
an image of the audience members in mind, and I address that imaginative audience as I
write. Unlike comments addressed to the superaddressee, however, the image that my
writing yearns to speak with and to is not idealized and thus involves problematic or
“impure” utterance. A superaddressee offers only one possible reaction—pure, ideal
understanding. My imaginative interaction with the second person as I write a play is
“impure,” messy, and hesitant, as I struggle with the possible reactions my second
person(s) might offer. And in the consubstantial chronotope, the addressee of the
utterance is primarily the living, breathing audience in our messy world.
Consider, for instance, one of the most popular forms of medieval theatre in the
late middle ages, “a type of discursive comedy or farce similar to the medieval debat, or
debate, […which] was intended to amuse as well as, now and then, teach its audience”
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(Gassner 231). In some ways, these discursive comedies, such as The Play Called the
Four PP, resembled traditional moralities such as Wisdom and Everyman. Where the
traditional morality debated issues of good and evil in the hopes of saving individual
souls, however, discursive comedies like The Play Called the Four PP were aimed almost
exclusively at entertaining crowds of sophisticated theatergoers with intellectual play:
“Short on plot and long on discussion, the[se] interludes did not so much thrive on any
public stage as appear as a form of private entertainment in the halls of great houses”
(Gassner 231).
What strikes me most as I read and imaginatively attempt to re-create the
experience of a medieval theatergoer watching one of these discursive comedies is how
dependent such comedies are upon the presence of a large, lively, witty audience for their
success. One can easily imagine that a traditional morality such as Everyman might be
successfully performed for an audience of only one member, as the goal of such
moralities was to save even one soul from hellfire. A discursive comedy such as The
Play Called the Four PP, however, would be terribly boring and ineffectual without a
boisterous audience present to enjoy the sheer rowdy play of ideas.
The “plot” of John Heywood’s The Play Called the Four PP, if it can be said to
have one, involves the chance meeting of a Palmer (or pilgrim), a Pardoner, a Pedlar (or
merchant), and a Pothecary (or healer)—hence the title. Having stumbled onto one
another in a space that is never differentiated from the space and time of the audience in
the banqueting hall, the four P’s decide to pass the time by debating the merits of their
various callings in an effort to determine which calling is the most righteous and
appropriate. The Pedlar, having perceived that the greatest skill the other three have in
common is a talent for lying, proposes that they settle the argument with a contest to
determine who can tell the biggest lie. After the Pardoner entertains those assembled,
including the audience, by offering them holy relics to kiss such as the “great-toe of the
Trinity” (l. 509) and the “buttock-bone of Pentecost” (l. 521), the tall tales begin.
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It should perhaps not surprise us, given that many of these banquet-hall
performances functioned as the medieval equivalent of an “old boys’ club” where
influential men made contacts and arranged deals while ignoring the presence of any
women (if indeed any women were present), that the tale each great liar tells is uniformly
misogynistic. The Pothecary tells the story of his curing a young woman by giving her
an enema and plugging up her anus until the plug explodes from her and flies “ten mile
long level” (l. 743) destroying two castles on its way. For his contribution, the Pardoner
tells a tale of having descended into Hell to save the soul of a shrew who died without the
benefit of the sacraments. After debating the Devil to a standstill, the Pardoner asks for
the soul of the shrew, which is given up joyfully by the demons in hell who rejoice in the
absence of her harsh tongue. The Palmer, who has been mostly quiet and demure
throughout these rowdy tales, objects at this point to the Pardoner’s description of such a
shrewish, mean-spirited woman. Referring to his wide travels and to the many souls he
has encountered, the Palmer observes, “Of all the women that I have seen,/ I never saw,
nor knew, in my conscience,/ Any woman out of patience” (l. 1002-4). To this claim of
feminine gentility, the other P’s respond enthusiastically that this is, indeed, the single
greatest lie they have ever heard.
Discursive comedies like Heywood’s The Play Called the Four PP are rowdy,
playful, light entertainments that seek neither to save souls nor to damn them. They are
not pious rituals of faith, like Latin liturgical dramas, nor are they moralizing treatises
reaching out to save lost souls, like traditional morality plays. These comedies require
the presence of a witty intellectual audience familiar with the practice of theatergoing, an
audience that the plays clearly address themselves toward with all the messy and profane
implications that typically marks such addressivity. And it is revealing that Heywood
ends his interlude in a manner that anticipates Shakespeare’s epilogue by Puck in A
Midsummer Night’s Dream:
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And all that hath ‘scaped us here by negligence,
We clearly revoke and forsake it.
To pass the time in this without offence
Was the cause why the maker did make it;
And so we humbly beseech you take it[.] (1230-34)
The caution that Heywood displays here is characteristic of much Tudor and Elizabethan
theatre, where playwrights were careful to insure that their plays were taken as light
entertainments—tongue-in-cheek phantasms with no ontological authority over their
audience.
Conclusion: Divided Worlds
While theatre within the consubstantial chronotope can toy with the conventions
of actor-audience relationships, playfully crossing the boundary between the first and
second worlds such as when the audience of The Play Called the Four PP is invited to
kiss various disgusting relics, in the end this boundary-breaking reaffirms the division
between the first and second worlds of performance. This division lends itself to a
hierarchy between the two worlds which subordinates the ontological status of the fictive
metaworld. This is true not only for Medwall and Heywood’s works, but for many other
plays of the time, including some traditional morality plays that would otherwise seem to
challenge the audience more directly and individually:
In Mankind and other late fifteenth-century as well as early sixteenthcentury drama, audience addresses tend to be much more casual, more a
matter of course than in [the Corpus Christi plays…]. In consequence of
its reduced status the audience-address is used less for the expression of
shared experience than for the verbalizing of stage business: the players
announce that they must leave, or they ask for “room.” (Diller,
“Theatrical Pragmatics” 329)
Much of the audience address in the Tudor interludes, then, serves to highlight the
subordinate status of the performers and, by extension, the subordinate status of the
metaworld created by those performers. Calls to “make room” and similar references
remind the audience that their agreement and/or acquiescence is required in order for the
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metaworld to be brought forward; without the audience’s support, nothing can happen in
such plays.
What the consubstantial chronotope gains in terms of “a heightened degree of
artistic self-consciousness” (Diller, “Theatrical Pragmatics” 330) therefore comes at the
expense of the power of the “shared experience” of the transubstantial chronotope which,
as we shall see shortly in our next chapter, is best illustrated by the Corpus Christi cycle
of biblical plays. The consubstantial chronotope, working from within an ontology of
self-sufficiency, authors a metaworld which is both consumed by and specifically
addressed to an actual human audience; that same metaworld thus lacks ontological
authority over the audience. In contrast, the ontology of community that informs the
Corpus Christi cycles of biblical plays produces a transubstantial chronotope where the
metaworld of performance can stand as an ontological equal with the audience, thus
allowing for the imaginative second world of performance to enter into a uniquely
persuasive dialogue with the first world of the audience and performers.
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CHAPTER 5
THE TRANSUBSTANTIAL CHRONOTOPE
[T]he staging of the last [i.e., concluding] Last Judgment scene on the
Pavement [in York] employed the durable and persistent tradition of
positional symbolism. Such a staging would have made sense of the
actual space: hell to stage left [and thus at the left hand of God], toward
the stinking [butcher shops of the] Shambles, and paradise to the right
[and thus at the right hand of God], near the church of all the saints, the
burial place of the mayors. The fact that the episode’s action calls for the
crowd itself to be searched and divided into souls damned and saved may
help, too, to explain why [seating] stations on the Pavement were not
always rented, scaffolds not always built. Where, in good conscience,
would one elect to sit?
--Anne Higgins, “Streets and Markets,” 91
Higgins’ description of the positional symbolism of the concluding Corpus Christi
play in medieval York takes us into territory that at first seems familiar. After all, the
sacramental chronotope associated with Latin liturgical drama drew heavily on positional
symbolism, using the same notions of left and right—as well as compass-point
associations—to enhance the spiritual and symbolic significance of action as it was
performed. And although the audience was sometimes leery of the public and private
difficulties of choosing to sit on either hand of God—after all, sitting on the left hand of
God damned you, but sitting on the right hand of God was a public display of an
unchristian arrogance—it is clear that stations on the Pavement for the final performance
of the pageant were indeed rented and scaffolds were on occasion built. In this sense, we
might see in Higgins’ description a shadow of the consubstantial chronotope, where the
Divine can be purchased for private ownership. At least some brave (or foolhardy) souls
were willing to lay down good money to obtain a good seat, and one might imagine that a
few purposefully chose to pay for a seat at the right hand of God.
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To say, however, that the Corpus Christi pageants prevalent in northern England
in the late Middle Ages were merely a bastardized gumbo of Latin liturgical dramas and
the more rowdy, secularized, and consumption-oriented plays of the consubstantial
chronotope would do the pageants a great injustice. What Higgins describes here borders
on the surreal: a group of people who are consciously spectators of an imaginative
theatrical experience who nonetheless see their town drawn into the symbolic action of
the play and who find themselves struggling over their own salvation as they participate
in the performance. Perhaps the simplest—and most comfortable—explanation for this
behavior is that the audience for these pageants was largely populated with spectators
unable to distinguish between the action of the performance metaworld and the action of
the “first world” of the audience. If spectators were simply not sophisticated enough to
be able to tell the two worlds apart, their moral dilemma over where to sit would seem
sweet—and thus would not seem disturbing to contemporary interpreters of the texts of
these plays.
What is potentially disturbing for us as modern interpreters of these plays is the
thought that something more powerful than we typically experience in a theatre might
have been going on as the clock raced toward midnight on the torchlit streets of York.
What if these spectators were not naïve at all but were instead quite sophisticated, able to
negotiate practical, ethical, and spiritual dimensions of meaning simultaneously,
confronting their neighbors and the Risen Savior with the same glance, speaking to and
with themselves and Satan at the same time? What if, in other words, the medieval
audience (as Carolly Erickson so astutely put it in Chapter Two of this study) actually
“saw more” than we are typically able to see in these plays? Are we able, from our
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contemporary position, to experience something of the richness of what medieval
audiences saw?
The transubstantial chronotope associated with performances like the York
Corpus Christi pageants of the late Middle Ages is in many ways a more complex
phenomenon of perception than the two previous chronotopes we have explored. To
explore this chronotope fully, we must first explore the ontology of community that drove
people to produce and participate in these immense theatrical spectacles. We must then
consider the generative and lively bodies at work and at play within the transubstantial
chronotope, after which we can explore the wide range of audiences being addressed by
this performance discourse.
The multiple and complex forms of addressivity in the transubstantial chronotope
leads us into the territory of what Bakhtin called “innerly persuasive discourse,” where
we can explore how the various voices being produced by the performance discourse are
given weight and agency. The transubstantial chronotope features a particularly active
form of innerly persuasive discourse, and this comes in part from the figural concept of
time which informs the transubstantial chronotope. Figural time allows performers and
spectators to discourse in one and the same moment with the immediate present, the
Biblical past, and the Revelation to come. I conclude this chapter with an imaginative recreation of the medieval experience of the York Corpus Christi pageants in an attempt to
evoke something of the transubstantial chronotope.
The Scope of the York Corpus Christi Cycle
Perhaps the most famous theatrical genre of England’s medieval period was the
biblical cycle, often staged as a series of short plays which, additively, constituted a great
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procession telling the story of Christianity from Creation to Last Judgment. In York and
other northern English towns, these plays were regularly staged outdoors, and local
townspeople designed and built the huge pageant wagons that would transport the
performances from station to station along a predetermined route, made costumes and
props for the plays, and were themselves performers in the plays (Harris 125-140). Of
the four major Corpus Christi cycles from northern England to have surviving complete
play texts—the York, Chester, and Wakefield pageants, and the “N-Town” plays
associated with East Anglia—“York’s is the oldest and best preserved of the surviving
English cycles” (Beadle and King ix). For this reason, we can productively narrow our
discussion of Corpus Christi pageants to the Biblical cycle staged in York from roughly
1376 through to the late 1500’s.
The Corpus Christi festival, which was introduced into the Church calendar in
1311, existed for several years without any associated theatrical performances. The high
point of the festival in its earliest stages was a procession of clergy carrying the
Communion Host, which was eventually supplemented with static tableaux on floats
designed to illustrate Biblical stories (Tydeman, “An Introduction” 20-21). It is difficult,
given the limited nature of the surviving documentation, to assume an evolutionary
movement from a simple clerical procession to static tableaux on wagons to the fullblown theatrical presentations of the York pageants. Nonetheless, an important step
toward the production of fully theatrical pageants came when responsibility for the
processional performances was assigned to the craft-guilds of “various trades or
‘mysteries’” (Bevington, Medieval Drama 227). These craft-guilds were formed to
protect and promote specific trades, such as plastering, ironmongering, tilemaking,
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armoury, and butchery; they also served administrative functions such as the collection of
various taxes and fees required from trade members by the city, and they served social
functions by bringing together artisans and merchants with similar interests and values
(Dobson; Beadle and King xv). As Richard Beadle and Pamela M. King note:
At the earliest stage in the history of the York cycle a decision must have
been taken to divide the long sequence of events stretching from the
Creation to the Last Judgment into manageable units for the purposes of
processional performance. Each of these units became a separate play, or,
as it was then often known, “pageant,” and each was assigned to a
particular craft-guild of the city. The craft-guilds therefore became
responsible for furnishing the pageant-wagon on which the play was to be
performed, and for finding suitable actors, properties, costumes, and so
forth. It is also possible that the guilds commissioned scripts for their
plays locally, but the names of the playwrights have not survived. Those
sufficiently learned in sacred history are likely to have been clerics, such
as parish priests, or perhaps members of the monastic or mendicant orders,
who were strongly present in York. (xii)
As is clear from this description, although the pageants were produced (i.e., overseen) by
the craft-guilds of York, a myriad of others were involved in the writing, planning,
preparing, and performing of these plays.
The use of local, familiar, and largely secular space, time, and bodies to stage a
massive performance portraying the eternal history of God implies a quite different set of
principles informing the Corpus Christi pageants of medieval England than the informing
principles of either the Tudor-era interludes or of the Latin liturgical dramas that we have
previously examined. These pageants functioned as expressions not only of religious
faith and identity but also—and perhaps more importantly—as expressions of civic
identity and even civic pride. In almost elegiac terms, Higgins describes the late
medieval transition from civic play to private spectacle, focusing on how the York
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pageants were thoroughly infused with and informed by the life and livelihoods of the
town and the people within it:
With the rise of performance in privately owned, not public, spaces, the
rough equality of citizens in the streets of their own city, watching a play
produced and largely performed by their neighbors, was lost forever. No
longer would they see guildsmen whom they knew performing in plays
using the tools and products of their daily work; no longer would they see
the neighborhood changed for the nonce into Jerusalem, or heaven and
hell. There was a time when townspeople owned their play, and they also
owned the playing places. (91)
Higgins’ tone here may be sentimental, but her observations are nonetheless both
accurate and significant. The York pageants fed off of the resources of the entire city and
its environs, and as such their performances were a way of enacting and embodying civic
consciousness—a means of creating or instilling or reproducing civic virtues. The
performances were of the community in the most thoroughgoing manner imaginable.
With the possible exception of large-scale parades for Mardi Gras and other
holidays which involve individuals of all kinds throughout a city coming together to
produce a major festival event, there are few if any contemporary equivalents for a live
theatrical performance event as massively and thoroughly communal as the Corpus
Christi processions staged in York. The term “community theatre” today often refers to
either small amateurish enterprises or equally small social-political efforts at grass-roots
community transformation. Yet as Beadle demonstrates, the sheer scale of the
community’s involvement in staging the 48 plays of the York Corpus Christi procession
was extraordinary, involving most or even all of the citizens of York as well as a host of
foreigners:
The script called for over 300 speaking parts, and there was an unknown
but undoubtedly much larger number of supernumeraries—musicians,
stagehands, and other assistants—required to mount the performance,
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which normally took place annually on Corpus Christi Day, beginning at
dawn and probably not ending until after midnight[…]. These immense
physical demands in relation to a single artistic enterprise by one
community have no significant modern analogue, and the practical
conception answers to an equally significant grandeur and complexity of
thought: the idea of a unified drama of the Fall and Redemption of
mankind presented in such a way as to implicate the spiritual lives of the
audience throughout. (88)
Both in terms of practical resources and intellectual scope, these Corpus Christi pageants
were the grandest artistic enterprises of their day.
Community and Contestation
The question now is how we might describe the ontology that informs the
transubstantial chronotope of the Corpus Christi pageants. The sacramental chronotope
was defined by an ontology of need, and the consubstantial chronotope was defined by an
ontology of self-sufficiency. Perhaps the most obvious way of describing the ontology of
the Corpus Christi pageants, given the holistic nature of the enterprise, would be to
elaborate an ontology of community. Doing so, however, produces two difficulties. First,
the concept of “community” in contemporary critical and cultural theory is multivalent,
highly contested, and deeply ambiguous. Second, a unitary and monologic view of
community is insufficient to describe the diverse groups of bodies that populated the
post-plague medieval English city. We must first, therefore, find a definition of
community that can accurately describe the Corpus Christi pageants as cultural,
communal performances, and we must then describe the various competing communities
at work in the rapidly developing English cities of the later Middle Ages.
A useful definition of community in the context of performance studies can be
found in a 1995 study by Kirk Fuoss of the organized-labor social drama of sitdown
strikes by Michigan autoworkers in 1936-37. Fuoss interprets these strikes as agonistic
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performances where competing visions of community were articulated, re-articulated,
and contested. In the context of such agonistic performance, community functions both
to build coalitions and to articulate grievances and concerns, thus allowing for
contestation both within and among communities:
The tendency to view community and contestation as oppositional social
forces results, I believe, from the idealization of community and the
demonization of contestation in much contemporary thought. For many
persons, community is thought to involve sharing, similarity, cohesion,
and camaraderie, while contestation is thought to involve conflict,
difference, divisiveness, and enmity.[…] Far from being oppositional
social forces, community and contestation are, I contend, intimate
bedfellows, with each one incessantly producing and reproducing the
other. (94)
As opposed to an idealized image of communitas as a meeting of true minds and hearts,
Fuoss describes community as always and essentially in process—that is, a given
community is understood as always engaging other communities while community norms
and values are continually negotiated both by “in-group” and “out-group” members.
Such a description, as we will see shortly, fits well with the multiple and often
contestatory communities that worked to produce the York Corpus Christi pageants.
Such a description also forces us to reconceptualize community “primarily as a symbolic
construct rather than a social structure” (Fuoss 81-82). Community is not a thing but is
rather an ongoing doing, and it is “done” at least in part by means of cultural
performances.
While acknowledging that as “a result of the variety of interpretations afforded
community, some scholars caution against its use,” Fuoss contends that community can
be understood as inherently and productively multiple (81-82). Such an approach to the
concept of community requires researchers to “recognize that different persons use the
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concept differently and investigate what those differences reveal” (Fuoss 81). Analyzing
and describing multiple and often competing interpretations of community within a
specific historical context can thus transform what was a problem into its own solution
given that “the obstacle to investigation—multiple interpretations of community—is
reconceptualized not as an obstacle to but as the object of investigation” (Fuoss 81,
emphasis in original).
Perhaps most importantly in the context of my analysis of the ontology of the
transubstantial chronotope, Fuoss explicitly links cultural performances to the process of
building and articulating communities, thus allowing us to consider the Corpus Christi
pageants as community-producing, community-engaging, community-contesting cultural
performances. As described by Fuoss, community both produces cultural performances
and is produced by cultural performances. Cultural performances articulate communities
“by inscribing particular interpretations of community in the cultural performances
themselves and by enacting communal relationships in the very process of gathering for
and participating in the cultural performances either as actor, audience member, or both”
(Fuoss 82). Communities thus derive some of their meaning, substance, and effectivity
from the process of their articulation through cultural performances.
Harald Kleinschmidt offers the means for us to begin discussing the multiple and
contestatory communities that struggled to articulate themselves through cultural
performances in medieval England. Rather than describing an evolution from small
groups to larger societies in the Middle Ages, Kleinschmidt treats the development of
larger-scale groups as a process of incorporation, absorption, and the removal of choice
or options. He chooses to “focus on the problem of the processes that led to the
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disappearance of the variety of groups to which a person could choose to belong”
throughout the Middle Ages (92). Medieval Europeans generally experienced a shift
from participation in a variety of small groups which could largely be entered into or left
voluntarily to participation in two limited, limiting, and largely involuntarily major
groups: political groups such as nations and social groups based on law, such as stratified
social castes. “The shrinking size, reduced competence and declining autonomy of kin,
neighborhood and contractual groups paved the way for the rising administrative and
legal importance of political and social groups” (Kleinschmidt 119).
Throughout the Middle Ages, the size of one’s kinship group was systematically
reduced, thus reducing the importance of such groups to the public life of a community.
“Before the acceptance of Christianity, the most widespread rule of inheritance in the kin
groups was double descent, which allowed the tracing of descent through the maternal
and the paternal lines” (Kleinschmidt 92), thus creating large extended families which
could effectively function as their own communities. In an effort to reduce the strength
and power of such communities, the Church worked actively to shrink the size and
importance of these kinship groups in public life by determining, among other things,
how far removed one must be from one’s spouse in order to be married legitimately or
even to bear legitimate children (Kleinschmidt 94). Through their continued redefinition
of kinship, Church representatives managed to “acquire a position where they could
authoritatively decide on the legitimacy of successors to rule” (Kleinschmidt 95). As a
result, kinship groups went from being huge extended families with sizable political
impact to less formal and less powerful groups made up largely of what we now call the
“nuclear family.”
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As the importance of kinship groups waned, so too did the importance of
neighborhood groups, although for different reasons. By “neighborhood groups,”
Kleinschmidt primarily refers to groups who have migrated together to new territory for
the purpose of resettlement. These neighborhood groups came together out of a shared
geographic and temporal past, a shared purpose, and a shared vision of their future
together in a new place. Such migrations were a frequent occurrence in England from
roughly 600 to 1050, after which most major territories of England had been settled
(Dyer 140-142). As these migrant communities formed and developed a shared history,
they could and often did “become instruments to articulate discontent through the
submission of grievances and the organization of violent protest” (Kleinschmidt 102).
Throughout much of England, the mass migrations that were the source of many
neighborhood groups generally ceased around the eleventh century, and thus the
importance of neighborhood groups declined, especially in rural areas.
In the cities, however, a sizable number of migrants came seeking their fortune as
labor shortages created by the Black Plague of 1348 created exciting and unprecedented
opportunities for social mobility (Keen 65-66). Such an influx of new laborers into an
established city or town often intensified tensions rooted in economics and class:
The overall effect of this on the way in which things developed over the twenty to
thirty years following the “first pestilence” was to generate a greater cohesion
between the groups standing on either side of the great dividing line in society
between those who worked for themselves and for others, and those who
depended on the work of others to maintain them, and to exacerbate the natural
tensions between them. (Keen 40)
As such, the communal outlet for grievances offered by neighborhood groups were all the
more important
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in the urban communities of towns and cities, where traditional kinship
ties among double-descent kin groups played no role, [and thus] the
settlement as a whole became the primary focal point of social
organization and, hence, could absorb many of the tasks which the
extended double-descent kin groups had been in charge of before[…].
(Kleinschmidt 103)
Such neighborhood-based grievances no doubt proliferated in medieval York, which was
by all accounts one of the largest and most prosperous English towns of the period (Keen
79-80). The devaluing of such neighborhood communities that was simultaneously
happening in the more rural areas most likely added to the sense of urgency that the more
urban neighborhood groups felt about claiming their territory and their rights.
Perhaps the broadest group to experience a substantial decline in the late Middle
Ages, however, were the various contractual groups that offered citizens choices that
were not restricted by birth. Kleinschmidt identifies three major types of contractual
groups in the Middle Ages: contractual relations between retainers and warlords;
contractual relations between monasteries and those chosen to lead them; and contractual
relations among merchant or craft guild members. Given the substantial involvement of
guilds in the creation and maintenance of the Corpus Christi pageants, it is essential to
note that in contrast to the other two forms of contractual groups, both of which
diminished in importance throughout the Middle Ages, guilds actually “rose in
significance with the spread of trading activities and the formation of urban communities
in towns and cities” (Kleinschmidt 106).
The general tendency that Kleinschmidt observes for kinship groups,
neighborhood groups, and contractual groups to shrink both in size and importance
throughout the Middle Ages involved, he argues, a general loss of choice for most
citizens of medieval Europe. Kinship groups could be voluntarily left (through
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migration) and voluntarily joined (through marriage). Neighborhood groups could be
voluntarily formed through new migrations. And of course contractual groups involved a
notable degree of choice and opportunity. As these three types of groups began to lose
strength and numbers, two group divisions rose to prominence, but these two types of
groups were fundamentally static, involuntary, and assigned “from above.” Both political
groups and social groups assigned individuals into involuntary categories based on
geography and law rather than on voluntary relations.
What Kleinschmidt calls “political groups” are groups which initially formed out
of some common purpose or history, such as kinship ties, migrations, and contractual
obligations, but which eventually became associated strictly with geography. As
geography began to define group membership, group structures based on “the land of the
English” or “the land of the French” came to have more power and significance than the
relatively smaller kinship, neighborhood, and contractual groups that had dominated
social life in the early Middle Ages (Kleinschmidt 108-111). By the early sixteenth
century, the principal vision of political relations between various groups had become
reified: “Europe was viewed […] as being composed of relatively stable sizeable
territories, each under the control of a single ruler and inhabited by political groups”
(Kleinschmidt 111).
What Kleinschmidt calls “social groups” might most easily be understood as what
we today call socioeconomic classes, with the notable caveat that money was just one of
many standards for categorizing classes in medieval England. Membership in these
groups was assigned by a variety of laws and regulations, rather than being derived from
interactions: “Social groups arrayed their members in accordance with economic, social
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or legal criteria, such as wealth, professional identity or availability of the use of the
means of production, but irrespective of contractual obligations, political traditions, kin
affiliations or place of residence” (Kleinschmidt 111). The most famous of these social
orders was known as the “three estates,” as throughout the Middle Ages in England
it was traditional wisdom that society was composed of three orders,
functionally defined in their relation to one another: the clergy whose
business was with prayer and spiritual well-being; the warriors who
defended the land and people with their arms, and the labourers whose toil
supported the other two “orders” or “estates.” (Keen 1-2)
Ideally, all members of a given society could be assigned to one and only one of these
estates. While some choice and social mobility was possible within this classification
system—one could, after all, join the clergy or be knighted for one’s service—
functionally, one’s membership in one of these estates was involuntary, often being
determined at birth. The three estates world view “was no warmer towards social
mobility than it was to social equality. Principally because hierarchical ordering was
seen in terms of divine intention, the relationship between the three orders was viewed in
a static way” (Keen 3).
The simplistic notion of three distinct estates grew substantially more complicated
after the Black Plague of 1348, when rapid depopulation created labor shortages that in
turn created more social mobility for individuals, especially those individuals who lived
in or near cities and towns. By the end of the fifteenth century, the increased wealth of
the merchant class, the creation of a variety of new administrative and leadership posts,
and the availability of good land for purchase created a variety of new professions and
social ranks that did not fit directly into the three estates scheme. Rather than abandon
the concept of the three estates, however, many medieval thinkers reacted by
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multiplying the number of “degrees” or “estates” that must be fitted into
their place in the body politic. The reaction to overt signs of changing
conditions is not to conclude that the framework needs loosening, but
almost the opposite, to seek to define more narrowly and relate more
carefully functions and “degrees” within the social whole. (Keen 8)
Thus a bewildering variety of laws in late medieval England sought to establish
equivalencies between relatively new social ranks such as mayors or lawyers and wellestablished social ranks such as knights or barons. By means of legislating what taxes
each rank owed and what clothes each rank could wear, England’s ruling elites could
maintain at least some semblance of a functional three estates classification system, as the
three estates simply “branched out” to include further divisions within each of the three
main orders (Keen 9-16). The effort required to maintain this social structure, however,
was great, and social tensions abounded which required ever more legislation and social
pressure to keep in check.
The Corpus Christi Pageants as Contested Cultural Performances
One might well imagine, then, that these social tensions between various
communities might be reflected in the York Corpus Christi pageants, and indeed the
pageants, as cultural performances, articulated and engaged communal tensions.
Planning for the pageants was “top-down,” working from the highest levels of
organization and wealth, but reaching down to include the lowest social levels. When
one takes into account the “incidental” aspects of the performances, such as feeding the
performers and the audience and making and selling paraphernalia associated with the
performances, one must assume that not only the guild members but indeed most of the
population of York was in some way urged to participate in the great event.
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In the case of the York pageants, the control that was exerted from above likely
represented an effort by cultural leaders to control a potentially riotous event:
It is now common ground among historians and literary critics alike that
by the 1390’s, when we first have a chance to glimpse the organizational
framework of the York Corpus Christi play cycle as a whole, that cycle is
clearly already being supervised and indeed directed from the mayor’s
council chamber, and by his common clerk. Whatever else the mystery
plays might or might not have been intended to be, they have already by
the year of the Ordo Paginarum (1415) become intensely regulated from
above, a more or less deliberate exercise in social control upon the
commons of the city by its governing elite. (Dobson 100)
Despite any desires to exercise control over the pageant (or perhaps because of these
desires), the leveling nature of Christian doctrine, which assumes that all will be subject
to God’s judgment, meant that all pageant participants—audience and performers, elite
and commoner—were embraced by the scope of the performance:
The market on the Pavement [where the Last Judgment was staged] was
the place of business of the victualing trades, traditionally viewed as
scarcely better than that of the butchers. These were also the trades most
practiced by women[…]. Like Doomsday itself, the Pavement embraced
all people, both the mayor’s wife and foreign regrators [victual
tradesmen]. Here York’s merchants and artisans made their final
statement to themselves and to outsiders about what kind of freedom theirs
was. (Higgins 90)
The Corpus Christi performances at York were thus a source and a reflection of immense
civic pride—as well as a source and a reflection of various civic tensions—due to the
thoroughgoing community participation in the performances.
The movement of the Corpus Christi pageants through the streets of York was a
cultural performance which most notably reflected tensions between religion and civic
life. Perhaps the most striking performance evidence of this is the fact that the procession
carrying the Communion Host—the likely source of the pageant procession—was
eventually (between 1465 and 1476) separated from the plays and scheduled for the day

182

following the pageant procession (Beadle 90). Indeed, the two processions—one clerical
and somber, the other commercial/civic and often rowdy—took similar routes through
York until they reached the minster, at which point the clerical procession traveled on to
St. Leonard’s Hospital, while the pageants proceeded to the mercantile and unsavory
territory of the Pavement (Higgins 85).
There were frequent tensions between the Church and England in the Middle
Ages, often based on control of land and economics (Keen 240-242), and these tensions
were about to erupt into major religious and social change as Henry VIII battled the
Catholic Church. These same tensions over control of land, workers, and other economic
forces were at play in York, but this should not obscure the fact that religious and civic
organizations had to cooperate as well in order for such massive productions to develop.
Glynne Wickham neatly sums up how civic, commercial, and religious organizations
cooperated to produce the pageants:
For a variety of reasons, both the driving force and the sheet anchor of the
new drama resided in those distinctively medieval social units known as
the guild and the parish[…. W]here the parish was a topographical unit
dominated by the church and the priest in charge, the guild was a social
unit formed for a particular purpose which could be religious, charitable,
artistic or commercial. If parishes, moreover, were principally
administrative units encompassing towns and country districts without
discrimination, guilds were just as self-evidently fraternal organizations
self-consciously established to advertise, promote, and protect special
interests[…]. Acceptance of the Feast of Corpus Christi as a new festival
in the Calendar served to activate both of these units, guild and parish,
since each parish had to determine for itself how the Feast was to be
observed and every guild had to decide what contribution it could and
should make to the festivities. (Medieval Theatre 67-68)
For these reasons, we might argue that the pageant performances constituted a nexuspoint where religion, civic life, and theatre came together in a way that worked both to
demonstrate and to obscure or assuage the tensions between various social forces.
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We might therefore say that in comparison to the ontology of self-sufficiency that
informs the consubstantial chronotope or the ontology of need that informs the
sacramental chronotope, the Corpus Christi pageant plays were informed by an ontology
of community. In this context, however, “community” must be understood as both a
“coming-together” and a “struggling-with”—that is, diverse communities with multiple
goals and values organized themselves to address the pageants, and the pageants, as a
cultural performance, articulated both the celebration of these bodies coming together
with shared purpose and the struggles within and between communities brought into
proximity through the pageants. Unlike an idealistic vision of communitas as a perfect
unity of purpose and heart, the ontology of community which informed the
transubstantial chronotope of the Corpus Christi pageants offers a more “messy”
ontology, articulating a space and time for bodies to engage differences as well as
similarities.
Like an ontology of need, the Corpus Christi pageants created an awareness of
interdependence and belongingness, but here interdependence is to be understood as
something sought out for shared pleasure and increased resources rather than as a
heterodynamic desperation for help-mates. The essentially negative angst for the other
experienced in the heterodynamic bodies of the sacramental chronotope is born of a sense
of lack and deficiency. In the ontology of community, however, this angst is re-figured as
a celebration of togetherness, a positive embrace of the power that multiple bodies have
to please each other and to enhance each other’s lives. In the chronotope of the Corpus
Christi pageants, community members could come together to articulate shared
grievances, and although contestation was an inevitable factor in the coming-together of
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these bodies, contestation can be understood as celebratory and transformative in this
context.
As Fuoss puts it, we should resist the tendency to equate contestation solely with
“conflict, difference, divisiveness, and enmity” (94). While contestation within and
between communities can bring all of these things to the fore, contestation can also be
driven by strongly held shared beliefs that allow bodies who are moving together toward
a goal to derive strength and purpose from each other. Thus, while a sort of quiet
desperation characterizes the ontology of need which informs the sacramental
chronotope, the ontology of community which informs the transubstantial chronotope
derives additional strength from others, viewing cooperation not as necessary but as
valuable.
Like an ontology of self-sufficiency, the bodies working together to produce the
Corpus Christi pageant plays draw upon their own individual capacities and their own
sense of self to construct the performances, but these bodies also revel in their communal
interrelatedeness. Rather than celebrating a purely autodynamic freedom from communal
concerns, an ontology of community urges participants to co-create something larger than
they could create from their own resources. Whereas the autodynamic body sees itself as
the origin of its own power and value, within the ontology of community, bodies are
constructed as both individually valuable and communally empowered to convey
concerns, express shared values, and articulate a sense of communal identity.
A final element of the ontology of community worth mentioning here is the
integration of religious faith into both civic and theatrical communal effort. The craftguilds which produced the Corpus Christi pageants were not only mercantile but also
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religious in nature. As Dobson notes, as craft-guilds moved from the high Middle Ages
to the post-plague late Middle Ages, they developed an internal stability “provided by an
apprenticeship system, control by their own masters and searchers, and religious cohesion
focused around an altar or chapel” (Dobson 97). Many of these craft-guilds were
explicitly devoted to the worship of Mary Mother of God or one of His Saints. Couple
this with the likely help of clergy in writing the plays and one comes to the conclusion
that these plays spoke for, with, and to a variety of spiritual elements and entities as well
as speaking for, with, and to civic entities and institutions. As we saw in Chapter Two of
this study, spiritual entities were considered as much a part of the medieval community as
material entities were, and so spiritual entities can be understood as participating in an
ontology of community. We will return shortly to the concept of multiple material and
spiritual addressees in the performance of the Corpus Christi pageants; first we must
explore the movement of the bodies within the transubstantial chronotope in more detail.
Communicative Bodies
As we have seen, bodies within an ontology of community are characterized
neither by the desperate anxieties that motivate Kleinschmidt’s heterodynamic bodies nor
by the purely individualistic celebration of the capacities of one’s own body that drive
Kleinschmidt’s autodynamic bodies. Perhaps Kleinschmidt’s categorization system,
based on two mutually exclusive categories of heterodynamic and autodynamic bodies,
can be seen here as too limiting. Implicit in the heterodynamic/autodynamic distinction
is an assumption that bodies which derive power from their own resources cannot or do
not derive additional power from cooperation, collaboration, and even contestation. Yet
while it is clear that frail, needy heterodynamic bodies are reliant upon each other for
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their survival, it is equally clear that strong, confident autodynamic bodies can derive
additional strength not only from their collaboration but also from communal efforts of
contestation.
We would benefit, therefore, from an intermediary category which can describe
bodies who embrace the presence of others rather than being dependent upon the help of
others. Arthur W. Frank’s communicative body may provide us with a description of this
intermediary form. As described by Frank, the communicative body is defined by four
qualities. The communicative body is dyadic and other-related, reaching out to others for
pleasure and for mutual benefit. It is also self-associated—that is, the communicative
body is comfortable in its own skin, as it were, rather than experiencing body and self as
two distinct entities. The communicative body also embraces its contingency; rather than
fearing the potential for failure and mis-behavior inherent in our flawed flesh, the
communicative body claims and even celebrates its contingency as a source of potentially
positive change and growth. Finally, the communicative body produces desire rather
than lacking it, and this desire is produced by its contingent, inspiring, and inspirational
interactions with other bodies (Frank 79-89).
As Frank makes clear, the communicative body must be understood, in the end, as
an idealized approximation of an idealized praxis (79). Though he struggles to convey
this idealized form through examples based on dance and health care, Frank is forced to
admit that neither example fully embraces the promise of the praxis inherent in the
communicative body: “The essential quality of the communicative body is that it is a
body in process of creating itself. Theory cannot describe such a body, nor can it
prescribe it. The task is rather to bring together fragments of its emergence” (Frank 79,
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emphasis in original). Nonetheless, Frank locates the medium of the communicative
body “in what can loosely be called recognition, models of which may be shared
narratives, dance, caring for the young, the old, and the ill, and communal ritual” (54,
emphasis in original). As such, this communicative body offers the possibility of helping
us to understand the bodies participating in the York Corpus Christi pageants. These
bodies used performance to tell shared narratives in the context of a communal ritual
which sought to heal, if not the bodies of the young and old, then certainly their souls.
Likewise, the Corpus Christi performances gave several groups—and individuals
as well—a chance to be recognized and to recognize each other. Higgins suggests that
the York pageant functioned, in part, as a way for various social groups to “beat the
bounds” of their territory and to establish their ownership and rights. For example, once
the religious procession began to travel one route while the pageant procession traveled a
different one, the two groups implicitly sought recognition for their sometimes diverging,
sometimes overlapping spheres of influence:
The religious procession ended up demarcating the religious liberties [that
is, the religious territories] of York by visiting the three chief religious
foundations. It claimed authority in the whole city by recapitulating the
royal and civic routes up to the minster gates. On the other hand, the guild
pageant route redefined the route of ancient royal and religious
processions and then swung farther along […] to the Pavement, to mark
out boldly all the territory that was part of the mercantile and artisanal
franchise. (Higgins 85)
From the earliest days of the festival, “the Corpus Christi procession and its tableaux
vivants mapped out not just the city’s space but its ideal social and political hierarchies”
(Higgins 84). As such, the great procession created a space where bodies could
collaborate both to seek and to find recognition for their interests and rights, and it also
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created a space where those interests could be contested, defined, and redefined in the
public spaces of the town.
It would be idealistic and even naïve to attribute to the bodies of the York pageant
participants the full range of qualities that Frank attributes to communicative bodies.
These pageants were raucous and even sometimes violent, as large festival processions
tend to be. Officials were aware of the possibility of an out-of-control audience during
the pageants: “On the eve of Corpus Christi a proclamation of mayor and sheriffs
forbade ‘distorbaunce of the kynges pees, and ye play, or hynderyng of ye processioun of
Corpore Christi’” (Chambers 400). As Harris notes, the “calls for good order and the
relinquishment of weapons were doubtless a necessary precaution when dealing with a
rowdy, holiday-making and quite possibly drunken crowd” (135). At times, certainly, the
bodies participating in the Corpus Christi pageants must have closely resembled
Bakhtin’s grotesque carnivalesque bodies: “This body eats, drinks, laughs, and curses—
but does not necessarily contemplate the world or hold dialogues with it” (Morson and
Emerson 444). Indeed, there is even something of Bakhtin’s carnivalesque “decrowning”
implicit in the Corpus Christi narratives: “There is little hesitation shown in deriding
those authoritarian figures—emperors, kings, prelates, governors—who set themselves
up in opposition to the Supreme Being or who seek to resist its mandate” (Tydeman, “An
Introduction” 26).
Likewise, the pageant participants were often explicitly and sometimes boldly
commercial in their planning of and conduct during the procession. We have seen one
example of capitalism in action in the sale of seating stations,
where the corporation leased “performing rights” for each station to the
highest bidder, the money taken going towards the cost of production.
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The fact that the cost of such leases amounted to more than a month’s
wages for a skilled workman, and that they were acquired by bidding,
means that this is unlikely to have been simply a way of raising extra
money to support the plays; on the contrary, it implies that there was a
good profit to be made by erecting stands to seat the spectators who could
afford it […]. (Harris 132)
Such mercenary impulses smack of the more “purely” autodynamic body, the body that
grasps for what it can obtain by its own power for its own use.
Of course, the pageant participants were not always this carnivalesque or
mercenary, especially given the sacred nature of the material being performed. We are
still left to imagine, though, that the reality of the pageants probably fell at least
something short of Frank’s idealized bodily praxis:
What communicative bodies are about is the capacity for recognition
which is enhanced through the sharing of narratives which are fully
embodied. What is shared is one body’s sense of another’s experience,
primarily its vulnerability and suffering, but also its joy and creativity.
(89)
Yet the fact that the pageant bodies may have fallen short of an ideal should not blind us
to the very real ways in which those bodies strove toward the ideal. After all, the York
pageants were organized for the “sharing of narratives” which, as we will see shortly,
were not only Biblical stories but were also stories of the lives and bodies of the people
of York. These narratives were “fully embodied” not only by the performers but also by
the audience, who were routinely drawn into the action of the play, serving as the damned
and the saved in the Last Judgment, booing and hissing Herod, and witnessing the
crucifixion and being indicted for their passivity as was described in Chapter One of this
study. And in the stories of the Bible and the echoing stories of the town lurking
“underneath” the Biblical narrative, the pageant participants experienced not only the
“vulnerability and suffering” of others, but also shared their “joy and creativity.”
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The Procession of the Host: Messy and Pure Addressivity
It is tempting to end the story of these bodies here, with passionate and
communicative flesh reaching out toward other flesh, sharing pain and pleasure in a
moment of communal creativity. To do so, however, would be to limit the addressivity
of these plays to the human bodies present during the performances. Certainly these
plays reached out to these audience members present, as William Tydeman argues:
These were plays for the public forum; they had to declare both openly
and tacitly their affinities with the life of the market-place, the backstreet,
the farmyard, and the language, both verbal and visual, had to convince
onlookers that the men and women of the Bible looked, and, even more
importantly, spoke as they did themselves. (Tydeman, “An Introduction”
27)
Yet given the spirit-soaked nature of medieval England, these plays also reached out to
other entities, yearning (as was the case in the sacramental chronotope) for communion
with the divine. The all-encompassing history of Christianity presented in the pageants
invites audience members to contemplate the events which
constitute the central facts of their spiritual lives—the episodes where
Christ, having come from instituting the Eucharist (literally, Corpus
Christi), embarks upon the work of redemption in the Passion—and then
his general judgment of all mankind at the end of time on Doomsday.
(Beadle 108)
Such contemplation, in turn, would have urged pageant participants to seek out God, and
to do so immediately, for fear of losing the opportunity to do so. “Only one medieval
conception of present time had an affirmative tone, and its beginning is staged by the
central story of the Corpus Christi cycle: whatever else ‘now’ might be, it was
historically the time of mercy” (Kolve 102). We find here a desire to communicate with
the ultimate superaddressee in the hopes of being understood “purely.”
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One way of coming to terms with the complex addressivity of the Corpus Christi
pageants would be to consider the formative events that contributed to the development
of the pageants in the first place. As we have seen in previous chapters of this study, the
sacrament of the Eucharist inspired passionately held doctrines and was for most
Christians (including the consubstantially oriented Lollards) the central rite of the
Christian Faith. It should come as no surprise, then, that the festival which begot the
Corpus Christi pageants was designed to celebrate the Eucharist. By exploring the
messily divine history of the origins of the Corpus Christi festival, we can see that from
its nascent days, the festival was addressed both to humanity and to God, speaking both
to temporal and extratemporal concerns.
Glynne Wickham’s description of the origins of the Holy Day of Corpus Christi
offers a traditional, if only partial and somewhat misleading, interpretation of how
Corpus Christi came to be:
If we seek the reason for this phenomenon we have first to consider the
doctrine of transubstantiation instituted by the papacy in 1215; for this
gave to the Eucharist a new importance—the status of a miracle on a par
with those of virgin birth and resurrection from the dead[…]. The crucial
link between this new drama [i.e., the Corpus Christi pageants] and the
miraculous status accorded to the Eucharist by the doctrine of
transubstantiation was the institution of a new Calendar Festival created
for the specific purpose of celebrating its new significance in Christian
worship[…]. Unlike Easter Sunday of Christmas Day, therefore, the
prime purpose of this new festival was not to be commemoration of an
historical event, but to give thanks for man’s salvation through God’s
decision to become man and to pay the price, through Christ’s crucifixion,
of man’s redemption from original sin. (Medieval Theatre 62-63)
Wickham goes on from here to offer a now-conventional argument that because the
Corpus Christi festival lacked a specific event to celebrate (such as Christ’s birth or
resurrection), the organizers of the pageant felt urged to construct a festival which would
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recognize the entirety of God’s love for humankind. Hence, when plays developed to
accompany (and eventually dominate) the festival, those plays were drawn toward an
encompassing narrative moving from Creation to Last Judgment. Only such an utterly
encompassing narrative, according to this line of reasoning, would be appropriate for
celebrating the miracle that occurs as bread and wine become Christ’s flesh and blood,
shed for our ultimate salvation.
Such arguments make sense, and they at least partially explain why the pageants
developed into such massive history-spanning affairs, although as other critics have
pointed out, the lack of emphasis on the Last Supper in all the major Corpus Christi
cycles undermines this whole line of reasoning somewhat (Tydeman, “An Introduction”
21). Nonetheless, it is clear that the pageants had their origin, at least in part, in a desire
to look and speak heavenward, to address God and thank Him for His Gift:
The Eucharist serves to recall both the Last Supper and the flesh and blood
of Christ offered on the cross—events about which it is possible to rejoice
only when they are related to man’s fall, Christ’s Resurrection, and the
Last Judgment[…]. To play the whole story, then, is in the deepest sense
to celebrate the Corpus Christi sacrament, to explain its necessity and
power, and to show how that power will be made manifest at the end of
the world. (Kolve 48, emphasis in original)
This line of reasoning reminds us of another addressee for the Corpus Christi pageants: if
they are designed to “explain” and “show how power will be made manifest,” then they
clearly also address the flawed human participants in the pageants, thus serving didactic
and hortatory purposes.
Yet the story of the Corpus Christi pageants is more messy than it would at first
seem if we were to stop our analysis, metaphorically, at the doors of the Church. The
procession itself took to the streets, and it did so even before the pageant-plays
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developed. We must, therefore, look beyond the rather pristine impulses to thank God, as
a superaddressee capable of responding to the performance discourse “purely,” and we
must look beyond the almost equally pristine hortatory impulses of the traditional “quick
books for the unlearned” argument for the development of Biblical cycles as pedagogical
and persuasive tools. As valuable as these insights about the addressivity of the pageants
are, they serve to obscure the radical human messiness that may well have inspired the
Church to consider creating a special Holy Day to celebrate the Eucharist.
John Wesley Harris offers an alternative interpretation of the origins of the
Corpus Christi Holy Day, and this interpretation begins much further back in history than
most such interpretations do. His central argument is that changes not only in creed (i.e.,
the reification and official acceptance of the doctrine of transubstantiation) but more
importantly in the physical practice of administering the Eucharist created a need to solve
a wholly human and messy problem. The problem began, according to Harris, in the
ninth century, when priests who were increasingly worried over the fate of Christ’s flesh
and blood in the Eucharist began to take steps to safeguard the precious Host. One step
taken to safeguard the Host was to require those taking Communion to kneel so that the
priest could serve them rather than allowing the unordained celebrant to contaminate the
Host by touching it with his or her hands (Harris 71-72). In such a position, the celebrant
is physically inferior to the priest, reduced to a reverent dependency.
In the twelfth century, priests went further to safeguard the wine through the
theological argument that “Christ’s command to both eat and drink in remembrance of
him was adequately satisfied by the communion of the priest alone, acting on behalf of
the congregation—at least so far as the wine was concerned” (Harris 72, emphasis in
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original). To provide some order to the procession of celebrants waiting their turn to
kneel and receive their wafer, “the altar-rail sprang into existence” (Harris 72). Soon the
altar-rail “began to be placed outside the rood-screen” which separated the congregation
from the altar, “so that no profane feet might trespass upon the Holy of Holies” (Harris
73, emphasis in original). The consequence of these changes in Eucharistic practice was
that the congregation was repeatedly pushed further and further away from the very
object that they sought most to attain—the flesh and blood of Christ, which brings
salvation to all who partake of it. “So the Mass became even more distanced from the
people, and was increasingly treated as a mystery […] which was not so much to be
participated in as to be adoringly wondered at by ‘the simple folk’ and contemplated from
afar” (Harris 73).
The bodies forced to contemplate the mystery of the Eucharist from afar began to
contest this incessant effort to restrict public/secular access to the Host, and their
contestation in turn forced the Church to reconsider the function and practice of the
Eucharist. Harris’ description of this struggle is so clear and cogent that it merits
extensive quotation here:
The distancing of the people from the Mass was now complete, and they
saw it as a remote theatrical performance, replete with rich costumes, soft
lights and sweet music, played against the backcloth of a decorated altar,
far in the distance beyond the fretwork of the rood-screen[…]. Thus it
came about, in the late Middle Ages, that the Consecration of the two
species, which were both elevated, and particularly the Elevation of the
Host itself—actions which were visible to the congregation—became the
climax of the Mass[…]. To look upon the sacred Host while it was
elevated by the priest became for many the be-all and end-all of the Mass,
equivalent to the act of communion itself—in fact, much more important
than the communion. At the Elevation, the Host had become the real body
of Christ nailed high upon the Cross—see the body of Christ and be
saved![…]
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In the cities people ran from church to church to see the elevated Host as
often as possible, since they assumed that the more Elevations you saw,
the more grace you would acquire[…]. People started lawsuits to ensure
that they obtained pews which provided a favourable view of the altar[…].
This scandalous situation greatly troubled the church authorities. It could
obviously not be allowed to go on, and the first movement towards finding
a remedy was advanced by Pope Urban IV in 1264. He proposed a new
feast to celebrate the joy of the Passion, at which the Host could be carried
around the town and publicly displayed to all the people—a kind of safetyvalve, in fact. (Harris 75-76, emphasis in original)
It was not until 1311, however, that the Feast Day of Corpus Christi was incorporated
into the Church calendar, falling on the Thursday after Trinity Sunday, on what would be
the equivalent on our contemporary calendar of anywhere from June 4 to July 6
(Bevington, Medieval Drama 230). In 1318, Corpus Christi Day began to be generally
celebrated throughout England (Kolve 37). The first mention of pageants in York records
occurs in 1376, although this date may not be the first year the pageant-plays were
staged; the date of the first pageant-plays may be earlier, because so few reliable records
on the subject exist prior to 1376, or it may be later, if the references to “pageants” in the
1376 York Memorandum do not in fact refer to pageant-plays based on an allencompassing Biblical cycle of stories (Dobson 97).
What is important to draw out of this history is the clear implication that the
Corpus Christi festival arose in part out of quite messy bodily concerns relating to various
efforts and counter-efforts to control the meaning and practice of the Eucharist by
limiting or granting access to the Host. As the priestly class distanced “the simple folk”
from the miracle of the Eucharist, they also laid claim to the privilege of that form of
contact with the Divine. In return, the secular townsfolk redefined contact with the
Divine as seeing the Host being elevated, and as such they began the contestatory
practice of taking great pains to observe the Elevation as often and as clearly as possible.
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In a contestatory counter-move, the Church laid down strict regulations about the
“proper” observance of Communion (Harris 76), while also creating a festival which
would provide one day out of the year as an outlet for the congregation to engage in their
rabid pursuit of the sight of the Elevated Host.
Yet even the development of this new feast day was delayed for decades. And
once the feast day did begin to be celebrated, it was first celebrated as a reasonably
refined and sober affair, a procession of clergy carrying the Elevated Host through the
streets for people to adore—but not touch. One might argue, then, that the eventual
development of the more theatrical, participatory, and secular/civic practice of staging a
cycle of Biblical plays served, at least in part, to fulfill the urge of “the simple folk” to be
active participants in this celebration. In these plays, not only the city’s craftsmen but
indeed all the workaday folk of the city had an opportunity to come in contact with the
Divine by embodying various roles from their spiritual history. Whether they were able
to play “leading roles” such as God or Christ, or whether they were simply able to play
the roles of the saved or the damned at the Last Judgment, the secular townspeople of
York were now creating an opportunity to participate in divine space. It is in this context
that we can understand Higgins’ claims that the divergence of the clerical procession
route and the secular pageant route was a deeply symbolic split—the pageant route
demarcated the space of the town in terms of civic, not Church, interests, in part by
concluding at the profanized mercantile space of the Pavement (Higgins 86-87).
We must therefore take into account a variety of addressees as the pageants wend
their way through the dusty early summer streets of York. These pageants spoke to the
clergy, claiming certain religious rights (and rites) for the secular townsfolk. The
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pageants also spoke to civic leaders about the value of the merchant practices that made
York (and other larger northern England cities of the time) so successful. They spoke as
well to the needs of a faith in crisis, a Christianity suffering under the weight of the
plague of 1348 and the subsequent “fallen” state of the clergy that was discussed in
Chapter Four of this study. And the pageants spoke, too, for bodies yearning to
experience something of the Divine, bodies that sang their participation in the cosmic
history encompassed by the story of God and his Risen Son.
Innerly Persuasive Discourse and the Transubstantial Chronotope
The multiple addressivity of these performances, however, complicates our
understanding of the first and second worlds of performance. In the sacramental
chronotope, the first world of the audience and participants in Latin liturgical dramas was
brought into contact with an ontologically superior spiritual world through the act of
performance. The most important—indeed, perhaps the only important—presence during
the Latin liturgical dramas was the presence of God. The audience and participants in
these dramas function virtually as accessories in both senses of the word—both as
helpmates who bring the material world into contact with divinity, and as less-thannecessary ornamentation which glorifies and praises the holiest of holies.
In the consubstantial chronotope, the first world of the audience and performers
occupies just the opposite ontological position. Rather than being inferior to the divine
world brought into awareness through the Latin liturgical dramas, the first world of the
consubstantial chronotope is ontologically superior to the second world created in and
through the performance. By way of simplification (and perhaps over-simplification), we
might say that in the sacramental chronotope, the faithful address the Divine, and thus the
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first world addresses the second world; in the consubstantial chronotope, the performers
address their acts to the consumers of the performance, and thus the second world
addresses the first world. When considering addressivity, then, we must not only ask
who is being addressed, but with what authority the different voices address each other.
By way of metaphor—and also by way of discussing medieval performance
practice, given the use of masks in the Corpus Christi pageants and other medieval
performances—we can return productively to the considerations about relations between
performer and mask that we mentioned in Chapter Four of this study. As we noted there,
one way of understanding a performer’s relation to the mask he/she wears in performance
is to assume that the performer has complete ontological authority over the mask—the
performer is real, not the mask. This is a consubstantial interpretation of the function of
masking, where “reality” is located in unmasking. Perhaps a more radical approach to
masking would be to regard the mask as ontologically superior to the performer. If the
mask is somehow sacred, then in it resides the truth, not in the performer’s humble and
profane body. This is a sacramental interpretation of the function of masking, where
“reality” is located in the ultimate reality of the Divine.
There is, however, a third possible relationship between performer and mask—
each can be regarded as ontologically substantial. In this view, the act of creation
becomes an act of co-creation as mask and performer work together to bring life forth
onstage. Such a view is deeply dialogic, in a Bakhtinian sense, for it situates both
performer and mask on the same plane of authority and asks them to confront each other
honestly. This, we can say, is the transubstantial interpretation of the function of
masking, where “reality” is located in a conversation—an unfinalizable conversation that
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must be engaged each and every time the mask is worn. In terms of our first
world/second world distinction, neither the fictive metaworld nor the world of the
performers and audience can trump the other, and thus both worlds address each other
more or less as equals.
Bakhtin provides us with language that can describe the peculiar tensiveness of
the transubstantial chronotope, where both image and audience struggle with each other
for meaning and authority. In his effort to analyze the diverse relations among diverse
voices that interanimate what would otherwise appear to be singular discourse, Bakhtin
also investigates a range of ways in which the multiple voices within each person
interanimates each seemingly singular consciousness. Part of Bakhtin’s project in
analyzing multi-voicedness therefore involves an exploration of the coming-into-selfhood
that arises, at least ideally, out of the messy jumble of voices which informs our
consciousness:
Bakhtin relocates the central opposition in language as it shapes the self in
inner speech. He imagines the self as a conversation, often a struggle, of
discrepant voices with each other, voices (and words) speaking from
different positions and invested with different degrees and kinds of
authority. (Morson and Emerson 217-218, emphasis in original)
Bakhtin identifies two distinct kinds of voices that exercise different kinds of authority
within a given consciousness: “authoritative discourse” and “innerly (or internally)
persuasive discourse.”
Authoritative discourse, both in linguistic texts and within a given consciousness,
is an essentially single-voiced form of discourse that retains utter semantic authority over
itself. Such discourse “enters our verbal consciousness as a compact and indivisible
mass; one must either totally affirm it, or totally reject it” (Bakhtin, Dialogic 343). As
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such, authoritative discourse resists dialogue in an attempt to maintain its own semantic
authority:
The authoritative word demands that we acknowledge it, that we make it
our own; it binds us, quite independent of any power it might have to
persuade us internally; we encounter it with its authority already fused to
it. The authoritative word is located in a distanced zone, organically
connected with a past that is felt to be hierarchically higher. It is, so to
speak, the word of the fathers. Its authority was already acknowledged in
the past. It is a prior discourse. (Bakhtin, Dialogic 342, emphasis in
original)
The a priori quality of authoritative discourse holds that discourse “at arm’s length,” as it
were, preventing a given consciousness from engaging the authoritative word in dialogue.
Authoritative discourse, then, works to cease the free play of voices dialoguing
with other voices within texts or within an individual’s consciousness: “Demanding
unconditional allegiance, authoritative discourse does not allow us to play with it,
integrate it, or merge it with other voices that persuade us. We cannot select what we like
from it or accept only a part of it; that would be heresy (in the root sense of selection)”
(Morson and Emerson 219, emphasis in original). Such heresy—that is, metalinguistic
play—is essential to dialogic relations; utterances must have the ability to challenge each
other, to contest each other, to re-shape and accentuate each other, in order for those
utterances to participate in a dialogue of different social voices. Yet the authoritative
word “is by its very nature incapable of being double-voiced; it cannot enter into hybrid
constructions” (Bakhtin, Dialogic 344).
The sacramental chronotope articulates space and time in such a way as to render
the first world of the participants subject to the authoritative word of the Divine. As
monastically trained bodies moved through the symbolically charged space of the church
to the rhythms of the monastic day and the church calendar, these bodies were
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conditioned to regard the Divine as possessing the kind of certainty and single-voicedness
which Bakhtin attributes to authoritative discourse. Consequently, the first world of
performance, in the sacramental chronotope, functions as a recipient of the authoritative
discourse of the spiritual world brought into contact with our space and time through the
performance of Latin liturgical drama. The only options in the face of such a word are to
accept it or reject it: “One can disobey authoritative discourse, but so long as it remains
fully authoritative, one cannot argue with it. By definition, it precludes dialogic
relations” (Morson and Emerson 219).
Innerly persuasive discourse, in contrast, allows for dialogic relations by allowing
for what Bakhtin calls “assimilation” of the discourse:
[T]he unique speech experience of each individual is shaped and
developed in continuous and constant interaction with others’ individual
utterances. This experience can be characterized to some degree as the
process of assimilation—more or less creative—of others’ words (and not
the words of a language). Our speech, that is, all our utterances (including
creative works), is filled with others’ words, varying degrees of otherness
or varying degrees of “our-own-ness,” varying degrees of awareness and
detachment. These words of others carry with them their own expression,
their own evaluative tone, which we assimilate, rework, and re-accentuate.
(Bakhtin, Speech 89, emphasis in original)
Whereas authoritative discourse refuses to participate in metalinguistic play—refuses to
be re-intonated or to be understood differently—innerly persuasive discourse attains its
persuasiveness by surrendering some of its semantic authority over itself. It is precisely
because such discourse becomes at least partially “mine” that it can begin to have agency
within a dialogue of voices within a single consciousness. “When such an influence is
deep and productive, there is no external imitation, no simple act of reproduction, but
rather a further creative development of another’s (more precisely, half-other) discourse
in a new context and under new conditions” (Bakhtin, Dialogic 346).
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An experience many graduate students have had may help to illustrate how such
discourse becomes internally persuasive. The movement from undergraduate studies to
graduate coursework is, for many students, a movement away from the authoritative word
of professors whose knowledge seems so prior and distant that it outstrips the student’s
capacity to respond to that word. In graduate school, students are challenged to contest
their teachers’ ideas, and it is in that very contestation that many ideas work their way
insidiously into the students’ consciousness.
Internally persuasive discourse—as opposed to one that is externally
authoritative—is, as it is affirmed through assimilation, tightly interwoven
with “one’s own word.” In the everyday rounds of our consciousness, the
internally persuasive word is half-ours and half-someone else’s. Its
creativity and productiveness consist precisely in the fact that such a word
awakens new and independent words, that it organizes masses of our
words from within, and does not remain in an isolated and static condition.
It is not so much interpreted by us as it is further, that is, freely,
developed, applied to new material, new conditions. (Bakhtin, Dialogic
345)
As the new graduate student experiences the play of various discourses within his/her
consciousness—none of which establishes itself as semantically authoritative and
finalizing—some of these discourses will eventually feel a little more than half “one’s
own word.” By allowing for dialogue, engagement, re-intonation, and metalinguistic
play within the graduate student’s consciousness, the freshly encountered innerly
persuasive discourse of the student’s coursework becomes assimilated into his/her
consciousness.
Of course, the reverse may occur as well—by surrendering itself to metalinguistic
play, the innerly persuasive word risks the possibility that it will lose its hold on the
consciousness of an individual:
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Much as authoritative voices may come to lose their authority, so innerly
persuasive discourses can come to seem less persuasive, more than half
“someone else’s.” When this happens, we typically begin to play with the
discourse, make an objectified image of it, turn it into a “word of the
second type,” or attach it to a specific other person one holds at some
distance. (Morson and Emerson 222, emphasis in original)
Such innerly persuasive discourse has been, as it were, hoist on its own petard—having
made itself accessible to transformation, it has become something of functionally less
ontological value, an object of contemplation. This, I would contend, is what occurs in
the space and time of the consubstantial chronotope, where the first world of the
performers and audience consumes the second world created through the performance.
We might say that the audience becomes the ultimate semantic authority over the
metaworld in the consubstantial chronotope, as opposed to the tendency of the
sacramental chronotope to assign utter semantic authority to the spiritual world
experienced through the performance of Latin liturgical dramas.
By comparison, the transubstantial chronotope associated with the Corpus Christi
pageants creates, I would contend, a space and time where the innerly persuasive
discourse of the fictive metaworld can engage in dialogic play with the first world of the
audience and performers. As a result, both the first and second worlds of performance
are on an equal ontological footing, each capable of re-accentuating the other, each
capable of re-writing the other. The second world of performance, like innerly
persuasive discourse, becomes an essentially unfinished and unfinalizable entity, one that
has the creative power to challenge the first world of the audience and performers:
We have not yet learned from it all it might tell us; we can take it into new
contexts, attach it to new material, put it in a new situation in order to
wrest new answers from it, new insights into its meaning, and even wrest
from it new words of its own (since another’s discourse, if productive,
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gives birth to a new word from us in response). (Bakhtin, Dialogic 346347, emphasis in original)
Significantly, implicit in Bakhtin’s description of innerly persuasive discourse is the
concept that such discourse has a creative agency which resides in the word itself, rather
than in any of the bodies of various readers or performers or audience members. The
word—or, in the case of the Corpus Christi pageants, the fictive metaworld—wrests from
us new meanings, speaks to us in a voice something like our own.
What, then, is the ontological status of the imaginative “second world” of the
performance if the pageants did indeed feature innerly persuasive discourse?
Ontologically speaking, that fictive metaworld is real—it possesses the authority and
agency of any other legitimate voice. The dialogic impulse present in the Corpus Christi
pageants cannot be sustained without each voice granting the ontological substance of the
other. In other words, two voices cannot legitimately converse unless—and until—they
first work from the presumption of each other’s ontological substance, and as we wander
through the streets of York encountering God and all His Creation, we may justly
shudder at the thought of denying the substance of that story. Both performers and
audience members would have been strongly inclined if not indeed compelled to orient
themselves toward that imaginative metaworld as they would orient themselves toward
any other Being endowed with ontological substance; such an endowed world would be
able to speak to and with the participants in the performances.
Flesh and Spirit as One in the Corpus Christi Pageants
In the previous two chapters, we have explored two ways of understanding the
portrayal of religious, ethical, and/or moral themes in medieval English theatre. In the
sacramental chronotope, the religious, ethical, and/or moral themes conveyed during
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Latin liturgical dramas were given flesh through a ritual act designed to bring
worshippers closer to the Divine. Rather than creating an imaginative world through
performance, the sacramental chronotope connects participants to an underlying spiritual
reality which allows them to understand and to embody certain religious, ethical, and/or
moral themes. We might say that the sacramental chronotope features the authoritative
single-voiced discourse that Bakhtin called “direct, unmediated discourse”—the speech
of one who does not brook the possibility of “the word” having more meanings than The
Author has allowed.
By comparison, the consubstantial chronotope that we saw exemplified in Tudorera interludes like Fulgens and Lucres actively authors an imaginative space and time
distinct from the space and time of the “real” spectators and performers. Yet while it is
distinct from the space and time of the spectators and performers, the metaworld born of
the consubstantial chronotope is in an ontological sense only real as ideas being
contemplated by consumers of ideas. Such ideas may certainly have an impact on the
world, and may change the world in powerful ways, but ontologically, the ideas are
“owned” by their contemplators, by the “real” people who choose (consciously or
unconsciously) to accept—and thus to consume—these religious, ethical, and/or moral
precepts. It is the contemplator—and not the idea being contemplated—which possesses
the ontological status of being “real.”
There is, however, a third possibility for the space/time constituted through the act
of performance. Unlike the sacramental chronotope, which joins two pre-existing and
ontologically substantial space/times through ritual performance, and unlike the
consubstantial chronotope, which authors a temporary and ontologically insubstantial
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space/time (or metaworld) for the audience’s consumption, the transubstantial chronotope
constructs an ontologically substantial space and time distinct from the “real” space and
time of the audience and performers. By “ontologically substantial,” I mean that the
audience and performers in the transubstantial chronotope feel obligated to engage the
metaworld brought into being during the performance as if it possessed all the
requirements for Being, for “reality.”
In this sense, the transubstantial chronotope might best be understood as a sort of
middle ground between the sacramental and consubstantial chronotopes. Like the
sacramental chronotope, the transubstantial chronotope assumes the fundamental
interconnectedness of the material and spiritual worlds. Like the consubstantial
chronotope, the transubstantial chronotope allows for a distinction between the first world
of the audience and the second world of the play, although this distinction is often blurred
by the interconnectedness of the material and the spiritual. While the transubstantial
chronotope reflected in the Corpus Christi pageants displays an awareness of the
distinction between the audience-sphere and the play-sphere, the ontological force of the
constant spiritual presence in the play complicates the distinction between the “first
world“ and the “second world.” Everyone—performer and audience alike—is subject to
the will of God and has been saved by the blood of Christ, and no one—neither player
nor spectator—can escape God’s immanent (and imminent) judgment. Onstage acts can
thus potentially acquire the force of God.
These Corpus Christi performances thus created a space and time where
performers and audience alike could confront a spiritual reality and could engage that
spiritual reality on an equal ontological footing. Such a strong assertion may seem
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unwarranted to critics who find the Corpus Christi plays “naive” in their “unrealistic
representations.” Yet as Gail M. Gibson notes:
What has too often been confused with the naive and the childlike, or has
been dismissed as crudely popular because it had an afterlife in succeeding
centuries in the cultural residue left to peasant culture, was in fact a
deliberate and conscious effort to objectify the spiritual even as the
Incarnation itself had given spirit a concrete form. (8)
What may seem unrealistic and naive to modern minds is the notion that Christ came to
the Earth as God Incarnate. Working from the position that the Bible conveys the
absolute history of the world and that Christ’s Passion was the perfect intermingling of
matter and spirit, the transubstantial chronotope has its own rules of realism. “It is
precisely this capacity of the drama to make visible the reality of the Passion and the
Resurrection, to represent Christian truths in the here and now, that made it the object of
such care and spiritual dedication on the part of its producers and its audience” (Coletti 9,
emphasis in original). In other words, the very incarnational impulse of the Corpus
Christi performances moves us into transubstantial territory.
As the Corpus Christi plays carried God and His Risen Son out into the world,
they did so with a sense of the importance of the audience that Diller found lacking in
Latin liturgical drama. “In contrast to the hierarchical situations of the liturgical drama,
the Corpus Christi cycles know, and recognize, an audience; they are performed in the
presence of a crowd which is not continuously drawn into the represented situation”
(Diller, Middle English 75). Because this audience was largely free from the monastic
discipline that characterized liturgical performance, they could actively step back from
and engage the represented world. A liturgical “audience” is always part and parcel of
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the church ceremony; the Corpus Christi pageants established a second, fictive metaworld
which was ontologically distinct from the world inhabited by the audience.
Yet at the same time that a distance was created between the first and second
worlds, the production circumstances of the Corpus Christi plays also worked to integrate
the audience-sphere and the play-sphere. These guild-produced plays “used actors from
the community who were known to the audience in real life” (Kolve 23). Although he
admits that a “few records in York suggest that occasional performances were graced by
actors imported from outside,” Kolve goes on to observe that “this was the exception, not
the rule; local, familiar faces in biblical roles would have made any fully developed kind
of theatrical illusion impossible” (24). The audience was, after all, watching a
performance featuring, for the most part, the handymen of the town, and one saw these
handymen onstage performing remarkably similar tasks to their workaday tasks—the
Shipwrights built the Ark; the Fishers and Mariners oversaw the Flood; the Vintners
brought forth the Marriage at Cana, where Christ turned water into wine; the Bakers
prepared the Last Supper.
Not only did the audience watch familiar faces perform, they got to see these
faces up close, creating an intimate and personal relationship between performers and
audience. Although much of the action of the Corpus Christi plays took place on the
pageant-wagons, a notable amount of action took place on the ground in front of, around,
and through the audience: “The audience surrounded the playing area, as clearly visible
to one another as the players were to them; occasional exits, entrances, and even dramatic
action took place on street level in their midst” (Kolve 23). Frequently, when the action
did descend to the audience’s level, it did so to frighten the audience (Herod descending
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in rage), to indict the audience (Jesus descending to the ground during the Harrowing of
Hell), or simply to have fun with the audience at their expense (Satan’s minions
descending with pitchforks, which could have been staged in either terrifying or playful
ways). Regardless, the action that occurred amongst the audience was not merely
metatheatrical; such action brought the audience into the same sphere of Being as the
Divine and Damned—for at least a moment or two.
Additionally, the characters portrayed by these familiar faces spoke the same
language as the audience, sometimes in a markedly anachronistic fashion: “Old
Testament speeches liberally seasoned with oaths, ‘by Christ’ or by the saints or even ‘by
Mahound’ [Mohammed], are undoubtedly the result of […] a wish to write vivid
colloquial dialogue” (Kolve 104). Peter Happe places this colloquial dialogue in its
historical context:
The fourteenth century is the time of Chaucer, Langland, and the poetry of
the north-west represented by Sir Gawayne and the Grene Knight and
Pearl. For the first time, if one may be permitted a generalization, the
English language was a means of literary expression of the first rank[…].
The fact that the performance of the mystery cycles was in the hands of
common labouring men meant that English had to be used there too. The
language acquired a new status in the community, and there seems little
doubt that the development of the cycles was part of this process.
(“Introduction” 22)
Through means of this vernacularization, the various languages of the Bible (Aramaic,
Greek, Latin) were brought into contact with the language of the audience, thus setting
the stage for an innerly persuasive interplay of meanings within each participant’s
consciousness.
Taking the language of God into one’s own mouth via one’s own “tongue” is a
particularly potent tool for urging metalinguistic, dialogic play between the past and the
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present, creating a space for the Divine to speak with one’s own voice. Bakhtin
acknowledges the power of religious speech to encourage such an innerly persuasive
dialogue:
Our motif [of innerly persuasive discourse] carries even greater weight in
the realm of religious thought and discourse (mythological, mystical, and
magical). The primary subject of this discourse is a being who speaks: a
deity, a demon, a soothsayer, a prophet. Mythological thought does not, in
general, acknowledge anything not alive or not responsive. Divining the
will of a deity, of a demon (good or bad), interpreting signs of wrath or
beneficence, tokens, indications and finally the transmission and
interpretation of words directly spoken by a deity (revelation) or his
prophets, saints, soothsayers—all in all, the transmission and
interpretation of the divinely inspired (as opposed to the profane) word are
acts of religious thought and discourse having the greatest importance. All
religious systems, even primitive ones, possess an enormous, highly
specialized methodological apparatus (hermeneutics) for transmitting and
interpreting various kinds of holy word. (Bakhtin, Dialogic 350)
Through the hermeneutics of vernacularization in the Corpus Christi pageants, the Word
of God was brought into the sphere of the Word of Man, so that each word spoke to the
other.
Not only was the language of the Bible brought into contact with the vernacular
language of the English, it is also clear that the “Holy Land” of the Corpus Christi
pageants bore a striking resemblance to the lands near where the plays were performed:
“Action itself told the story, and it happened there in England, in front of and amid the
spectators” (Kolve 23, emphasis in original). Consider, for instance, Richard Beadle and
Pamela M. King’s observations about the similarity between the Skinner’s play of Jesus’
entry into Jerusalem and the medieval tradition of entry processions for noble worthies
who came to visit important towns like York:
Jesus must have ridden on the ass in the street amongst the audience, who
were thus deftly drawn into the illusion of the play, and given a role as the
crowd that lined the route into Jerusalem. The […] tableau at the end,
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with its ordered arrangement of formal greetings, suggests that the
dramatist had in mind the conventions of the contemporary royal entry
into the medieval town. In the last line of the play, the local audience
must have had a strong sense that the King of Heaven was being
welcomed as much to medieval York as to the biblical Jerusalem. (106)
The conclusion of the play—“Hail, whom all thing shall dread and doubt./ We welcome
thee;/ Hail and welcome of all about/ To our city” (l. 541-544; Beadle and King 124)—
thus neatly combines the metalinguistic and (for lack of a better word) the metaspacial
elements of the Corpus Christi pageants. Christ’s reception is both linguistically and
spatially double-edged, referencing the colloquial and the eternal at one and the same
time.
Such anachronistic layering of one time onto another brought God’s history into
contact with the audience’s history. Throughout the Corpus Christi pageants, the
frequent use of
dramatic anachronism involves conscious artistic intention. It is used, for
instance, in the service of the medieval poor, registering the wrong they
suffer within the context of an Advent that will ultimately damn their
oppressors forever[…. T]he raging Herods and the proud high priests
serve to image the sins of the contemporary rich and powerful. (Kolve
104-105)
The Eternal Story of God is thus embodied in the here and now to indict those present
who have failed to heed Christ’s call to care for those less fortunate than ourselves
(Matthew 25:42: “For I was hungry and you gave me nothing to eat…”).
Beadle offers a compelling and clever interpretation of just one short phrase in the
York Moses and Pharaoh, a phrase that would be easy for us to overlook today but which
would have resonated powerfully for the late medieval audience at York. The phrase is
“great pestilence,” and it is spoken by an Egyptian bemoaning the fate of his land to the
Pharaoh: “My lord, great pestilence/ Is like full long to last” (l. 345-346; Beadle and
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King 45). As Beadle points out, the phrase “great pestilence,” in the post-plague world of
northern England, “had come to be the customary way of referring to the Black Death of
1348-9” (85). As such, the plague that doomed a Pharaoh had come, as well, to the time
and place of the audience:
Upon hearing the grim words, the tyrannous and verbose Rex Pharaoh is
immediately deflated, capitulates and orders the release of the Israelites—
in performance, a moment of chill stasis after the pell-mell black comedy
with which the reports of the preceding plagues of Egypt would have been
presented. When the play was new, this may also have been a moment of
remembrance for survivors of the Black Death and those born in the
succeeding generation, for the York Hosier’s play of Moses and Pharaoh
was probably composed when the memory of this, the most destructive of
all the plague’s visitations, was still a living memory. (Beadle 85)
A moment of silence inspired by dramatic timing and powerful storytelling becomes,
with just one slight phrase, a moment of silence as well for those who never had the
chance to attend the performance the audience is now watching.
Higgins perhaps puts it best when she notes that the
Corpus Christi procession and play told the story of many bodies, from the
body of Christ in life and in the Eucharist to the extended body of Christ
in the corporate body of all believers[…]. When townspeople saw their
own work and bodies dramatized in the history that the tableaux and plays
represented […] they also saw their towns so used. (79)
Thus a curious tension between the two aforementioned theatrical axes obtains wherein
we achieve both maximal interpenetration and maximal distance. Although Geoff the
mercer, a salesman of fine goods that many in his medieval audience may know
personally, is clearly not Christ on the Throne of Judgment, he somehow echoes Christ in
this communal religious act. The ground upon which demons tread is both Hell and the
streets of York, and the play is set simultaneously in the distant past, the immediate
present, and the foreordained future. The Corpus Christi pageants offer secular-produced
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plays in the vernacular language that somehow participate in the world of the Spirit—
scatology mixed with eschatology. In a sense that may be impossible to recapture fully in
our time, the Corpus Christi plays were both “real” and “imaginary,” both “material” and
“spiritual.”
Figural Time in the Corpus Christi Pageants
As we saw in Chapter Two, the common medieval practice of viewing history
through the lens of figural time meant that history was never “gone” but was, instead,
always present. History recurred, so that (for instance) Jonah’s trip in the belly of a
whale pointed to, and was remembered by, Christ’s three days before His Resurrection.
Figural interpretation moves not only between events in the Old and New Testaments, but
also between current events and Biblical ones. This is a crucial point for understanding
the impact of figural thinking on the lived experience of a medieval townsperson
watching a pageant play.
For instance, the character of Cain onstage was “typical of the tight-fisted
Christian farmer who refused to give God his due—a tithe, or tenth, of all his earnings for
the use of the Holy Church” (Harris 96; see also Kolve 105). Cain thus potentially
prefigured the behavior of some audience members, moving via figural thinking from the
metaworld of the play to the “real world” of the audience. Of course, within a figural
worldview, the “metaworld” of the play is as “real” as the “real world” of the audience,
possessed of its own ontological validity.
The concept of figura had a profound impact upon the development of the Corpus
Christi pageant cycles. Figural interpretation provides much of the structure of the
cycles. As Harris points out, the selection of which Biblical events would be staged in
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the various plays of a given cycle (and thus which events would be left out) was driven in
part by figural schema (94-5). Events were chosen because of their figural
interrelatedness, and events which did not fit (or could not be creatively fit) into a
teleological pattern of prefiguration were largely overlooked in the staging of the Corpus
Christi cycles. This figural interrelatedness was then highlighted through performance.
For instance, the story of Abel’s murder prefigures the execution of Christ, “and in many
performances of the play he was murdered on the very spot where he had [earlier] offered
his lamb on the altar, thus becoming identified with the Paschal Lamb, or Christ in his
sacrificial aspect—a vivid way of bringing the figure out” (Harris 96).
It is precisely because figural interpretation connects two real historical events
that the metaworld of the Corpus Christi plays possesses ontological substance and even
authority over the lived experience of the audience. Through figura, the two worlds of
play and audience share substance, achieve contact; indeed, within a figural concept of
time, the narrow streets of northern England can “touch” the dusty streets of Jerusalem.
References to local English surroundings in the mystery plays, often mistaken by
nineteenth and early twentieth century scholars for naiveté, become in the context of
figural interpretation a sophisticated way of showing the links between then and now.
In the transubstantial chronotope of the figura, the word does become flesh; just
as bread and wine are transformed into the body of Christ, the metaworld of a mystery
play is transformed via the transubstantial chronotope into an enfleshed historical reality
as substantial as anything else in the medieval audience’s reality. In the consubstantial
chronotope, by comparison, the relationship between substance and spirit is purely
metaphorical. In the Tudor era interludes of Henry Medwall, for instance, the division of
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substance and spirit transforms the theatrical metaworld into a dreamworld with less
ontological substance than that of the audience. One might say, then, that a unique and
powerful miracle occurs within the transubstantial chronotope—a miracle facilitated at
least in part by figural interpretation in the Middle Ages.
As we have seen in Chapter Four, visual art in the Middle Ages also reflected this
figural urge to implicate the spectator directly in the actions of the Divine. Pictures in the
“Books of Hours” which served as prayer-books for the laity in the fourteenth and
fifteenth centuries placed art patrons in the same visual frame as Christian figures: “The
Hours of Mary of Burgundy contains a mysterious portrait of its owner in prayer before
the Madonna,” and many other Hours included the patron in images of famous Christian
events (Reinburg 39). While in some ways merely a reflection of the egotism of the rich
and/or noble patrons of such art, the inclusion of contemporary figures in Biblical art also
(and more importantly) reflects the blurring of boundaries between past and present,
spiritual and material, that informed medieval visual interpretation.
Sylvia Tomasch examines another picture by the Master of Mary of Burgundy in
terms of the many temporal and spatial frames it presents the viewer. At the heart of this
image is Christ being crucified; surrounding and framing that action is a crowd of mostly
disinterested or noncommittal folk; and most notably, framing both these images is a
window clearly from the fifteenth century—the viewer is invited to look out of his/her
window and see Christ’s crucifixion (81). Viewers must therefore negotiate the various
frames, asking which frame demands their attention most. Is Christ at the center of their
lives? Are they like the noncommittal crowd, passively watching Jesus die? Or is the
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most important frame that of their own lives in the here-and-now, a frame that looks back
on and derives strength from Jesus’ death and His eventual resurrection?
Tomasch argues that a similar sort of framing occurs verbally in the Corpus
Christi plays and that both visual art and theatre of this time refuse to allow the spectator
to remain unindicted, disengaged spectators:
The audience’s illusions of passivity and non-complicity must indeed be
broken. While the establishment of individual frames may initially seem
to set off portions of dramatic or artistic presentation as divided,
potentially dissociated, worlds, the breaking of these separating frames
redirects attention from past or future events to contemporary reality,
bringing all worlds together in one significant present, one cohesive
whole. (Tomasch 91).
The blurring of boundaries between “first” and “second” worlds that I have described in
the transubstantial chronotope thus seems informed by medieval developments in visual
art as well as developments in theatre. Through figural interpretation, medieval
audiences were able to perceive their own space and time as sharing substance with/in the
space and time of Biblical events, thus granting both frames ontological substance,
creating the ground for a dialogue between the two worlds.
Interlude: The Last Judgment Comes to Town
It is some time around midnight on an early summer evening in the 1400’s in
York. After something like twenty hours of performance, the Mercer’s pageant, The Last
Judgment, arrives, and a gold-masked God takes us back to the where the story—and the
day’s performances—began, with the moment of Creation:
GOD: First when I this world had wrought—
Wood and wind and waters wan,
And all-kin thing that now is aught—
Full well methought that I did then.
When they were made, good me them thought;
Sithen to my likeness made I man,
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And man to grieve me gave he nought,
Therefore me rues that I the world began. (l. 1-8; Beadle and King
268)
Our God here sounds surprisingly world-weary, an old man who has seen too much and
has grown somewhat cynical—perhaps not unlike some of the folks seated in the
audience might feel at this moment. God lays out the entirety of his grievances for the
audience, reminding us of all that we have seen throughout the day—man’s fall; the
arrival of Jesus to redeem the human race; the Passion, Harrowing of Hell, and the
Resurrection.
He concludes his ponderous opening monologue with a grave threat:
GOD: In earth I see but sins sere [everywhere],
Therefore mine angels will I send
To blow their bemes [trumpets], that all may hear
The time is come I will make end. (l. 61-64; Beadle and King 269)
Trumpets sound in the distance, their source unseen in the dense black night as yet, but
moving closer. The time of Judgment has come.
As the play progresses, Christ comes down to “Earth” to judge all souls. As Meg
Twycross notes,
Plays like the Creation or the Last Judgement represent events on a cosmic
scale. Modern theatre directors tend to interpret this in terms of a
sweepingly wide set and scores of actors. But this is unnecessary: it is all
a matter of context. When you stand in the street in front of a Last
Judgement pageant wagon, and your head tilts back to follow the angels
climbing up to take their places on the Heaven deck among the rooftops
[of the city], you get a real sense of height, and of hierarchy: the three
layers—the highest of Heaven, the area “in the clouds above the earth”
where God comes to judge and the ground where the dead rise and out of
which the mouth of Hell opens. (48)
Torches light the stage—or are they hellfire? The “episode’s action calls for the crowd
itself to be searched and divided into souls damned and saved” (Higgins 91), and as
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Christ approaches, despite the fact that this isn’t “real,” one hopes to avoid being one of
those chosen for eternal damnation.
The play—and thus the pageant, and thus the whole cycle of history as well—
ends, however, not with a grieving and tired God but with Jesus, who rebukes the damned
while he praises those about to be conducted to Heaven:
JESUS:

Caitiffs, as oft it betid [happened]
That needful aught asked in my name,
Ye heard them not, your ears ye hid,
Your help to them was not at home.
To me was that unkindness kid [showed],
Therefore ye bear this bitter blame;
To least or most when ye it did,
To me ye did the self and the same.
My chosen children, come unto me,
With me to won now shall ye wend
There joy and bliss shall ever be,
Your life in liking shall ye lend.[…]
They that would sin, and ceased nought,
Of sorrows sere now shall they sing;
And they that mended them whilst they might
Shall bield [dwell] and bide in my blessing.
(l. 357-368 and 377-380; Beadle and King 279)

The stage directions here note, “And thus he makes an end, with melody of angels
crossing from place to place” (Beadle and King 279).
The play is over; the audience is exhausted, but also now free to leave the space
of Judgment for home. But “home”—the city, the familiar streets, places, and faces—has
been somehow forever changed by this evening. Around the corner, one might meet
Lucifer…or God…or Christ.
One wonders…what will Lucifer, or God, or Christ, say when meeting one face to
face tomorrow in the sunshine of a new day?
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Conclusion: Back to the Future
We have now explored three distinct chronotopes of medieval performance,
charting various relations of space and time, actors and audience, and spirit and flesh that
informed a medieval theatergoer’s phenomenal experience of Latin liturgical dramas,
Tudor-era interludes, and the Corpus Christi Biblical cycles. What remains for us to do is
to explore an as yet unmentioned genre of medieval theatre, the morality play, which
employs a variety of chronotopes due in part to the diverse staging circumstances for
these plays. We must also return to our own time so that we may consider how these
chronotopes of performance might inform our own understanding of modern
performances of medieval theatre. By doing so, we can look forward to some possible
applications of these three chronotopes in the analysis of a variety of performance forms
beyond those staged in medieval England.
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CHAPTER 6
MORALITIES AND MODERN MYSTERIES
NOWADAYS:
Make room, sirs, for we have to be long!
We will come give you a Christmas song.
NOUGHT:
Now, I pray all the yeomanry that is here
To sing with us, with a merry cheer.
[Sings] It is written with a coal, it is written with a coal…
[NEWGUISE and NOWADAYS make the audience sing after him.]
NEWGUISE and NOWADAYS:
It is written with a coal, it is written with a coal…
NOUGHT:
He that shitteth with his hole, he that shitteth with his hole…
NEWGUISE and NOWADAYS:
He that shitteth with his hole, he that shitteth with his hole…
NOUGHT:
But he wipe his arse clean, but he wipe his arse clean…
NEWGUISE and NOWADAYS:
But he wipe his arse clean, but he wipe his arse clean…
NOUGHT:
On his breech it shall be seen, on his breech it shall be seen…
NEWGUISE and NOWADAYS:
On his breech it shall be seen, on his breech it shall be seen.
Cantant omnes
Holyke, holyke, holyke, holyke, holyke, holyke!
--from the late 15th century morality Mankind,
l. 332-343 (Lester 21-22)
This study has discussed and developed three chronotopes of performance—the
sacramental, consubstantial, and transubstantial chronotopes—which informed the
phenomenal experience of medieval theatergoers. In the sacramental chronotope,
disciplined heterodynamic bodies sought contact with an ontologically superior divine
realm through the praxis of ritual performance. The primary function of performance in
the Latin liturgical dramas associated with the sacramental chronotope was to connect the
“first world” of the ritual participants with the divine “second world” that was always
already present. Just as the sacrament of the Eucharist within the doctrine of
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transubstantiation was designed to unite the participant not with some imaginative
concept of Christ, but with His Body as transformed in the moment of partaking, so too
the sacramental chronotope took advantage of spatial and spiritual correspondences and
the rhythms of monastic time to bring performers and other participants in Latin liturgical
dramas into contact with the divine in the moment of performance.
The consubstantial chronotope, in contrast, functioned within an ontology of selfsufficiency sustained by autodynamic bodies that located the primary source of their
power within themselves, rather than seeking such power from spiritual “victory helpers”
or religious or temporal leaders. Locating power within oneself generally meant that the
specific power to interpret and to author meaning could also be located within oneself,
that is, the individual could author meaning in the act of contemplating a performance, a
religious item, or any other life event. Ownership of divine relics and religious aids was
an extension of this general logic, as bodies came to own the divine rather than feeling
compelled to travel to locations where divinity was grounded, such as churches, shrines,
and reliquaries. Just as the Eucharist in the always simmering but not quite yet
articulated consubstantial interpretation of the Last Supper involved no substantive
transformation of wafer and wine but rather served as an opportunity for private
contemplation, so too in the consubstantial chronotope performance and representation
generally came to be “owned” by the contemplator. Within this chronotope, no
substantive or enduring transformation was understood to occur through performance;
instead, performance constructed an imaginary second world that was ontologically
inferior to the first world of the audience and performers. The second world existed for
the audience and performers and because of the bodily and interpretive efforts of the
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audience. Performance became, within this chronotope, an act of production and
consumption by bodies that generally understood themselves as producers and
consumers.
Finally, in the transubstantial chronotope, an ontology of community informed
efforts to articulate communal identity and grievances through cultural performances,
most notably the community-encompassing performance of the Corpus Christi pageants
that were performed in Northern England. In an idealized praxis, these communicative
bodies used performance to tell shared narratives in the context of a communal ritual
which sought to strengthen, purify, and heal souls. The reality of these cultural
performances was perhaps more contestatory and even hard-hearted than the idealized
praxis that Arthur Frank associates with communicative bodies, however, as rivalries
between church and civic authorities inflected and infected the staging of these
performances. The openly contestatory quality of these pageants weakened any claim to
authoritative discourse that such religious performances might have offered. Instead, the
performance discourse of the Corpus Christi pageants opened itself up to dialogic play,
allowing these performances to function as innerly persuasive discourse. The use of
familiar space and time to stage the supposedly timeless mysteries of Christian lore
strengthened the sensation of engaging in an innerly persuasive dialogue with the divine.
As the first and second worlds of performance collided, mingled, struggled, and toyed
with each other in the transubstantial chronotope, the discourse of the imaginative second
world came to possess an unusually resonant linguistic agency that placed the metaworld
on the same ontological plane as the world of the performers and spectators.
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Throughout this study, therefore, we have examined a wide variety of medieval
theatrical practices broadly associated with spirituality, ethics, and morality. The tactics
available for addressing such concerns through theatrical means are impossible to catalog
or describe in any comprehensive way, and the three chronotopes of performance here
can at most serve as a starting point for exploring various relations among space, time,
performers, and audience in the performance of medieval religious or ethical discourse.
Hopefully, though, these three chronotopes create grounds for us to discuss productively
even the most scatological and transgressive forms of medieval religious or ethical
performance. As the opening quote of this chapter suggests, sometimes divine faith can
be observed more in its breach than in its practice. In the midst of a supposedly sober
morality play exploring Mankind’s efforts to resist temptation in favor of hard work, the
three vice figures of Nought, Newguise, and Nowadays tempt not only Mankind but
also—and more importantly—tempt the audience as well. By giving in to the enticement
to sing along with the vices, the audience is led straight into unforeseen temptation,
singing a “Christmas song” that is shot through with what Bakhtin rather euphemistically
calls the “material bodily lower stratum” (Rabelais 18-24). Thus, just like Mankind in
the play, the audience discovers how easy it is to sin and how quick the desire for
repentance can come on.
One can, of course, argue that the play functions in the exact opposite manner,
inviting the audience to behave rudely and to identify with the more attractive vice
figures. Of more interest in the context of this study, however, is the way that Mankind’s
ontological experience of temptation “crosses over” from the second world of the play to
the first world of the audience. The audience’s space and time collide with, and perhaps
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even become coterminous with, the space and time of the imaginative metaworld.
Whether this crossing over leads to identification with the vices or rejection of the vices
is less significant than the fact that such boundary-breaking (or boundary-blurring) moves
us into the domain of the transubstantial chronotope. But can we say the same about the
other morality plays of medieval England?
This study has explored three major forms of medieval performance—Latin
liturgical dramas, Tudor interludes, and Biblical cycle pageants—but one of the most
famous forms of medieval theatre has been absent from this study thus far: morality
plays. Where do moralities such as Everyman, Mankind, The Castle of Perseverance,
and Wisdom fit into our three chronotopes of performance in medieval England? The
answer, as we shall see, is as complex as the various plays that make up the genre of
English morality plays. Whereas the liturgical dramas, Tudor interludes, and cycle plays
each featured distinct production circumstances that shaped perceptions of time and space
throughout the performance, the production circumstances of the plays we now call
moralities were quite diverse, making it difficult to categorize the genre as a whole into
any one chronotope.
Still, one might wonder, in this postmodern/posthumanist age, if these
chronotopes of medieval performance have any contemporary meaning and relevance. In
an effort to locate something of the transubstantial in contemporary theatre practices, I
will conclude this chapter, and the study as a whole, with an analysis of a recent
production in the East End of London called Yimmimingaliso: The Mysteries. This
production, staged in a ramshackle old nineteenth century music hall, evoked—for me, at
least, and I imagine for others present on the night I witnessed the performance—
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something of the transubstantial. The multi-racial, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual cast from
South America drew upon contemporary images and issues to connect the texts of several
of the Chester mystery cycle plays to my own experiences and spiritual yearnings. The
performance, too, tugged upon my own life experiences as a university student in the
southern United States in the 1980’s, pushing the performance to reach out to me in a
particularly stirring, evocative, and I believe transubstantial way.
Multichronotopic Medieval Moralities
The five plays traditionally associated with the English medieval morality genre
are The Pride of Life, The Castle of Perseverance, Wisdom, Mankind, and Everyman, all
dating from the late fourteenth through the early sixteenth centuries. “The problematic
502-line fragment known as The Pride of Life” provides some material, especially in the
Prologue, for one to speculate on the nature of the play as a whole, but such speculation
must, perforce, be made with less than acceptable confidence (King 258). Because we
cannot make detailed assumptions about the production circumstances of this play, and
because we have so little of the play’s text from which to speculate about the metaworld
created through its performance, it is difficult to consider how the play might have
constructed time and space for its audience during medieval performances. As such, The
Pride of Life will not factor into our analysis of the morality genre.
Of the four remaining plays, each of which has survived more or less in its
entirety, we can hardly find any points of connection at first blush. The dour and
relatively unadorned Everyman, which is likely of Dutch origin, seems far different from
Perseverance and its ambitious exploration of Humanum Genus’ entire life span as well
as its elaborate staging in the round. Neither play much resembles Wisdom at face value,
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with its more rarified and intellectual debat format that seems more suited for university
wits than common folk. And as the opening quote to this chapter suggests, the bawdy
humor of Mankind seems completely removed from the more sober tone of the other four
plays.
The plays do, of course, have certain thematic and dramatic similarities, but these
similarities are textual and structural and do not take into account the plays’ production
circumstances in the Middle Ages. Pamela M. King has summed up these generic textual
markers for us nicely:
What these plays have in common most obviously is that they offer their
audiences moral instruction through dramatic action that is broadly
allegorical.[…] The protagonist is generally a figure of all men, reflected
in his name, Everyman or Mankind, and the other characters are polarised
as figures of good and evil. The action concerns alienation from God and
return to God, presented as the temptation, fall and restitution of the
protagonist. (240)
While the presence of these qualities, shared across a variety of texts, does allow us to
speak meaningfully of “moralities” as a genre, in terms of their production circumstances,
the plays differ greatly. And for us to be able to speak meaningfully about space and
time in the performance, some consideration of the production circumstances is
necessary.
As Bevington notes,
In matters of staging, the morality play confronts us with a variety and
uncertainty that calls into question the very concept of a single entity
called ‘the morality play.’ Probably it is better to assume […] that
morality drama is of a piece with medieval drama generally and shares its
diversity of staging methods. (“Castles in the Air” 100)
Some medieval English moralities were clearly intended for large-scale outdoor
productions, while others could be and most likely were staged at a variety of locations,
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making use of everywhere from church yards to cathedrals to town halls. Likewise, these
moralities interact with their audiences in fundamentally different ways, crossing the
divide between the first and second worlds of performance for different reasons using
different techniques. Chronotopically, then, each play constructs time, space, and
actor/audience relationships in very different ways.
While staging circumstances are not the only concern we have when considering
the chronotope of a given performance—other issues such as tone, verbal imagery, the
function of asides and audience addresses, and bodily training strongly influence
chronotopic consciousness—we cannot afford to overlook completely production
circumstances if we wish to conduct a full chronotopic analysis of a specific play text,
performance, or genre. Consider, for instance, that one feature of Latin liturgical dramas
which allows us to discuss these dramas as exempla of the sacramental chronotope is the
consistent similarity of tone and production circumstances in virtually all of these
performances. The sacramental chronotope can only be understood in terms of its
participation in sanctified church space, its reliably sober tone, its use of monastically
disciplined bodies, and its connection to the seasonal clock of the Church calendar.
Likewise, the largely secular Tudor interludes are associated with the consubstantial
chronotope due in no small part to their shared production circumstances in great halls for
wealthy patrons exploring (and frequently exploiting) the power of their autodynamic
bodies, often in rowdy and boisterous ways. In each case, it is not simply the text of the
plays which moves them into one chronotope or the other (although textual features can
certainly contribute to a given text’s participation in a particular chronotope); additionally
the specific shared production circumstances, including the use of specific kinds of
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bodies in specific spaces at specific times, inflected (or infected) with a distinct
intonation, moves us to associate certain plays with one chronotope or another.
We cannot, however, identify such similarities in the moralities of the later
Middle Ages. Even the limited selection of the five moralities we have identified thus far
demonstrates a variety of distinct production circumstances and the construction of a
variety of different bodies in time and space. If we move to include other later moral
interludes such as Hickscorner and Lusty Juventus, we find it even more difficult to
identify a specific chronotope that adequately describes the experience of participating in
these diverse moralities. More productive, perhaps, would be an effort to describe the
chronotope of specific moralities, exploring how these very different plays moved
through sacramental, consubstantial, and transubstantial space and time. Given the
limited space of this chapter, we might usefully concentrate on the three so-called “Macro
plays,” Perseverance, Wisdom, and Mankind, which were discovered together and which
all date from roughly the same period, from around 1440 to 1465 or 1470 (King 243).
Although all three plays “are of proven East Anglian provenance” and are roughly
contemporaries of each other, they are at best distant cousins in terms of production
circumstances, tone, actor-audience relationships, and other chronotopic markers: “On
examination it becomes apparent […] that each of the three plays belongs to a radically
different theatrical context and, consequently, audience” (King 243-244).
Harris offers a useful categorization of the moralities in terms of both staging
circumstances and theme:
In the later fourteenth century, “moral plays,” as they were called then,
became so abundant that is becomes convenient to consider the different
categories into which they fall […]. In terms of physical presentation, to
take that first, the plays can be clearly divided into two groups: large-
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scale plays mounted by the community, in the same way as the mysteries;
and small-scale plays, known as “interludes,” usually intended for
production by companies of professional travelling players, often at a
dinner or a banquet. These two groups can be sub-divided again
according to their main subject, into what are called by modern critics
“general moralities” and “specific moralities.” The general morality casts
its net very wide and embraces the whole life-journey of man, often
pursuing it through a series of “ages,” each of which has its associated
vices, while the specific morality play deals either with the sins of one
particular “age,” usually youth, or a particular problem of Christian life.
(160)
In Harris’ terms, of the four moralities that we have complete texts of, only The Castle of
Perseverance provides an example of a large-scale, outdoor production of a “general
morality” portraying the entire life of its protagonist, Humanum Genus. In contrast,
Wisdom and Mankind are interludes, both in terms of textual scope and production
circumstances; both are capable of being staged indoors by traveling players. Wisdom
and Mankind fit into Harris’ category of specific moralities, each exploring “a particular
problem of Christian life”: maintaining intellectual discipline in the face of temptation in
Wisdom, and remaining a diligent Christian worker despite the lure of a carefree
reprobate’s life in Mankind. By examining the three plays in more detail, we can see that
each play constructs the grounds for theatrical representation in time and space quite
differently, and thus that each play participates in a different chronotope of medieval
performance.
The Castle of Perseverance: A Sacramental Morality
The Castle of Perseverance dates from the early fifteenth century, and its “3,649
lines encompass several distinguishable plots joined in sequence: the struggle between
the Virtues and Vices for Man’s soul, the coming of Death to Mankind, the debate of
body and soul, and the parliament of heaven or the debate of the four daughters of God”
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(Bevington, Medieval Drama 796). Perseverance is therefore remarkable in the way it
employs four different morality plays themes—some of which, like the struggle between
the Virtues and Vices as well as the coming of Death, are the subject of whole moralities
in and of themselves—into one epic performance. By enacting this epic in a huge and
rigorously symbolic outdoor setting, Perseverance moves the audience through space and
time in a way that is remarkably similar to the movement of performers through space
and time in the sacramental chronotope of the Latin liturgical dramas.
Designed as it is “to represent the whole life of a man from his birth until the day
of his judgement before God’s throne” (Bevington, “Castles in the Air” 108),
Perseverance was staged on the grandest scale of any of the surviving moral plays, using
the full resources of the entire community in which it was staged:
The large-scale public moralities were very popular and were produced,
like most cycle-plays, on an essentially non-commercial basis by groups
of citizens—often quite large groups. Sometimes the audience had to pay
to see them, but the intention was usually not to make a profit but simply
to defray expenses, as happened with the large-scale continental mysteries
and saints’ plays—after all, scenic units and costumes must have made
considerable demands on the pockets of the producers in the case of plays
like The Castle of Perseverance, and such costly pieces cannot possibly be
intended for professional production. In an age when it was difficult to
keep even a six-man troupe together, it would have been economic suicide
for travelling players to risk mounting anything so enormous: if it had
failed, they would have spent the rest of their lives in gaol for debt.
(Harris 161)
We are fortunate to have a visual record of this costly and spectacular stage area. Figure
6.1 (see next page) shows a modernized version of the famous diagram from the Macro
play manuscripts showing the playing area of The Castle of Perseverance (Bevington,
Medieval 797).
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Figure 6.1: A modernized version of the illustration accompanying the Macro
manuscript of The Castle of Perseverance (Bevington, Medieval 797)

As the figure demonstrates, the play used five scaffolds, four of which occupied
the four cardinal compass positions that were regularly used symbolically in medieval
churches. In the context of this stage arrangement, God is visually opposed to the
traditional medieval “evil Trinity” of forces from whence spring the seven deadly sins:
the World, the Flesh, and the Devil. In the east is God’s scaffold, symbolically connected
with the rising sun (and risen Son); directly opposite this is the World’s scaffold,
reflecting the medieval convention of associating the west with materiality and
impermanence. The north, we may remember from Chapter Three, was traditionally
where women stood inside medieval churches; it should come as no surprise, given the
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prevailing patriarchal interpretation that located demonized women in the north, that we
find the Devil lurking there outside the Castle of Perseverance. To the south—
traditionally the place where men stood in medieval churches—we find the temptations
of the flesh that all men must so strenuously resist.
The location of Covetousness in the northeast seems at first odd, a violation of the
compass point symbology. But Pamela King offers a compelling interpretation of the
symbolic relevance of Covetousness’ scaffold in the context of the play’s action:
Destroying the familiar symmetry of the rest, Covetousness has a scaffold
of his own, in the northeast. As Covetousness alone among the
comprehensive scheme of sins that assail the protagonist in the play is the
one that he will find irresistible, the diagram is effectively a map of the
play’s action. (King 245)
In other words, the audience is urged to read Covetousness as an especially significant sin
given that his scaffold is visually a violation of medieval symbolic geography. Indeed,
one can “read” not only the visual action but also most of the plot of Perseverance from
this diagram alone, and this is an essential aspect of the play’s communicative strategy.
By examining the various relationships of the characters in space, the audience—despite
possible difficulties hearing and understanding the action of the play at various points—
would have little difficulty inferring the action from the underlying geographical
symbolism of the stage area.
King offers a succinct summation of the action of the play:
Briefly, it offers a package of orthodox biblical doctrine as armament
against the sin of covetousness.[…] Mankind [Humanum Genus],
accompanied by his Good and Bad Angels, is subjected to various
temptations by the forces of the World (Mundus), the Flesh (Caro), and
the Devil (Belial). Backbiter eventually persuades him to join
Covetousness, but he is retrieved by Penitence and Confession and enters
the Castle of Perseverance. The forces of evil lay siege to the Castle,
where Mankind is defended by an array of seven Virtues. Although the
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Virtues win, Covetousness tempts Mankind to leave the Castle, offering
him material success in the form of possession of the now vacant Castle.
Death comes and Mankind’s riches are seized by the enigmatic I-wotnevere-Whoo, while his Soul is carried to Hell. The Four Daughters of
God—Mercy, Peace, Righteousness, and Truth—hold a debate, which
Mercy wins, freeing the Soul to ascend to Heaven. (244)
One can easily see from this description that most of the action of the play is illustrated
through and rendered meaningful by Mankind’s movement through stage space: the
“major thematic movement of the play depends on the presentation of man’s life as a
journey […,] a pilgrimage, from birth to death, synonymous with the progress from
flawed innocence to experience, and represented theatrically as a physical journey
through a landscape” (King 244). Even the seemingly undifferentiated space of the
ground in between the various set pieces assumes a symbolic function: “The play calls
for a large platea or open space surrounded by scaffolds, with a castle in the center of the
arena” (Bevington, Medieval Drama 798), and in the context of the performance, this
“platea is a neutral ground, a place of moral change” (Bevington, “Castles in the Air”
109).
Natalie Schmitt’s description of this stage layout is particularly chronotopic in its
interpretation of the various movements through space and time in Perseverance:
The castle of man’s soul is set at the center of the playing area which
represents at once the universe and the self; the boundaries between the
internal and the external are not clear. Ideally, man resides within the
castle watched over by the powers of good and protected from the realms
of the world, the flesh, and the devil beyond. Outside the castle man is in
exile and wilderness. All is shown from the perspective in which the war
for man’s salvation is the central reality, a very inward view in which that
which acts upon the embattled self—world, flesh, and devil—are things of
equal reality. (Schmitt 306)
Just as church space was saturated with spiritual meaning in the sacramental chronotope,
here the ground upon which Perseverance is performed acquires symbolic and spiritual
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meaning both prior to and during the performance: “Fixed points on the play’s set,
including the Castle, operate as ports of call on the journey, objectifying the moral state
of the protagonist” (King 245).
Schmitt’s interpretation here (“Outside the castle man is in exile and wilderness”)
recalls Victor Turner’s description of the function of an initiand’s movement into liminal
space in various ritual contexts, where such movement is often a ritual requirement for
initiation into a new rank in society or some other notable self-transformation (26). The
various movements to and from the Castle at the heart of the stage area thus ritually
initiate liminal moments of Humanum Genus’ separation from the comforts of
civilization and serve as well to provide for his eventual return to those comforts and to
the established social order represented by the Castle (Turner 41-42). Indeed, the liminal
space associated with the five outer scaffolds of Perseverance often functions as the space
of inversion and parody that Turner associated with liminal space (25-27). The Deadly
Sins, for instance, offer a mock-heroic parody of chivalric ideals as they struggle to win
access to the central Castle: “They boast of their prowess but are ignominiously
overthrown in battle, at which point they turn on one another in the slapstick comedy of
physical abuse. Their speech, often profane and scatological, proclaims them to be
deplorable even if they are also amusing” (Bevington, Medieval Drama 798).
Thus the movement of the characters through the symbolic space of the set
functions ritually to establish a centralized order which is then assaulted by centrifugal
forces of disorder, and the chronotopic logic of the performance serves, like Turner’s
liminal rituals, to reinforce beliefs about the value of the centralized, orderly structure of
Christian life. In this sense, the performance functions not pedagogically, as a teaching
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tool for those unfamiliar with Christian doctrine, but rather ritually, as a visceral reminder
of the values of belonging to the fold of the saved:
Although these [morality] plays are often described as didactic, that term
requires qualification. As is the case with the cycle plays, their orthodoxy
serves to confirm and to celebrate rather than to argue. In fifteenthcentury religious drama, the desired effect was concordance, achieved by a
conspiracy of the verbal and the visual: diction, costume, placing and
gesture all function as clear supportive signs of moral status. The dynamic
nature of these plays lies not in internally contrived conflicts, but in the
manner in which they generate pressure upon the audiences emotionally
and physically, as well as intellectually. (King 243)
The passage through space and time in Perseverance, like the movement through church
space and time in the Latin liturgical dramas of the sacramental chronotope, functions as
an embodied orthopraxis of remembering and embracing the central truths of Christian
life. The audience, having been urged by the logic of allegory to identify with Humanum
Genus, shares in his ritual isolation and eventual re-integration into the society of God’s
Chosen.
But the audience does not merely experience Humanum Genus’ fall vicariously;
they also, and more importantly, move within the same space as the protagonist at times.
In her interpretation of the diagram illustrated in Figure 6.1, King observes the likelihood
that the scaffolds were located not inside the circular moat that defines the playing area,
but outside that moat, thus giving the audience access to the outer edge of the
symbolically charged performance space:
The scaffolds, strategically placed because their placing is vital to the
symbolic action, but not drawn probably because they conform to some
contemporary theatrical norm, do lie outside the circle.[…] The
disposition of the scaffolds creates a symbolic universe, within which the
audience would stand to watch the action. The spatial meaning of the
created place [i.e., the platea area outside the circular moat] is akin to that
of the church as traditionally used in, for instance, processions at
Epiphany. As this space contains both play and audience, has fixed
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coordinates which relate it to the entire universe and, at the same time, is
not cut off from the “real” world by any architectural barrier, it suggests
that the play world and the real world are one and the same. Consonant
with this, the play contains no verbal references to any place not contained
within this mimetic space. (246)
Significantly, the audience moved around and through the liminal space of the scaffolds,
but the function of the moat, as clearly indicated in Figure 6.1, is to “strongly bar” the
audience from crossing into the central playing area. Much debate has arisen as to the
nature of this moat—was it a real ditch, perhaps full of water (which would require
moving tons of dirt), or was it merely a scenic element suggested through presentational
means rather than a literal ditch? Yet whether “real” or not, the moat functions as a
barrier that Humanum Genus can cross, thus being symbolically cleansed of his sins,
while the audience is forced to remain outside, desperately desiring access to this
purgation: “To cross over water when entering the castle of the Virgin or of the soul is to
experience a cleansing transformation,” a transformation that the protagonist experiences
bodily, leaving the audience yearning for a similar experience (Bevington, “Castles in
the Air” 101).
While Humanum Genus is granted access to the sacred area of the central Castle,
the audience is moved around the symbolic space of the play following the action of the
protagonist by ushers whose job was to discipline the audience’s bodies by insuring that
they moved where and when such movement facilitated the performance:
Ushers, the “stytelerys” mentioned in the diagram, control the spectators
sitting or standing on the level ground below the banked seats, in order to
facilitate the many processions of this play from scaffold to scaffold and to
provide room for the action immediately around the castle. (Bevington,
“Castles in the Air” 100)
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Thus the audience for Perseverance was moved around the symbolic geography of the
playing space, following the action of the protagonist both literally, via movement, and
vicariously, via synecdoche, where the protagonist “stands in” for the audience as a
whole.
The movement through space and time in a medieval performance of The Castle
of Perseverance is perhaps not “purely” sacramental, inasmuch as there are notable
differences between the likely medieval experience of this play and the likely experience
of the Latin liturgical dramas. Perseverance was staged on secular ground, probably by
secular performers who addressed a mostly secular audience, and that audience is likely
to have paid some fee to obtain admission to the performance, which was typically not
the case in Latin liturgical dramas. The bodies of both the performers and the audience
for Perseverance were not conditioned by monastic discipline, and the play was not
specifically linked to the seasonal calendar of Christian holy days or to the monastic
“clock” of matins, tierce, and so on, as was the case in Latin liturgical dramas.
Yet in performance, Perseverance managed to create a sacred symbolic
geography, rather than “finding” that geography built into the structure of the church as a
performance space. And the bodies of the performers and audience were disciplined, if
not by monastic training, at least by several pragmatic forces: by the moat which
restricted access to this performance’s equivalent of the “holy of holies”; by the
“stytelerys” who shepherd the audience from one space to another; by the frequent longwinded philosophical digressions into sermonic speech by the Virtues; and by the sheer
length of the performance, which likely extended to five or more hours. Through these
means, The Castle of Perseverance likely gave its medieval audience a taste of the
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movement through symbolic, ritual space that monastic bodies experienced in the context
of the sacramental chronotope of the Latin liturgical dramas.
In a sense, Perseverance demonstrates the fluidity of chronotopes—the way that a
chronotope which developed in one spatial and temporal context (church space and time)
could be adapted to produce similar effects on the bodies of theatergoers in a notably
different spatial and temporal context. Whereas, for instance, the sacramental chronotope
of Latin liturgical dramas drew upon more or less preexisting heterodynamic qualities of
the bodies of the monks who participated in the performances, Perseverance found ways
of instilling a certain heterodynamic quality in the audience’s bodies regardless of
whether those bodies arrived at the performance regarding themselves as needy and
incomplete. Through their dependence on the “stytelerys” to move them through a
symbolic geography, audiences for Perseverance were moved into the position of
initiands in a ritual, being led by those who knew the ritual better than they through a
sacred space and time that was created for this performance alone. What the Latin
liturgical dramas found, The Castle of Perseverance manufactured, demonstrating that
chronotopes are not “given” but are rather constructed in order to provide the grounds for
a specific narrative representation.
Wisdom: A Consubstantial Debat
Another play which participates in the morality genre, Wisdom, constructs
through performance a quite different understanding of time and space than that of
Perseverance, borrowing many of the techniques associated with the Tudor interludes
such as The Play Called the Four PP to urge spectators toward the consubstantial
chronotope. In contrast to the elaborate and winding narrative line of Perseverance,
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Wisdom tells a more focused story of the “specific morality” kind, portraying the efforts
of Wisdom to keep the play’s heroine, Anima (or “Soul”), from being tempted by fiends
such as Perjury and Gentle Fornication. Organized through the dominant metaphor of the
Christian soul’s “marriage” to Christ in medieval theology (King 251-253), the central
action of the play personifies specific aspects of the soul “as its own trinity of Mind, Will
and Understanding” (King 252). This “holy trinity” of the Three Mights is befuddled and
eventually led astray by the tricks “of spurious likeness, disguise and deceit, as
perpetrated by Lucifer” (King 253).
Yielding to temptation, the Three Mights fall, and thus Mind is transformed into
“Maintenance,” Understanding into “Perjury,” and Will into “Gentle Fornication.” It
then remains for Wisdom to effect a re-conversion, largely by means of intellectual
debate. In this sense, Wisdom employs a performance strategy similar to that of
Heywood’s The Play Called the Four PP, where the play moves forward not by the
strength of its narrative but rather by offering an entertaining and/or instructive debate.
Wisdom can be further distinguished from Perseverance by its resemblance to the popular
court masques of the Tudor era: “There are a number of mute persons attendant on the
chief characters, whose coming and going, ‘dysgysyde,’ create scenic effects, as in a
masque” (Chambers 438; see also Bevington, “Castles in the Air” 104).
David Bevington describes the environment of a 1984 performance at Trinity
college in Connecticut of Wisdom which helps us visualize the more ornate and elaborate
staging circumstances of that play:
The play was located indoors, in a college hall, and was surrounded with a
series of ceremonial occasions[…]. A medieval banquet before the play
added to the sense of festive occasion. Spectators were arrayed along both
sides of the hall, with the king and his royal party on the dais at the lower
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end of the hall. A small stage with rising steps stood at the opposite end,
near the entrance doors. Ceremonial action, such as the exchanges
between Wisdom and Anima, occurred usually on this stage, whereas the
livelier action of the three Mights took to the floor among the spectators.
(“Castles in the Air” 103)
This staging may have been influenced by earlier interpretations of the play as intended
for a courtly London audience. More recent evidence has come to light which suggests
that the play may instead have been designed for performance at the Abbey of Bury St.
Edmunds, “one of the richest abbeys in England, one which, although nominally full of
contemplatives, also owned and ran the prosperous cloth town in which it was situated”
(King 253-254). Regardless of whether the play was designed for royalty or clergy, it
was clearly intended for a more elite clientele than Perseverance, and Bevington’s
description of the 1984 staging of Wisdom is thus useful in helping us imagine the feel
and flavor of the performance.
Merle Fifield argues persuasively that Wisdom may be a remnant of an otherwise
lost sub-genre of English morality play which relied almost exclusively on debat
techniques rather than on the strength and evocative power of a narrative line:
There are [morality] plays which have no narrative, but which consist
entirely of exchanges of speeches. These speeches, which sometimes
approximate orations, need not clash; they may merely state the
ideological position of the character speaking.[…] No pure examples of
this form of morality survive in England, but […] the Continental practice
of this form may explain the often criticized verbiage of Wisdom Who is
Christ. Though the narrative events of this play are structured according
to a rhetorical organization which assigns the play to the most complex
form of moralities, all meaningful narrative events result from expository
dialogue and visual effects.[…] In contrast to the other English moralities
of the medieval period, the enactment of the narrative events of Wisdom
Who is Christ is restricted to dialogue and pageantry. (Fifield 288-289)
While spectators of Perseverance were physically, viscerally drawn into the action of the
play—moving from space to space, watching epic battles, and yearning to follow the
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protagonist bodily across the purifying water of the “moat”—the audience for Wisdom
was instead asked to appreciate the more rarified intellectual arguments that are the
central feature of the performance. “Both The Castle and Mankind present a
phenomenological, experiential account of the action of grace upon man. Wisdom is
much more intellectually analytical” (King 251).
The spectator’s enjoyment of Wisdom, then, derives from contemplation of the
sumptuous visual spectacle of the costuming, which was conspicuously symbolic of each
character’s station and function in the play; from reflection on the elegant movement of
the mute figures in the masque-like sections of the performance; and from contemplation
of the various arguments and counter-arguments that make up the bulk of the play’s
dialogue. Unlike Perseverance, which offers grace through the act of literal and visceral
participation in the action of the protagonist, Wisdom offers grace through the act of
visual and intellectual consumption. In this sense, Wisdom evokes the consubstantial
chronotope’s ability to render the divine as an object from consumption and ownership.
Additionally, Wisdom’s similarity to court masques evokes the values and
sensibilities of the courtly and upper-class autodynamic bodies that characterized the
consubstantial chronotope. Pamela King makes an intriguing argument that begins with
the observation that Wisdom consciously employs the language of this upper class:
Much of the topical reference material [in Wisdom] is relevant only to
courtiers. Mind when he falls becomes Maintenance, or the practice of
hiring surplus retainers who will bear arms on one’s behalf in return for
protection. He has a reciprocal relationship with Perjury, Understanding’s
fallen identity, as the chief protection offered in so-called bastard
feudalism was protection for the law of the land, effected most simply by
the bribing of jurors. (253)
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Costuming in the play reinforces the assumption that the play is directed specifically at an
empowered elite audience: “Wisdom and Anima, although their meaning is eternal, are
clad in a manner of a contemporary monarch and his consort,” and “Mind/Maintenance’s
masquers are dressed in a livery which parodies the ostentatious traffic in badges that
characterised bastard feudalism” in late medieval England (King 254-255).
Moving on from these observations, King argues that the play, if it was indeed
staged at the Abbey of Bury St. Edmunds in East Anglia, would likely have served overt
political purposes:
At the time around which it was likely that the play was written, the
Abbey was busy ingratiating itself with the Yorkist monarch, Edward IV,
having supported the defeated Henry VI[…], and the fall into sin within
the play features contemporary issues concerning the abuse of authority.
(King 254)
Performance of Wisdom at Bury St. Edmunds may, then, have served a similar function
to that of Medwall’s secular interlude Fulgens and Lucres in that it may have exhorted
nobles to behave more nobly:
The banqueters [attending the performance] become loyal subjects of the
king and Wisdom. The fall of Will into the temptations of the flesh has a
direct humorous analogue with the banquet context, whereas the fall of
Mind and Understanding into political corruption reflects more darkly the
crimes to which courtiers and their acolytes could be tempted in such
turbulent times. (King 254)
Like other secular interludes of the late Middle Ages and early English Renaissance—
most notably Gorboduc, which offers an overt call for Elizabeth to extend the line of
succession by marrying and producing heirs (Creeth xxxix)—Wisdom in this light would
seem to offer a metaworld that urgently begs the “first world” audience members to
respond positively to the message of the performance. In such a context, the metaworld
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of Wisdom, as in other consubstantial performances, lacks ontological authority over the
audience-sphere.
Regardless of whether or not Wisdom functioned to accomplish some specific
political end in light of East Anglian politics, it would seem likely that the play
participates in a general trend that Harris identifies in later English moralities:
[I]t was not long before the inner struggle for man’s soul was reflected far
more aptly by the image of a court intrigue, where the Vices all indulged
in hypocrisy, cunning, honey-tongued persuasion and constant backstabbing—a much more valid image [than earlier personifications of Vice]
in psychological terms, since people are very ready to persuade
themselves that their own worst instincts are really nothing but good. This
new development went hand in hand with the appearance of political
allegory. (Harris 155)
The contemporary topicality of moralities like Wisdom moves the plays out of the “pure”
space and time of the sacramental chronotope, dominated by thoughts of sacrifice and
salvation, and into the more messy sphere of consubstantial negotiating, wrangling, and
even bickering with the audience.
An example of this messiness comes in the form of the sumptuary laws popular in
late medieval England. Designed to insure that class distinctions would remain visible by
virtue of the types of clothing worn by each class, sumptuary laws paradoxically
demonstrated the difficulty of keeping class distinctions stable in an era where wealth and
status did not always go together (Sponsler 15-17). By “dressing the part” of a noble,
members of the wealthy mercantile class could deceptively appear to be members of a
station much higher than their own, a fact which is reflected in the narrative logic of
Wisdom:
Garment change accompanies change of name to indicate change in moral
status and identity. Appropriately, Lucifer, the prince of disorder, abuses
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this language by disguising himself as a goodly gallant whilst remaining
unchanged in his moral character. (King 254)
Wisdom thus comments metatheatrically on the power of the player to define himself and
to “create” his social station, but in doing so it consigns such performativity to the
schemes of the Devil. Wisdom is intended, then, for an audience consumed with
practical political concerns of power, wealth, and status whose pursuit of the divine
comes, not via physical or even vicarious participation in the action of the play’s
protagonist, but rather through the purchase, contemplation, and consumption of a play
whose argumentative logic matches the spectator’s own values.
Harris describes the messy consubstantial urges bound up into these smaller, more
intimate moralities:
Because of the intimacy, the language too can be detailed, and there is a
far greater emphasis [than in large-scale outdoor productions] not only
upon wit and word-play, but also upon quite detailed argument and
debate—usually involving a good and a bad character who each put their
case to the audience, drawing forcible examples from the community they
see around them, and who not infrequently get into a heated argument,
ending up in a brawl. (178)
In this sense, Wisdom can be said to participate in the consubstantial chronotope. It may
not end up in a brawl, but the tone and logic of the play is drawn from the secular,
political concerns of the surrounding community, and play speaks more to contemporary
needs than eternal truths.
The bodies seated in the banqueting hall awaiting a performance of Wisdom were
clearly the confident, autodynamic bodies that Kleinschmidt associates with the late
medieval merchants and knights who eventually came to dominate England
economically. Performances of Wisdom were directly addressed to these confident,
sophisticated consumers of theatre, who saw their desires mirrored in the play’s
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cautionary tale. The third and final Macro play, Mankind, was often staged under similar
conditions to those of Wisdom, and it is likely than many who came to see the play in
performance did so with a similar expectation of being entertained by—but not
challenged by—an ontologically inferior imaginative world of performance. A variety of
metatheatrical tactics in Mankind, however, functioned to call the audience to task, to
catch the audience in a moment of pleasure and then to have them contemplate the
consequences of their own behavior. The second world created in and through
performance in Mankind “crossed over” to the first world of the audience in some
surprising sophisticated ways that evoke the power of the transubstantial chronotope.
Mankind: Reaching for the Transubstantial
Of all the Macro plays, Mankind is the most flexible in terms of its staging
requirements and the variety of settings where it could be staged:
In direct contrast with The Castle of Perseverance, Mankind is a play of
such evidently simple scenography that it can be played almost anywhere.
In the absence of records or diagrams, a growing body of twentiethcentury critical commentary has hypothesised about several eminently
possible settings for the most portable English morality play, both indoors
[…] and out […]. The text includes references to a door, a yard, standing
and seated audience members and a hostler. (King 247)
Most scholarly interpretations of Mankind tend to assume indoor performance in a great
hall of some sort, not only due to the textual references to the door and the seated
audience members, but also because the play is similar in temperament to other interludes
staged indoors and because the play was likely staged during the cold season from
Christmas to Lent. For the sake of convenience, and to provide a specific image of how
the play functions in space and time, we may imagine the production as an indoor
production either in a town hall or the great hall of some noble or wealthy patron’s
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manor. It is significant, however, that this play is, as King puts it, “portable,” because
that portability was likely to have given Mankind the opportunity to address audiences
more diverse than either Wisdom or Perseverance.
The play’s action concerns the fate of its namesake, Mankind, who is given the
specific occupation of a farmer in order to illustrate the play’s main theme, which is the
difficulty of remaining a diligent and hard-working Christian in the face of the temptation
to take up the life of a good-for-nothing troublemaker who preys on others while
producing nothing for the larger community. The play begins with a wordy, erudite, and
somewhat somnolent monologue by Mercy, the Virtue who will bring Mankind to heel.
After this theologically sophisticated, sometimes Latinate monologue, we find Mankind
being harassed by a trio of minor vices, Newguise, Nought, and Nowadays, under the
covert direction of the primary Vice figure, Mischief. After much merry-making,
dancing, and taunting of Mankind and Mercy, the three minor vices of distraction are
banished by Mankind’s swift spade.
In his continuing effort to cause Mankind to lose his faith in the value of his
earthly good works, Mischief sets out to summon forth unholy aid for their venture:
When the temptation to give up his work and join in the fun has been so
emphatically resisted by Mankind, Mischief has recourse to another ruse,
one which moves the play right away from the personification allegory
which it has nominally observed up to this point. In order to make
Mankind’s work so hard that he gives up trying, Mischief, with the
assistance of the other vices and members of the audience, calls up a real
devil. Titivillus, although remaining invisible to Mankind, agrees to
appear in corporeal form to the audience: “I com wyth my leggys wvnder
me,” he promises (line 454). He then puts a board under Mankind’s plot,
so that it is too hard to dig, and sends a call of nature to divert him from
his prayers, and the temptation is thereby effected. (King 249)
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Importantly, in contrast to Mischief, Newguise, Nought, and Nowadays, Titivillus is a
figure medieval theatregoers would have regarded as “real,” as he was not simply an
allegorical personification of a vice but was instead an actual demon: “Titivillus, who
also appears in the Towneley Last Judgement play and in the sermon collection Jacob’s
Well, was traditionally responsible for idle gossip, collecting in his bag, for instance, all
the words left out of the divine office by slovenly priests” (King 249).
Tempted away from his work by the difficulty of it, Mankind finds himself too
tired (and slothful) to attend the Evensong service, and instead he begs Newguise,
Nought, and Nowadays for forgiveness so that he may become their friend and learn how
to live the reprobate lifestyle of petty thievery, drinking, and adultery they these vices
lead. Borrowing from the familiar morality convention, as was seen in Wisdom, of using
changes in costume to indicate changes in moral status, the three vices transform
Mankind into a true rascal by helping cut his coat into a more fashionable one. In many
morality plays,
a convention developed where a costume-shift showing a change of
character took place off stage, while one showing a change of heart too
place on stage in full sight of the audience—like the trimming-down of
Mankind’s practical country gown to a tiny fashionable coat, which shows
his moral decline. (Harris 175, emphasis in original)
Now dressed ridiculously, Mankind is led into a life of debauchery that leads him to
despair. The three vices now close in for the kill, tempting Mankind to commit suicide.
Mercy intervenes on Mankind’s unworthy behalf and (as is often the case in moralities)
talks Mankind back to grace.
We can see that in terms of tone, Mankind is quite different from the other two
Macro plays, and we can therefore productively view “Mankind as a product of medieval
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Catholic culture, fully embracing both the secular and the spiritual, Carnival and Lent”
(Bevington, “Castles in the Air” 97-98, emphasis added). The more rowdy tone of
Mankind functions, on one level, simply to keep the audience’s attention, a reflection of
the play’s function as an interlude that was most likely staged by traveling players:
The commercial nature of the interlude explains the difference between
itself and the large-scale morality. The large-scale play aims to be vivid
and instructive, but is always serious and restrained, whereas the interlude
aims to amuse and is lively and often bawdy, particularly where the vices
are concerned, because the audience needs to be entertained if it is going
to pay; it also has many references to the spectators, to involve them in the
action or, alternatively, to stop them crowding the entrances to the hall that
the actors are using; and it contains a considerable amount of doubling of
parts, so the play is constantly interesting, but does not involve sharing out
the profits between too many actors. (Harris 161-162)
Yet the willingness to urge the audience to vice demonstrated in Mankind functions
structurally to assist the play’s message: “Mankind contains various structural provisions
for ensuring that the audience submit to its processes and become involved in the action,
so that the moral lesson becomes as object lesson. The dramatist employs [these
practices…] to stimulate responses in the audience that parallel those of the protagonist”
(King 250).
Two key examples of this effect are when the audience is tricked into singing the
profane “Christmas song” that I quoted at the beginning of this chapter and when the
audience works together with the three vices and Mischief to summon Titivillus. In both
cases, the fictive second world of the performance reaches out to the first world of the
audience, inciting them to participate in the very sins being illustrated and condemned by
the performance. Indeed, the summoning of Titivillus is accomplished by the audience
actually paying for the privilege:
NEWGUISE:
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Now ghostly to our purpose, worshipful sovereigns,
We intend to gather money, if it please your negligence,
For a man with a head that is of great omnipotence.
NOWADAYS:
Keep your tail in goodness, I pray you, good brother!
He is a worshipful man, sirs, saving your reverence.
He loveth no groats, nor pence of tuppence;
Give us red royals [i.e., gold], if ye will see his abominable
presence. (l. 459-465; Lester 28)
The audience understands, of course, that this is something of a sham—the players here
are, in the context of the first world of performance, “simply” calling for payment for
their performance—but the fact that such payment also supposedly summons a demon
who is familiar to the medieval audience complicates this deceptively simple act.
Under such circumstances, the audience finds themselves behaving on two planes
of action—the first and second worlds—where the behavior has one intonation in one
world but a quite different one in the other world:
The motive for calling up a spectacular devil slips from the fictional one
of destroying Mankind to the factive one of entertaining a paying
audience.[…] The audience is faced with the clear proposition that the
play cannot continue until they pay, the fiction is then re-established and it
becomes apparent that the audience has participated in a black mass and
enabled Mankind’s final downfall to be effected. They have done this for
reasons of practicality, adopting the line of least resistance. This is also
how Mankind will fall. (King 251)
The players’ playful threat to end the performance unless the audience contributes to the
hat being passed around moves from being inconsequential and pragmatic to being
blasphemous and utterly consequential as the audience shares in Mankind’s sins.
Although it employs vastly different production techniques than the biblical cycle
pageants, Mankind manages to evoke something of the transubstantial in its slippery
negotiation of the boundaries between “real” and “play,” and between “matter” and
“spirit.” The audience’s laughter in this play is ultimately redirected inwards, at
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themselves, transforming the laughter into both a guilty pleasure and a soul-scouring
reality check. In the same way that someone watching the Crucifixion play at York can
recognize both the “human” identity of the performer from the community who is playing
Christ while at the same time feeling chastened by symbolically participating in Christ’s
sacrifice, audience members in Mankind feel the pull of the spiritual in the strangest of
places—in the call to play. Such play bridges the ontological gap between the first and
second worlds of performance, moving Mankind into the territory of the transubstantial.
Just as the performance discourse of the Corpus Christi pageants opened itself up
to dialogic play, allowing those performances to function as innerly persuasive discourse,
so too does the boundary-crossing and boundary-blurring of Mankind allow the various
moral messages of the play to become, in the minds and hearts of the audience, both “half
someone else’s” and “half-mine.” Audiences for Mankind absorbed the discourse of the
play experientially and experimentally, trying out the ideas embodied in the play and
struggling to decide which impulse—the divine or the demonic—was stronger in their
lives. As the first and second worlds of performance in Mankind rubbed elbows with
each other in the transubstantial chronotope, the imaginative second world created in and
through performance came to possess a linguistic agency that placed the metaworld on
the same ontological plane as the world of the performers and spectators. And I would
argue that such an experience of innerly persuasive discourse can be communicated
through contemporary performance discourse designed to address contemporary issues of
spiritual and ethical practice on a global scale.
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Modern Mysteries
I wish to demonstrate that such a transubstantial experience is possible in a
contemporary setting by discussing a production called Yiimimangaliso: The Mysteries,
staged in Wilton’s Music Hall in the East End of London in 2001-2002. Created by Mark
Dornford-May and Charles Hazlewood and based on the text of the Chester Mystery
cycle of biblical plays, this South African touring production used a variety of languages
and performance styles and techniques to tell a very old story. By drawing upon the lives
and experiences of its multiracial South African cast, Yiimimangaliso: The Mysteries
was able to link the ancient Mysteries to contemporary social, racial, and political
concerns, yielding an unexpectedly moving and “modern” production.
To analyze this production, I will draw upon both my live experience of this
production as I saw it in 2001 and my experiences watching the production again on the
Heritage Theatre video recording of the show’s final performances in 2002. My ability to
review and closely examine minute segments of performance on the recorded version,
coupled with high-speed access to the internet to answer my questions about South
Africa’s history, politics, and arts, allowed me to mine deeply the influences of apartheid
on the various languages and performance techniques employed during the show. But
what first gave me access to the uniquely layered sensation of many languages speaking
with, against, to, and through the cast members’ bodies was my experience as an
audience member, an experience that I cannot recreate fully by watching the video. I do
remember, however, something of that first experience even now, and by exploring how
this performance spoke to me and to my experiences as a half-hearted apartheid protestor
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in the mid 1980’s, I can begin to articulate the way the production struck deeply for me
and, I think, for others in the audience.
In the summer of 2001, my wife Jennifer and I were together in London as part of
the Louisiana State University Study Abroad program in theatre. We were fortunate to
see a variety of impressive theatre productions that summer, but easily the most
compelling production we attended during that time was a performance of
Yiimimangaliso: The Mysteries staged in a ramshackle old Victorian music hall that
was, at best, only partially restored. Wilton's Music Hall is located in the East End of
London, so far east that most maps of London do not show its street location. Jennifer
and I found ourselves wandering in territory vastly unlike the western and northern parts
of London with which we were more familiar. A slight but insistent drizzle of rain
chilled us even in July as we hurried down startlingly empty residential streets framed by
unlit houses staring dully down at us. Occasionally we would see another pedestrian who
would move off quickly upon seeing us, as if the town knew we were lost and had
conspired to keep us lost in this strange twilight world.
We had arrived in this part of London with the intention of strolling casually to a
local pub, grabbing dinner, and then meandering our way to the theatre. Instead, we
found ourselves hurrying along the quiet streets, unable to find pub or grocery or
newsstand or anywhere we might stop for food and directions. Finally we found a noisy,
smoky, clearly “locals only” pub and ate quickly and ravenously. A pint or two of hard
cider later, we left, having been unable to find a single person in the pub who knew
where Wilton’s Music Hall was located. We had a vague idea of which direction we
should go, and we wandered forth into the deepening gray of the slow summer nightfall
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in London. As grace would have it, we finally saw and successfully hailed the only
taxicab we had encountered in this neighborhood, and the taxi driver informed us that we
were but a stone’s throw away from the theatre. Exhausted, we assured the driver that it
would be well worth our money and time to have him drive us to Wilton’s rather than
trying to follow his directions.
As we went into the theatre, we found scuffed, dirty wooden floors, bare brick
walls, and exposed light bulbs hanging from the high ceilings. We purchased our tickets
and went into the small “bar” that had been thrown together for this production—nothing
more than a plank resting on two stools and some canned drinks on ice. Soon we went
into the theatre itself, a long but not very wide performance hall with two levels—a
ground floor and a second level for more seating. This second level was unavailable to
audience members, as much of it would be used during the performance. The audience
instead sat on the ground level in plastic folding chairs—mine had a slight tear in the seat
that made it even more uncomfortable than it might otherwise have been. The walls of
the theatre, like the interior walls throughout the building, were made of exposed, dusty,
multicolored brick.
The stage was raised roughly three feet off the ground, and the center portion of it
extended well out into the audience as a sort of “runway” for actors to walk up and down.
Like the rest of the building, the stage boards looked ancient, weathered, with that
curious combination of strength and fragility that comes from surviving many years. The
audience would learn during the performance that the stage had two trap doors—one used
as the ground from which Adam arose as well as the tomb from which Lazarus also
arose, and the other used most often as Hell, with flames that could erupt just in front of
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the trap. At various points, water would rain down the back wall of the theatre, while at
other points, flames burnt that same wall, which left black sooty marks that could be seen
even before the performance began.
As I waited for the performance to start, I read through the program for the
production carefully. As a scholar of medieval theatre, I had sought out this critically
lauded performance because it was an adaptation of the Chester Mystery biblical cycle
being performed by a South African troupe. I was surprised to learn that this multiracial
cast, assembled largely through scouting trips to the amateur church choirs of small South
African townships, would be speaking in four languages throughout the performance, as I
discovered from the program notes written by Pamela M. King:
THE MYSTERIES uses the four main languages of South Africa and
some of the less widely used. Of the four main languages:
AFRIKAANS has its roots in Dutch but has been influenced by English,
Malay, German, French, Portuguese and some indigenous languages. It is
an "official" language of South Africa and is the mother tongue of about
15% of the population.
ENGLISH is the language of government and the legal and educational
systems. It has been spoken in South Africa since the 1790s and is
understood by the vast majority of the population.
XHOSA (SIXHOSA), originally the mother tongue of people in the
former Transkei, Ciskei and Eastern Cape regions, is now the mother
tongue of about 17.5% of the population. It is notable for its use of three
distinct 'click' sounds - the dental, represented by the letter 'c', the palatal,
represented by 'q' and the lateral, represented by 'x'.
ZULU (SIZULU) was originally the language of a prominent group of the
Nguni people and is now spoken throughout South Africa. It is the mother
tongue of about 22.5% of the population. Like Sixhosa, it has three 'click'
sounds, represented by the same letters.
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I found myself growing a little anxious. Despite my familiarity with the biblical stories
as told in the various medieval cycle plays, I wondered if I would be able to keep up with
the story as it unfolded in these four tongues.
Much could be productively said of the brilliant use of the four languages in the
performance. A detailed Bakhtinian metalinguistic analysis would allow us to delve the
multifold levels of meaning engaged when, for example, Cain spoke the English language
used by the ultimate colonial conquerors of South Africa while Abel responded in one of
the native African tongues. When God lost his temper for the first time and condemned
Lucifer to Hell, he repeated the initial lines of the play—“ Ego sum alpha et omega,/
primus et novissimus./ It is my will it should be so;/ it is, it was, it shall be thus”—but in
this second enunciation, he spoke in Afrikaans, thus employing the language of the first
colonizers of South Africa who had condemned the natives to the first of many exoduses
that would follow. Examples of such metalinguistic play abound throughout the
performance, but for brevity’s sake I wish to focus on four interrelated segments of the
performance: Herod’s slaughter of the innocents; Christ’s childhood education from
Mary; Christ’s temptation in the desert; and the woman taken in adultery. Through its
forceful use not only of different literal languages but also—and more strikingly—it use
of different “languages” of movement and scenic elements, Yiimimangaliso: The
Mysteries bridged the ontological divide between past and present, between spirit and
matter, and between the imaginative metaworld of the play and the very real social and
political concerns of South Africa and its “superpower” neighbors in the global
economy—Britain and the United States.
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Traveling from the familiar space of the London “tube” system to the unfamiliar
territory of the East End, and from those alarmingly quiet streets to this tumbledown old
music hall, was for me a profoundly liminal experience. I found myself profoundly
unsettled, uncertain if I belonged here, and my experience of the performance was
colored by this alienation. I was open—if not in the positive sense of being excited and
eager to embrace a new experience, then at least in the sense that I felt vulnerable and
exposed, raw and on edge.
The performance seemed to take advantage of this vulnerability to reach out to
me. At first I found myself charmed by sight gags such as fake angel wings on baseball
caps and silly red devil horns, as well as by pop-cultural references such as when Noah
led the audience in a rousing chorus of “You Are My Sunshine” after the dove returned
with the olive branch. But as I watched the muscular and commanding bald black man
who played God throw both a white Adam and a black Eve out of Paradise, and as I
watched an English-speaking Cain slay an African-speaking Abel, tension began to creep
into my body.
This tension built to a head as I watched an Afrikaans-speaking Isaac devoutly
offering himself (actually herself, as a female performer played this role) to an Englishspeaking Abraham for sacrifice to a black God. This scene was one of many where the
choice of language shifted the play from ancient Middle Eastern lands to the
contemporary time and space of South Africa. As we watched Isaac being prepared for
sacrifice by Abraham, we saw a complete inversion of the actual history of South Africa,
which was first colonized by the Dutch and then overtaken by the English, who
conquered the Afrikaners in the Boer War at the start of the twentieth century. In this

257

retelling, the Afrikaners chose to sacrifice themselves to the will of the native population,
and the English were chosen first to slay their colonizing bedfellows and then were
granted a reprieve from that dreadful task by an African God who stayed the sacrificial
hand, sparing both conquerors. To me, it became increasingly clear that this performance
was about matters spiritual and political, ancient and fresh as new wounds.
This sensation increased as Herod, in his desperate bid to avoid being replaced by
the coming “King of the Jews,” ordered his men to kill all the children under the age of
two. Herod’s men were mostly black men dressed in black military uniforms with black
berets; to me, they were reminiscent of Ugandan or Haitian terror forces, evoking images
of the police as paramilitary thugs. Among other things, the thugs were a visual reminder
the various native groups in South Africa who continue to “police” themselves through
violent acts of vigilantism (Minnaar). Herod commanded the guards to slaughter the
male children, and the guards dispersed into the audience. In their place came women,
holding babies and singing a simple lullaby. I found myself wanting to warn the women
what was to come; I wanted desperately to do something to stop what I knew would
happen. I knew, however, that I could not stop this—it has happened; it will happen. But
I wondered: can I do something to stop it from happening again?
The guards re-entered, thumping their nightsticks in rhythm to the lullaby. One
particularly deep-voiced guard took over the song, wresting it from the women,
perverting it. As the killing began, with children being beaten to death by black clubs,
dancers onstage began rhythmically thumping car tires upon the stage, setting up a killing
rhythm. Herod learned that his own child has been killed, and he confronted the nurse
who was caring for the child, strangling her as the tires were again thumped onstage,
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behind him, with Lucifer now orchestrating the rhythm. Herod was then dragged down
to a flaming hell by bullhorn carrying toadies of Satan.
This was the first moment we encountered the use of tires onstage, and
automobile tires had a special meaning in the context of a multiracial stage production
that had originated in South Africa. Starting in the combustible environment of apartheid
in the 1980’s, the practice of “necklacing” involved torturing and killing opponents of
one’s political beliefs by binding the opponents, placing a tire around their necks, filling
the tire with gasoline, and setting the tire—and the human inside the tire—on fire (Allie).
While the practice was first brought to world attention as a result of its use by black
South Africans to punish those blacks suspected of being “collaborators” with the whitesonly government, some evidence exists suggesting the practice may have first been
initiated by white police officers (Dixon, “South African Cops”). Rhetorically, the South
African government used the practice to continue to justify apartheid, arguing that the
rampant lawlessness of the black townships was most evident in their cruelty towards
members of their own race. Regardless of the origins of the practice, necklacing
continues in South Africa today (Allie; Minnaar), and it remains a profound source of
terror, anger, and self-loathing for both black and white South Africans.
The presence of the tires thumping onstage thus acquired multiple levels of
meaning as Herod was cast down into Hell. Notably, Herod was squeezed in between the
demon-wielded tires behind him and roaring live flames in front of him. To some extent,
this moment was a “sucker punch” for many of us in the audience. Up to this point in the
performance, the cast had used only whistles, their own voices, and “found” objects to
make sound and music for the production. Because one of these “music makers” had
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been the drumming of tires, visible to the audience but clearly off stage, the tires initially
read simply as sound-makers, yet they acquired new force and meaning once they were
strategically used in the stage space.
After Lucifer loudly condemned Herod to Hell and eternal perdition, he left the
stage, to be replaced by women who came softly humming the lullaby from earlier,
looking to comfort those women who had lost their children. The stage was then
completely taken over by women—their bodies, their voices. These women, led by the
Virgin Mary, worked to comfort the mothers as best they could. Then all the women
exited, singing; the lights faded to black, and the interval began.
When we returned from the interval, a woman sauntered onstage humming to
herself while she began to fold clothes. She was Mary, Mother of God. Christ (played
by the same muscular black actor as God) wandered up, bare-chested and wearing a
native South African wrap like a skirt, and Mary stopped working. Rising, she sized up
Christ. She then faced front and danced a complicated pattern of slaps and steps, after
which she gestured to Jesus, instructing him to do the same. He gestured to himself,
incredulous, and then awkwardly tried to duplicate the pattern, only to fail. Mary (and
the audience) laughed at Jesus.
Mary then instructed Christ to watch her more closely while she repeated the
pattern, ending with a flourish, dismissively turning away from Jesus. He tried the
pattern again, only to fail again. He then examined the wrap bound tightly around him as
if to blame the wrap for his inability to perform the dance steps. He unhooked the pin
binding the wrap to his body, handing it to his mother. Caught wondering if Christ was
going to strip naked, we found ourselves laughing as we discovered he was wearing a
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pair of rolled-up blue jeans underneath his wrap. Free of the wrap, our very
contemporary Christ was at last able to do the pattern correctly, if slowly and with some
coaching from His Mother. On a second pass, Christ was able to add speed, repeating the
pattern twice and even adding His Mother’s flourish at the end.
Two aspects of this performance at the start of the second half of the show are
significant. First, nothing resembling this sequence of narrative events occurs in any of
the medieval biblical cycle pageants—or, for that matter, in any of the orthodox scriptural
narratives of Christ’s life, where Mary appears solely in her role as the Vessel for God’s
child. The audience was therefore left with the likely conclusion that the performers and
the director, drawing upon their own talents for motives of their own, constructed this
sequence themselves to accomplish their own special purposes. As a result, in this
imaginative re-telling of the untold childhood days of Christ, Mary is given a unique
significance in the Christian narrative. Here we see her, not solely as the “carrier” of
Christ—a “mere” womb, with no value outside of that role—but rather as the teacher of
Christ, the one who instills values in Christ which will carry on throughout the
performance. In this sense, the opening sequence after the interval invoked something of
the revisionist efforts of theologians such as Elaine Pagels to identify and give value to
those elements of Christianity which had valued and embraced women in the earliest
days of the Church.
Most prominently, however, the sequence of slaps and stomps that Christ learns
reflects a South African dance tradition known as “gumboot dancing.” Norm Dixon
describes one typical cultural function of this dance in contemporary South Africa:
Within hours of touching down at Johannesburg airport, tourists on
package tours to South Africa find themselves whisked by coach to a
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nearby tourist attraction—a re-creation of a working gold mine. What is
presented is a very sanitised version of the working and living conditions
that millions of black South Africans were forced to endure for more than
100 years.[…] Part of the program is the “gumboot” dancers—half a
dozen or so black men in overalls, hard hats and gumboots creating
incredibly intricate rhythms by stamping their feet and slapping their
boots, hats and bodies. To see all the dancers performing these feats in
unison is an experience that few forget. (“Behind the ‘Gumboot Dance’”).
Like many slave traditions throughout the world, what once was a survival mechanism, a
tool for communication and for inspiration to stay alive, has been appropriated as a
cultural marker, a symbol of the exotic “entertainment” of South Africa.
Gumboot dancing began among African miners, working in the damp darkness of
the gold mines that fueled South Africa’s economy from the 1880’s on:
Black labourers worked in total darkness for three months at a time in
appalling conditions. They were chained to their work stations and were
forbidden to talk to each other. They stood up to their knees in infected
water causing skin diseases and ulcers resulting in lost time from work.
The bosses discovered that it was cheaper to provide them with Gumboots
(Wellington Boots) than to drain the mines. The miners used the
Gumboots as a method of communication by slapping their boots and
stamping their feet and rattling their ankle chains. Thus the miners[’]
uniform was created of Gumboots, jeans, bare-chest and bandanas to
absorb eye-stinging sweat.[…] During their free time, the miners would
sing and dance and drink together and remember their families a thousand
miles away. The tradition of Gumboot dancing was born. (“Introduction
to ‘Gumboots’”)
The history behind this dance form has, however, largely been stripped away by its
contemporary practice: “Unfortunately, gumboot dancing, or isicathulo, has become
something of a South African cliché. It is included in the repertoire of most South African
dance groups that travel the world.[…] Few know about its origins as a response by
mineworkers to their racial oppression under apartheid” (Dixon, “Behind the ‘Gumboot
Dance’”).
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By having Mary teach gumboot dancing to Christ, Yiimimangaliso: The
Mysteries re-conceived, or at least re-intonated, the entire story of Christianity. Not only
was Christian practice rewritten as having been learned from a woman, it was also
rewritten as the practice of an oppressed minority struggling to find self-expression.
Interestingly enough, such rewriting was in the end fairly apt, given the nature of Jewish
oppression by the Roman Empire during Christ’s time. Christianity can be understood in
this context as a faith of liberation from oppression, an intonation that Yiimimangaliso:
The Mysteries caught and intensified throughout the performance. Gumboot dancing
would acquire an additional level of meaning later in the performance, when Christ
teaches his disciples through this same medium of dance.
Before meeting the disciples, however, Christ first had to face the Devil’s
temptation in the desert. After teaching himself to play a tin whistle, Jesus sat and began
tweeting out the tune of his mother’s lullaby—the same lullaby we heard at the end of the
first half of the performance. As Christ repeated the tune, Satan—a smallish, agile bald
black man—entered, barefoot, dressed in red leather with Halloween costume red horns
on his head, and began to tempt Christ. His temptation took the form of a rowdy,
boisterous tune that he danced with some of his devils, loudly thumping on a cowbell.
The dance was an exaggerated form of gumboot dancing, done this time as a challenge—
can you do this? But Christ failed to take the bait. Instead, he began playing his
mother’s tune on the whistle again.
Furious, Satan returned to his clanging dance, but Christ turned away again,
ignoring the temptation. As the oblivious and inobservant Satan began to march
triumphantly offstage, convinced of his victory over the Son of God, Christ again played
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his mother’s tune, stopping Satan in his tracks. A third time, Satan and his devils danced
their tempting dance—a dance I now began to find myself drawn into, wanting to
participate in—and yet again Christ ignored and rejected them. Satan and his devils
again attempted to leave the stage triumphantly, this time moving through the audience
on a raised platform. Again, Christ calmly began playing his mother’s tune. Not only
furious but also shaken and distraught, Satan watched as his minions left him, one by
one; he yelled at Christ, but to no effect. Christ’s sweet tin-whistle music then drove
Satan from the stage.
This scene was so interpretively rich that it can only be partly mined for
resonances in the context of this chapter of my study. Perhaps the most striking aspect of
Satan’s temptation is that this sequence evoked how dance came to function, in apartheidtorn South Africa, as a form of combat, an aggression and a threat. In her review of the
documentary film Amandla! A Revolution in Four Part Harmony, Gillian Slovo describes
how the South African toyi-toyi dance was used by apartheid protestors as a threat:
Watching the documentary […] I was struck by the way I had, until that
moment, only thought of toyi-toyi from its inside. From its centre, it is a
joyous, collective demonstration of togetherness. What had not occurred
to me, however, was what it must have felt like from the outside. In the
film a group of white security policemen are interviewed. Sitting around
their braai (barbeque) these men, seemingly shell-shocked by what had
happened to their country, describe how terrifying a chanting toyi-toying
crowd was to young white soldiers, and how hard it was to get the raw
recruits to stand their ground.
We should not assume, of course, that Yiimimangaliso: The Mysteries consciously or
even unconsciously worked to link these triumphant, resistant acts of toyi-toyi dance with
the Devil. Rather, through performance Satan’s aggressive and violent dance contrasted
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with the more collaborative, inclusive gumboot dance that Jesus learned from Mary and
which he then taught his disciples.
As the disciples meandered onto the stage after Satan’s exit, Christ greeted each
one by name and danced a brief dance with each. Thomas—played by a white male—
could not dance very well, but he was accepted by Christ and the other (mostly black)
disciples anyway. Judas, a redheaded white man, danced aggressively, kicking out at the
head of Jesus, who in turn kicked back. Fearful, Judas cowered away and trembled, but
then Christ smiled and embraced him—it was just a joke, all in fun. Once again, violent
dance was trumped by a playful and forgiving spirit, and Christ led all the disciples in a
celebratory communal dance.
As this dance concluded, a young black woman howled in fear and raced onstage,
a pack of vengeful pursuers on her heels. This was the famous story of the “woman taken
in adultery,” the story made famous by Christ’s command, “Let he who is without sin
among you cast the first stone” (John 8:7). As the story is told in the Chester cycle—and
as it was re-told in this production—Christ first offered his pronouncement against the
stoning and then began writing something enigmatic on the ground. In the story as told
in the Bible, Christ begins writing first, and only after some moments does he rise to
address the woman’s accusers, who leave mysteriously after Christ begins writing again
on the ground. The Chester version of the story “cleans things up” by having each
accuser see his/her own sins written on the ground and flee in terror of Christ’s
knowledge of their worst sins.
In Yiimimangaliso: The Mysteries, however, the pursuing mob came armed, not
with stones, but with those same tires which provided the ominous background to
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Herod’s massacre of the children and his subsequent damnation. The mob seeking to
stone the woman caught in adultery was almost exclusively black, pursuing a black
woman whom they regarded as a sinner, and in performance they threatened her with
tires that have been and continue to be used to punish “sinners” for their sins of
collaboration with apartheid or for sins of petty crime in South Africa (Minnaar). The
silence in the theatre that followed Christ’s pronouncement about throwing the first stone
was total—the air seemed to leave the place, at least for me. Christ was condemning “his
own people” for their rush to judgment, condemnation, and murder, and he was writing
their sins on the ground for all to see.
In a sense, just as medieval English folk walked through the liminal space of the
dusty streets of Chester only to be confronted by Christ, in traveling to the East End of
London, I had traveled my own liminal path to this moment, and I found myself
confronted as well. In the mid to late 1980’s, I was an undergraduate at the University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill and, like many of my generation in America, I was
confronted with the problem of determining the “proper response” to apartheid. Many of
my friends participated vigorously in a variety of protest actions, and I vocally supported
their efforts. But I didn’t protest. I didn’t make an effort to learn more than the slightest
sliver of information about the history and practice of apartheid which the mainstream
American media offered. In some vague, bland, upper-middle class WASP way, I
assumed that apartheid was “just another kind of racism” that would melt away under the
light of international condemnation. So I did my homework, kept my nose clean, and let
things take care of themselves.
Fortunately for me, things did take care of themselves—at least in a way.
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Yet as I sat on the torn seat of that plastic folding chair in this grotty old music
hall, I found myself confronted with a spiritual vision. I remembered a sermon I had
once heard on Revelation 3:16-17: “So, because you are lukewarm—neither hot nor
cold—I am about to spit you out of my mouth. You say, ‘I am rich: I have acquired
wealth and do not need a thing.’ But you do not realize that you are wretched, pitiful,
poor, blind and naked” (Quest Study Bible 1714). Here I was, confronted by a black
Christ facing a white Judas without anger, faced with the very real practice of necklacing
being transformed into the very real (and still ongoing) practice of stoning adulterous
women, faced with a multiracial cast who had learned and mastered all the tongues of
their native land so they could speak with each other and struggle with each other
onstage. Here I was, faced with the simple thought that if these performers could
accomplish this, then I could do more.
I am not sure how indicative my response was of the response others may have
had at this performance. I can say, however, that as the performance ended with
triumphant South African song and dance celebrating the power of redemption and
resurrection—Godly and otherwise—the audience instantly stood and applauded with a
force that resonated with more than simple appreciation for the aesthetic achievement of
the experience. I can also note that most of the audience was about my age, in their mid
30’s to 40’s, mostly white middle-class Brits. One might well wonder how this
performance might have bridged the ontological gap from second world to first world in
the case of the British audience, who had their own unique relationship with apartheid as
they had defeated the Afrikaners and absorbed South Africa into their Commonwealth.
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In this sense, then, Yiimimangaliso: The Mysteries was likely to have stirred
other souls beyond mine to consider their “sins,” real or imagined. Boal’s critique of
catharsis rings loudly in the back of my head, making me wonder if these performances
merely release the audience from any sense that they would need to participate in
substantive change (26-47). Yet as a scholar of rhetoric as well as performance, I admire
the power such performances can have to author a positive vision of personal and social
change. I can only assume that those attending the great biblical cycles of medieval
England may well have experienced a similar ontological force hailing them through
performance as the spiritual and the material, the “real” and the “play-ful,” merged in a
moment that spoke to the past and present with both the voice of Christ and one’s
neighbor. And it is my hope that the vocabulary of chronotopes created for this study
will, in some small way, help move us toward meaningful discussions of such spiritual
experiences so that we may more fully appreciate the experience not only of those longdead souls from medieval England, but more importantly, so that we can begin to talk
about our own contemporary experiences with these kinds of transformative
performances.
Conclusion: Enduring Chronotopes
As part of his refutation of an evolutionary view of medieval theatre, Peter Happe
notes, “History does not move exclusively in straight lines, nor in sharp changes, and
often […] things are recalled from the past in a circular fashion” (English Drama 2). One
of the primary challenges for scholars of medieval theatre is to resist the tendency to
create a grand narrative wherein medieval theatre merely represents the West’s first
stumbling steps back from the death of theatre in the Roman empire. In a sense, we must
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resist the tendency to view medieval theatre history through a figural lens; all too often,
Shakespeare functions as the Christ of medieval theatre history—all things point to him
and return to him. Medieval theatre possessed valuable qualities of its own which need to
be understood in their original historical context. This historical understanding can then
serve to enrich our understanding of contemporary performance practices and vice-versa.
In this sense, my study has continued in the footsteps of those scholars who have
made significant efforts to “re-embody,” as it were, the practice of medieval theatre.
Michal Kobialka succinctly sums up the variety of positive effects produced from the
recent scholarly emphasis on the corporeal and the material in medieval theatre:
The emphasis on the materiality and textuality of events and texts allows
us not only to discuss them in terms of the circumstances of production,
the modes of reception and dissemination, or as constructs of the
theoretical and methodological traditions of each discipline. It allows us
to alter the very manner in which we view the systems that made them
appear in the past and that recognized them as historical records in the
present. That is to say, on the one hand, medieval religion or social
conditions can be treated as practices rather than theological doctrines or a
set of legal dispositions, defined for, or within, textual and paratextual
communities; on the other hand, the order of discourse, under the rubric of
postmodern theory and practice, can be discussed in terms of its own
historicity in the moment of its enunciation and utterance rather than in
terms of a unified system of signification. (“Medieval Representations” 12).
Kobialka argues that the work of “New Medievalists,” as he calls them, is primarily to
articulate the richly messy and complex palette of discursive and embodied practices that
informed medieval theatrical experience rather than searching for and constructing a
“unified system of signification” that would largely eliminate such textured historical
messiness. By describing the grounds for representability articulated in the sacramental,
consubstantial, and transubstantial chronotopes of medieval performance, I hope to
contribute to this New Medievalist effort to restore the gloriously muddled and often
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contradictory embodied practices of medieval religious and social experience to our
understanding of medieval theatrical practice.
Rather than assuming that all orders of medieval theatrical experience can be
subsumed into one of the three chronotopes articulated here, my research has articulated
diverse and often paradoxical embodied practices that might have informed the
experience of participating in a theatrical performance in medieval England—and my
research has articulated, as well, the ways in which these chronotopes may well have
competed with, cooperated with, and otherwise interacted with each other in the
experience of those watching and performing such plays. As such, my study represents
the first sustained effort to develop and describe chronotopes beyond those already
developed by Bakhtin. In the process, I hope I have demonstrated the utility of the
chronotope as an investigative tool for scholars in performance studies.
Future performance studies research can productively build upon these findings
by addressing with greater richness and depth what Bakhtin called the “complex problem
of the listener-reader” (Dialogic 257) in specific situated performances. In Bakhtin’s
original formulation, chronotopes were employed to explore various relations of space
and time within the context of a given novel. As such, chronotopic analysis has often
been used to describe the “second world” of a given literary, film, or theatrical text—that
is, the imaginative metaworld conjured into being through performance. Bakhtin sought,
however, to articulate not only chronotopic relations in this second world but also—and
more importantly—to articulate how those chronotopes “within” the text related to the
chronotopes of the “first world” of the “listener-reader,” in large part because it is these
first and second world interactions which contain (or fail to contain) the various
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sociopolitical tensions and forms of ideological mystification at work in the event of
performance. The field of performance studies would benefit greatly from more
extended discussions of how the chronotopes of the first and second worlds of
performance interact with one another in the context of specific performances, both in the
past and in contemporary performance practice.
Perhaps the most valuable aspect of medieval theatre that we may appreciate
through the lens of the sacramental, consubstantial, and transubstantial chronotopes,
however, is that those of us in the West have a tradition of sacred and spiritual
performance which in several ways mirrors non-Western traditions of performance such
as Japanese Noh and Kabuki theatre, Indian kathakali, and the shadow-play of Javanese
wayang kulit puppetry. These non-Western performance traditions construct a metaworld
which, through its spiritual underpinnings, possesses for its audience an ontological
substance traditionally denied to most Western forms of performance. Samuel Taylor
Coleridge’s famous declaration that theatre involves a “willing suspension of disbelief”
reflects the Western notion that the world created through performance lacks ontological
validity in and of itself and has authority and presence only to the degree that the
audience grants it authority and presence. In such a view, all “stage presentations […]
are to produce a sort of temporary half-faith, which the spectator encourages in himself
and supports by a voluntary contribution on his own part, because he knows that it is at
all times in his power to see the thing as it really is” (Coleridge 587).
This interpretation of the ontological substance of the metaworld created through
performance is not a recent phenomenon in the West. At least since Plato’s attacks on
mimesis, performance has been viewed with suspicion in the Western tradition, regarded

271

as a creator of mere “shadows on the cave wall” which lack ontological substance—
shadows which are deceitful, even if only in self-deceit. Analysis of the transubstantial
chronotope in comparison with the sacramental and consubstantial chronotopes may help
us to reconsider the pageant cycles as performances which resisted these attacks upon
mimesis. Despite many official church pronouncements against mimesis during the
middle ages, a performance tradition arose in England and Europe which found unique
ways of equating spirit and matter, faith and performance, soul and body in a
transubstantial act of theatrical transformation. In this sense, medieval pageant cycles
constitute a potentially unique interface of spirituality and performance in the history of
Western theatre.
If we are to avoid evolutionary thinking with regard to these three chronotopes,
we must resist the temptation to view them as a linear, chronological progression. The
sacramental chronotope did not “grow into” the transubstantial chronotope, and the
transubstantial chronotope most certainly did not “grow into” the consubstantial
chronotope. Instead, all three chronotopes of performance co-existed in the middle
ages—as indeed, they co-exist today. For instance, one may work from within the
sacramental chronotope while watching children sing in a church choir—children whose
performance does not create a second theatrical world but which rather expresses
something of the divine in their material existence within their role in the religious ritual.
In a related vein, television shows like such as Highway to Heaven and Touched by an
Angel which presume to offer religious content often render themselves as mere
entertainment and thus consubstantially drain themselves of spiritual authority.
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Finally, and in a very different light, we may consider the “Theater of the
Oppressed” of Augusto Boal, a theatre which aims to reach the intangible world of ideas,
hopes, and dreams through images in the physical body. The ontological status of the
second world in a Boalian performance where peasants discuss how to solve landownership disputes is no “mere game,” and yet it is a game. In Boal’s theatre games,
however, we can confront ourselves, challenge ourselves, in a way that is evocative of the
transubstantial chronotope.
Similarly, the “Holy Theatre” of Jerzy Grotowski aims to attain the spiritual
through disciplined training and use of the body, which (depending upon the relative
importance of the audience’s role in the performance process) may be seen as exemplary
of either the sacramental or transubstantial chronotopes. As his notion of “Holy Theatre”
developed over the years, Grotowski began to place progressively less emphasis on the
role of the audience and began to view the action of the performers as central, with or
without the presence of an audience. Thus one might argue that for the late Grotowski,
“Holy Theatre” functioned sacramentally, as an instantiation of spirit-in-flesh. The early
Grotowski, however, might have regarded “Holy Theatre” as essentially transubstantial,
as an effort to integrate the spiritual act of the performers with the spiritual involvement
of the audience. We may, in short, still be in the presence of the “divine”—even though
it is hard for us to see it.
A thorough understanding of the historical nature of the interpretive frames
informing these three chronotopes of performance requires us to come to terms with
minds very different from our own—minds rooted in an unrealistic “Realism” which sees
everyday events in the light of God, minds accustomed to contemplating day-long
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scholarly sermons in churches where demons and saints take on flesh. Yet in the final
analysis, such an awareness of the distance between the middle ages and our own time
may help us to see valuable aspects of contemporary performance practices, inviting us to
reconsider the spiritual grounds which inform our performances today.
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ENDNOTES
CHAPTER ONE
1

Some may object to my inclusion of Tudor-era interludes in the historical

period of the Middle Ages, arguing that fourteenth and fifteenth century dramas should
rightly be called works of the Renaissance or works of “early modern” or “early English”
theatre. Yet the issue of what name to ascribe to the fourteenth, fifteenth, and even
sixteenth centuries in England is far from a settled matter. Of the three major contenders
(Renaissance, medieval, and early modern/early English), the two that are most
frequently used to describe fourteenth and fifteenth century English theatre in
contemporary scholarship are medieval and early English, as a quick check of recent
titles that address such drama reveals: A New History of Early English Drama (1997);
The Theatre of Medieval Europe: New Research in Early Drama (1991); Contexts for
Early English Drama (1989); Death by Drama and Other Medieval Urban Legends
(2002); The Cambridge History of Medieval English Literature (1999); The Cambridge
Companion to Medieval English Theatre (1994).
The impulse driving scholars toward “medieval” even when describing works
from the fourteenth, fifteenth, and in many cases sixteenth centuries stems primarily from
a sense that perhaps these centuries do not represent a complete break from medieval
thought and that perhaps there was as much continuity between the Middle Ages and the
Renaissance as there was change. The impulse driving scholars toward “early English”
even when describing works from the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries stems
from a sense that perhaps these centuries more closely resemble our own “modern” era in
temperament and reasonability (or a lack thereof) than we would like to believe. Of these
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two impulses, my study is more closely tied to the former impulse—that is, I am
attempting to articulate points of connection between historical traditions of performance
that began in the tenth century but which continued, in some cases unabated, up through
to the fifteenth and even sixteenth centuries.
The unbroken line of these performance traditions can be most strikingly seen in
the Biblical cycles of pageant plays staged to celebrate Corpus Christi day throughout
northern England. We have documentary evidence for the staging of these processional
plays from at least the early 1300’s up through to 1656, when Sir William Dugdale
described the Coventry pageants in his Antiquities of Warwickshire (Harris 125).
Regardless of whether the socio-political milieu surrounding these seventeenth centuries
performances was “Renaissance” or “medieval,” the performance traditions themselves
were still clearly rooted in medieval thought and representational practices, anchored by
centuries of more-or-less continuous theatrical practice. For this reason, I choose the
term medieval to describe both the mindset which dominated the theatrical practices
described in this dissertation and the actual practices themselves. We might say that the
chronotopes which informed these performances were medieval regardless of what we
might call the historical periods in question.
2

The most popular English translations of Bakhtin’s works consistently use the

pronoun “he” as if it were generic. Additionally, many scholarly analyses of Bakhtin’s
thought, as well as many studies of medieval theatre, use “he” as if it were generic. To
insert editorial comments or corrections to address this gender-inaccurate phrasing in
every applicable quote throughout my dissertation would, therefore, become cumbersome
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in the extreme for the reader. I encourage readers to insert their own editorial comments
in response to these uses of the “generic he” as they see fit.
CHAPTER THREE
3

In this quote, the material in brackets was added by the original translator, Dom

Thomas Symons, and represents two distinct efforts on his part—first, to complete
thoughts that were grammatically incomplete in the original (as in adding “replies” to
“To which he”), and second, to offer what religious participants would have known to be
the completion of the antiphonal chants mentioned. As will be discussed in more detail
shortly, a noteworthy practice in the recording of almost all Latin liturgical dramas was
the shorthand use of the first line of an antiphonal piece to stand in for the musical work
as a whole. Among other things, this reminds us that the “dialogue” that the “characters”
spoke in these performances came, in the majority of cases, from pre-existing songs or
recitations from the monastic repertoire which were used verbatim in many of the “new”
liturgical tropes.
4

Much depends here, obviously, on one’s definition of “theatre” and what kinds

of performances fit into that category. Do modern dance performances require a
metaworld to be efficacious? Does performance art require a metaworld to be
efficacious? Does Brecht’s “smoker’s theatre” require a metaworld to be efficacious?
Yet these three examples, and many other performance movements that resist, contest, or
complicate metaworld creation, all developed in part as a response to the assumption that
theatre must “take you somewhere else.” In a sense, then, the presence of these
contradictions in the category of “theatre” confirms the normative nature of metaworld
creation in theatrical experience.
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